Defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because of two alleged scoring errors that occurred in determining the guidelines' range for his armed robbery conviction. In light of our Supreme Court's recent opinion in People v Cervantes, 448 Mich. 620; 532 N.W.2d 831 (1995), we must first determine whether the sentencing guidelines are still pertinent in determining an habitual offender's sentence. Six of the justices in Cervantes stated, in conformity with past precedent, that the sentencing guidelines do not strictly apply to habitual offenders.

The prosecutor then applied for leave to appeal in this Court. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of People v Cervantes, 448 Mich. 620; 532 N.W.2d 831 (1995). The Court of Appeals issued an order finding that the sentence constituted an abuse of discretion and remanded for resentencing. The prosecutor sought leave to appeal from the order, which this Court has now granted.

People v Hansford, 454 Mich. 320, 323; 562 N.W.2d 460 (1997). As such, "the Milbourn proportionality standard need not be reached," People v Cervantes, 448 Mich. 620, 629 n 17; 532 N.W.2d 831 (1995), and our review is simply "whether there has been an abuse of discretion." Hansford, 454 Mich. at 323.

However, "[t]here is no requirement that information to which challenges were sustained be made completely illegible at the time of sentencing, as long as it is 'stricken' and the court does not consider it." People v Martinez, 210 Mich App 199, 202; 532 NW2d 863 (1995), overruled on other grounds by People v Cervantes, 448 Mich 620; 532 NW2d 831 (1995). Our Supreme Court agreed that remand was not required because the trial court did not err by "refusing to order that a totally new presentence information report be prepared" for resentencing or by "leaving legible materials that it had agreed to strike," but remand was required so that information that the trial court deemed irrelevant but refused to strike could be stricken.

Finally, we agree that defendant's sentence as an habitual third offender, which was five times the guidelines and was the maximum sentence permitted, was an abuse of discretion because it violates the principle of proportionality. People v Cervantes, 448 Mich. 620; 532 N.W.2d 831 (1995); People v Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630; 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990). Without minimizing the seriousness of the offense or the effect on the victim, factors relied on by the trial court in sentencing defendant, we are not persuaded that defendant is the worst possible offender, especially in light of the age of his prior offenses and his age at the time of their commission.

In 1994, when defendant committed the offenses for which he was resentenced, the sentencing guidelines were mandatory except for defendants sentenced as habitual offenders. See People v Cervantes, 448 Mich. 620, 625; 532 N.W.2d 831 (1995). At the time defendant was originally sentenced, the sentencing guidelines for habitual offenders were considered advisory and habitual offenders were to be given an enhanced sentence that comported with the principles of proportionality under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630; 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990). People v Williams, 191 Mich.App. 685, 686; 479 N.W.2d 36 (1991).

Additionally, the judicial guidelines did not apply to habitual offenders. People vCervantes, 448 Mich 620, 625; 532 NW2d 831 (1995); People v Strickland, 181 Mich App 344, 346; 448 NW2d 848 (1989).

A court need not sentence a defendant with a "completely new" PSIR. People v Martinez, 210 Mich App 199, 202; 532 NW2d 863 (1995), overruled on other grounds by People v Cervantes, 448 Mich 620, 625-626; 532 NW2d 831 (1995). At the time of defendant's probation violation sentencing hearing in November 2017, the PSIR was approximately a year old.

The judicial sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the offense here do not apply to defendants sentenced as habitual offenders. People v. Cervantes, 448 Mich. 620, 630; 532 N.W.2d 831 (1995). However, the legislative guidelines that apply to offenses committed on or after January 1, 1999, include a set of prior record variables.

This Court properly reviews a defendant's sentence for an abuse of discretion. People v. Cervantes, 448 Mich. 620, 626; 532 N.W.2d 831 (1995) (Riley, J.). A sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion if it violates the principle of proportionality.