Opinion
E062467
04-02-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE CEJA, Defendant and Appellant.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Melissa Mandel, Meredith White, and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. FSB1404077) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Smith, Judge. Affirmed. John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Melissa Mandel, Meredith White, and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Jose Ceja pleaded guilty to one count of unlawfully taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). Subsequently, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which among other things established a procedure for specified classes of offenders to have their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors and be resentenced accordingly. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.)
In a previous nonpublished opinion, we affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47. (People v. Ceja (Dec. 14, 2015, E062467 [nonpub. opn.].) In this opinion, at the direction of the California Supreme Court, we reconsider the matter in light of People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's petition without prejudice to consideration of a subsequent petition providing evidence of his eligibility.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 8, 2014, defendant pleaded guilty to a felony violation of unlawfully taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). The vehicle in question was a 1996 Honda Accord, which had been stolen and which defendant was observed to have been driving shortly before being detained by police.
Defendant also admitted that he had violated the terms of his probation in a prior felony case. --------
On November 10, 2014, defendant filed in propria persona a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18. The petition was unsupported by any evidence, including any information regarding the value of the stolen vehicle, or the circumstances of the offense. On November 21, 2014, the trial court denied the petition, finding that defendant "does not satisfy the criteria in Penal Code [section] 1170.18 and is not eligible for resentencing."
In our previous opinion in this matter, we affirmed the trial court's ruling, finding that the trial court correctly determined defendant to be ineligible for recall of sentence and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18. (People v. Ceja, supra, E062467.) Defendant sought review in the California Supreme Court. In an order filed February 21, 2018, the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this court for reconsideration in light of Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1175. On February 23, 2018, we issued an order vacating our previous opinion and inviting the parties to submit supplemental briefing. Both the People and defendant did so.
III. DISCUSSION
In Page, the Supreme Court held that Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions "are not categorically ineligible for resentencing" under Proposition 47. (Page, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1189.) The defendant seeking resentencing bears the burden of establishing his or her eligibility by showing that the vehicle was worth $950 or less and the conviction "was based on theft of the vehicle rather than on posttheft driving [citation] or on a taking without the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession [citation]." (Id. at p. 1188, fn. omitted.) The petition at issue in Page "included no allegations, testimony, or record references to show either that his Vehicle Code section 10851 conviction rested on theft of the vehicle or that the vehicle's value was $950 or less." (Id. at p. 1189.) On that basis, the Supreme Court found the defendant's petition was properly denied, but that he was "entitled to an opportunity to file a new petition meeting the statutory requirements." (Ibid.)
In the present case, defendant's petition was not supported by any evidence of the vehicle's value. Furthermore, the defendant's plea form indicates that he pleaded guilty to "unlawful taking of a vehicle," but nothing in the record of conviction establishes whether that taking was with or without the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. Therefore, like the defendant in Page, defendant's petition was properly denied, but he is entitled to an opportunity to file a new petition meeting the statutory requirements.
In his supplemental briefing, defendant suggests that instead of affirming the trial court's denial of his petition without prejudice to consideration of a subsequent petition, we should remand the matter with directions to allow defendant to make an evidentiary showing. That is not, however, the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Page, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1190. Therefore, we decline to do so.
IV. DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying defendant's petition is affirmed without prejudice to consideration of a petition providing evidence of his eligibility.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: MCKINSTER
Acting P .J. FIELDS
J.