People v. Carney , 317 Ill. App. 3d 806, 814, 251 Ill.Dec. 354, 740 N.E.2d 435, 441 (2000) (while Carney cites no authority for this holding, we note it is merely a matter of common sense), rev'd on other grounds , 196 Ill. 2d 518, 256 Ill.Dec. 895, 752 N.E.2d 1137 (2001). Defendant cites People v. Cathey , 2012 IL 111746, 358 Ill.Dec. 630, 965 N.E.2d 1109, in his reply brief in response to Carney for the proposition defense counsel could be objectively unreasonable where he failed to raise an issue that had been addressed during the time of defendant's appeal. However, Cathey is inapposite.

We review the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition de novo. People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 17, 358 Ill.Dec. 630, 965 N.E.2d 1109. ¶ 49 We first address the State's argument that defendant waived his ineffectiveness claim by failing to plead it in his petition.

“At the first stage of proceedings under the Act, a petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel may not be summarily dismissed if (i) it is arguable that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) it is arguable that the defendant was prejudiced.” People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 23, 358 Ill.Dec. 630, 965 N.E.2d 1109 (citing Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 17, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204 ). I believe it is more than arguable that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and it is clearly arguable that the defendant was prejudiced by this ineffective representation.

The court remanded the petition in its entirety because it held that partial summary dismissals were not permitted under the Act. Id. ¶ 68 (citing People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 34).

(Emphasis in original.) People v. Cathy, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 148 (2004), quoting People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 388 (1988)).

Id. at 17 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). More specifically, a defendant must show that it is arguable "counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that there is a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 23 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). ¶ 28 "Trial counsel has a duty to conduct both factual and legal investigations on behalf of [their client]." People v. Montgomery, 327 Ill App. 3d 180, 185 (2001).

¶ 16 In an appeal from the first stage dismissal of a postconviction petition, a petitioner and his or her postconviction appellate counsel may not raise an issue for the first time that was not included in the postconviction petition and never considered by the circuit court. People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 21, 965 N.E.2d 1109; People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 470, 861 N.E.2d 999, 1006 (2006); see also 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2016) ("Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or [in] an amended petition is [forfeited]"). As our supreme court has explained, this is more than a routine matter of forfeiture; rather, it is a procedural bar that safeguards the integrity of the appellate process and as such it is a matter we cannot overlook.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must establish that (1) "counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms," and (2) "there is a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 23 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). As to the first prong, a defendant must show counsel's assistance was deficient in that " 'counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.' "

To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must establish that (1) "counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms," and (2) "there is a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 23 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). As to the first prong, a defendant must show counsel's assistance was deficient in that " 'counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.' "

¶ 18 By supervisory order, the Illinois Supreme Court vacated our initial decision. The court directed us to reconsider the result in light of its decision in People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, 965 N.E.2d 1109.¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS