We may consider evidence adduced at trial to affirm the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress. People v. Centeno, 333 Ill. App. 3d 604, 620 (2002). ¶ 16 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures.

While we review determinations of probable cause de novo, we will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698-99, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 919-20, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662-63 (1996); People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001); People v. Centeno, 333 Ill. App. 3d 604, 615-16 (2002). We will also give due weight to the inferences the trial court has drawn from those facts.

, on the inferences drawn from common sense. During the last month two different panels of the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District have rejected as a "proposed fiction" the same kind of "free to leave" arguments by Chicago police and by the Cook County State's Attorney's Office that the same defendants advance in this case: People v. Centeno, No. 1-99-1378, 2002 Ill. App. LEXIS 705, at *30 (Aug. 14, 2002) and People v. Davis, No. 1-00-0373, unpublished order (Aug. 12, 2002). 27. Both the evidence at the Hearing and cases such as those referred to in Finding 26 (and other cases cited there) call for one or both of the following inferences: (a) that the police are not credible when they claim that all witnesses are told they are free to leave and (b) that, even if some witnesses are so informed at times, as the police claim, the witnesses do not in fact perceive themselves to be voluntarily at the police station and do not actually believe that they are at liberty to leave the station at any time.

We find that, after defendant had been returned to the interview room following the polygraph test, a reasonable innocent person, having been advised of his Miranda rights, having denied any wrongdoing, and having been returned to the interview room rather than released, would not have believed that he was free to leave. People v. Ollie, 333 Ill. App. 3d 971, 984 (2002) (citing People v. Centeno, 333 Ill. App. 3d 604, 617-618 (2002) and Young, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 800-01). Accordingly, we conclude that defendant was under arrest no later than the time at which he was placed back into the interview room following the polygraph examination.

¶ 17 Custodial interrogation absent probable cause violates the fourth amendment. People v. Centeno, 333 Ill. App. 3d 604, 616-17 (2002). The execution of a lawful search warrant "implicitly carries with it the authority to detain occupants of the premises while the search is being conducted."

See Gomez, 2011 IL App (1st) 09185, ¶ 58. ¶ 49 In doing so, we have considered the decisions in People v. Ollie, 333 Ill. App. 3d 971 (2002) and People v. Centeno, 333 Ill. App. 3d 604 (2002) cited to by the petitioner, and find them inapposite. Neither of those cases involved a defendant arranging with the police to be interviewed.

¶ 84 When a defendant seeks relief in the appellate court to overturn the trial court's refusal to suppress his statement and the request is based on later-adduced trial evidence, the defendant can rely on trial evidence only if he renewed his suppression motion at trial and asked the court to reconsider its earlier ruling. People v. Causey, 341 Ill. App. 3d 759, 766 (2003) (citing People v. Centeno, 333 Ill. App. 3d 604, 620 (2002)). To successfully assert that counsel was ineffective for failing to file such a motion, the defendant must demonstrate that the motion would have been successful, thus affecting the outcome of the trial.

However, when a defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling is of constitutional dimension, we generally disregard forfeiture. See People v. Centeno, 333 Ill. App. 3d 604, 615 (2002). To be admissible, a witness's prior inconsistent statement must not only satisfy the requirements under section 115-10.1 but must also satisfy the confrontation clause.

Where, as here, the evidence is not in dispute, we review the propriety of a trial court's order of suppression de novo. People v. Centeno, 333 Ill. App. 3d 604, 776 N.E.2d 629 (2002). 1. Standing

Where the evidence is undisputed and the only matter challengeable is the trial court's legal conclusion, our review is de novo. People v. Centeno, 333 Ill. App. 3d 604, 616 (2002). A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and is therefore subject to the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness as developed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).