Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 203164
Sepulveda, J.
Defendant Levarn Cavers entered a plea bargain with the prosecution in which defendant pleaded guilty to second degree automobile burglary in exchange for a proposed disposition of a suspended sentence and probation. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b).) After pleading guilty, defendant moved to withdraw his plea and claimed his plea was made under duress because he was suffering from depression and stressful personal and financial situations at the time of his plea. (Pen. Code, § 1018.) The court denied the motion. Defendant appeals, and contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment.
The facts are drawn from the probation officer’s report and defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea.
Defendant broke into a car on the afternoon of August 21, 2007. The car owner, Jay Miller, reported that he was standing inside his residence when he looked outside and saw a man (later identified as defendant) looking through the passenger window of Miller’s car. Miller had a laptop computer on the front passenger seat. Miller went outside and approached his car. Miller saw defendant break the window with his elbow, and put his body through the broken window. Miller pulled defendant out of the car and tried to hold him for the police, but defendant pulled away and ran. Miller flagged down police officers, reported the incident, and gave the officers a physical description of the perpetrator. The police apprehended defendant nearby. Defendant had small scrapes on his hands and arms, and numerous fragments of broken tempered automobile glass in the shoulder bag he was carrying. The police showed defendant to Miller, and Miller identified him as the man who broke the car window. Defendant was arrested and a booking search uncovered a wrench inside his shoulder bag. Defendant provided a written statement to the police in which he admitted that he had “attempted a car burglary.”
II. procedural history
A complaint was filed on August 23, 2007, charging defendant with second degree automobile burglary and misdemeanor possession of burglar tools. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b), 466.) An attorney was appointed to represent defendant. Defendant initially pleaded not guilty and a preliminary hearing was set for September 6, 2007.
When the matter was called for preliminary hearing, defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and agreed to plead guilty to felony automobile burglary in exchange for a negotiated disposition in which the remaining misdemeanor count would be dismissed. The terms of the agreement provided for suspension of imposition of sentence and three years probation. The prosecution also agreed not to oppose a motion to reduce the automobile burglary conviction to a misdemeanor if defendant complied with probation conditions and other requirements. When entering his plea, defendant was fully advised of his constitutional rights by the court and he stated that he understood them. The court questioned defendant to be sure that defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary: “THE COURT: Has anyone threatened or put pressure on you to plead guilty? [¶] THE DEFENDANT: No. [¶] THE COURT: Do you freely and voluntarily enter your plea? [¶] THE DEFENDANT: Yes.” The court accepted defendant’s plea, and continued the matter to October 29, 2007 for sentencing.
Sentencing was continued to November 27, 2007, and continued again to December 21, 2007. When the matter was continued from November to December, the court noted that the case was continued for sentencing and a possible motion to withdraw the plea. A motion to withdraw the plea was filed on December 10, 2007, and heard in advance of sentencing on December 21, 2007. The court denied the motion and sentenced defendant pursuant to the plea bargain. Judgment was entered that day. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, and obtained a certificate of probable cause to challenge the validity of his plea. Appellate briefing by appointed counsel for defendant was completed in January 2009.
III. discussion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A trial court may permit a defendant to withdraw his plea “for a good cause shown.” (Pen. Code, § 1018.) “It is the defendant’s burden to produce evidence of good cause by clear and convincing evidence.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 585.) “Mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea.” (People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566.) “Other factors overcoming defendant’s free judgment include inadvertence, fraud or duress.” (People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208.) “However, ‘[a] plea may not be withdrawn simply because the defendant has changed his mind.’ ” (Ibid.) Nor may a defendant withdraw his plea on grounds that he felt pressured by family members to settle the criminal case (ibid.), or was “worried and harassed on financial matters and the pending charges.” (People v. Mills (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 725, 726-727.) Every “defendant faced with serious felony charges and the offer of a plea bargain” feels pressure. (Huricks, supra, at p. 1208.)
The requirement that a defendant make a convincing showing of good cause “codif[ies] the rule that leave to withdraw a guilty plea with its resulting inconvenience and expense should not be lightly granted.” (People v. Waters (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 323, 331.) Nor may we, as an appellate court, lightly overturn a trial court’s denial of leave to withdraw a plea. “A decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea ‘ “rests in the sound discretion of the trial court” ’ and is final unless the defendant can show a clear abuse of that discretion.” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.) Defendant has not shown an abuse of discretion.
In moving to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant maintained that his plea “was made under duress and without adequate time for reflection and contemplation.” Defendant claimed he was under duress because he (1) suffered from depression “brought on by a number of stresses in his life” (including his children’s military service in Iraq, “job stress, and financial burdens”) and had not received his antidepressant medication while in custody; (2) had received an eviction notice and was “deeply concerned” that if he did not get out of jail immediately (which he did by pleading guilty) “he would [lose] both his apartment and his possessions”; and (3) heard “the Court repeatedly ask whether or not [defendant’s] case was going to settle” while seated in the courtroom for his scheduled preliminary hearing as other cases were being heard.
Defendant did not present clear and convincing evidence that his untreated depression impaired the exercise of his free judgment when entering his guilty plea. Defendant’s treating psychiatrist offered no opinion on defendant’s mental state at the time of entry of the plea, saying only that “patients who suffer from major depression do have difficulties with concentration, focusing and memory.” The trial judge was in a good position to evaluate whether defendant’s mental facilities were impaired when the plea was entered, and she rejected defendant’s claim. The transcript from the plea proceeding offers no suggestion that defendant had impaired judgment. Defendant appeared alert and engaged. When the court asked defendant if his name was Lavern Cavers, defendant corrected the court by saying his name was Lavern Cavers, Jr. When the court asked defendant if he agreed with the terms of the plea bargain set out by defense counsel, defendant asked to speak to his attorney, did so, and then indicated his acceptance of the terms. Defendant acknowledged that he understood and waived his constitutional rights, and said he was not threatened or pressured to plead guilty. When asked: “Do you freely and voluntarily enter your plea?” defendant said “Yes.” The court asked defendant if he had consumed any drugs or medication “that would affect [his] ability to think clearly?” and defendant answered “No.” Defendant never said, nor showed any sign, that his unmedicated depression affected his ability to think clearly and to knowingly enter a plea.
Nor did the prospect of eviction show that defendant was under such a high level of stress that he did not knowingly enter his plea. Financial concerns confront most defendants charged with a felony and facing possible long-term incarceration. We recognize that defendant’s concern was particularly time sensitive, as he was under notice to vacate his apartment, but we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that defendant’s guilty plea was not the product of duress, despite pressing financial concerns.
Finally, there is no basis for finding duress just because defendant heard the trial judge ask if the case was going to settle. A simple inquiry is not coercive. The situation here stands in sharp contrast to those in which a judge’s conduct has been held coercive. Coercion has been found, for example, where a judge told defendant he should accept the offer, said there was “ ‘more than sufficient evidence . . . to convict’ ” defendant, asked defendant’s attorney if there was anything she could do to be of assistance in persuading defendant to accept the offer, and asked if the prosecutor would be willing to grant immunity to witnesses if they testified against defendant at trial. (People v. Sandoval (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 111, 127.) In contrast, the court here asked only if the case was going to settle. The question, even if repeated several times as alleged, did not pressure defendant to plead guilty.
Entering a guilty plea is not a “ ‘ “trifle, but a ‘grave and solemn act.’ ” ’ ” (United States v. Hyde (1997) 520 U.S. 670, 677.) A guilty plea may not be withdrawn at will, but only upon a showing of good cause. (Pen. Code, § 1018.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that good cause was not shown here.
IV. disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J., Reardon, J.