Opinion
5-22-0597
12-05-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID I. CATES, Defendant-Appellee.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 20th Judicial Circuit, St. Clair County, Illinois, Appeal No. 5-22-0597 Circuit No. 22-DT-1801 Honorable Tameeka L. Purchase, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hettel and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
ALBRECHT JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court erred in dismissing the charge against defendant because of its finding that there was no probable cause to continue prosecution.
¶ 2 The State appeals the St. Clair circuit court's dismissal of charges against defendant, David I. Cates, arguing that it erred in finding that there was no probable cause to prosecute the matter and that the citation was improperly amended. We reverse and remand.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On January 6, 2022, defendant was charged by citation with driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(5) (West 2020)). Defendant filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension, arguing that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him and that the police improperly amended his citation.
¶ 5 At the hearing on defendant's petition, Officer Julian Feix testified that on the night of defendant's arrest, he responded to a call regarding a male "passed out" behind the wheel of a white Ford pickup truck in the middle of a traffic lane. When he arrived on the scene, Feix observed that the truck had been moved to a nearby parking lot. Two officers were in the parking lot speaking with defendant. Feix met with a female witness who indicated to him that defendant was the person she saw unconscious behind the wheel.
¶ 6 Feix approached defendant and asked him what happened; defendant responded that he did not know. Defendant admitted to drinking alcohol but could not quantify how much he drank. Feix testified that he observed defendant had glassy eyes and told defendant as much. He also told defendant that his glassy eyes, as well as the fact that he was reportedly found unconscious behind the wheel and did not know what happened indicated to Feix that defendant was impaired. Feix also testified that he smelled the odor of alcoholic beverage emitting from defendant and that he was swaying while standing in place but admitted he did not inform defendant about these observations.
¶ 7 Feix chose to arrest defendant for DUI based on his own observations and the 911 call from the person who allegedly observed defendant passed out behind the wheel at a stoplight. He did not perform any field sobriety tests or a breath test due to the extreme cold that day and because he believed he had probable cause without performing those tests.
¶ 8 The citation Feix issued to defendant listed the charge as driving under the influence of a "combination" of drugs and/or alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(5) (West 2020)). After following procedure to deliver the citation to the appropriate person, Feix's supervisor, Patrol Sergeant James Mason, became aware of the arrest. Mason reviewed Feix's report and citation. In an email sent on January 7, 2022, he requested Feix amend the statutory subsection from 501(a)(5) to 501(a)(2), which was the designation for an alcohol related DUI. Mason told Feix that based on the report he did not see any indication that drugs were involved, and it seemed to him that Feix meant to issue a citation for an alcohol-related DUI. He asked Feix to inform him if this was incorrect. Feix chose to amend the citation to charge defendant under subsection 501(a)(2). 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2020).
¶ 9 A DVD from Feix's patrol car recording was entered into evidence and observed by the court. The video established that while Feix drove to the location, dispatch informed him that the suspect was out of the car blocking traffic and appeared intoxicated. At the scene, a witness pointed defendant out to Feix. Most of the interaction between Feix and defendant took place off camera, with only Feix's microphone on his body recording the incident. In the video, Feix can be overheard telling another officer on the scene that he did not feel the need to perform any tests on defendant because he had enough probable cause to arrest him for DUI. Approximately three and a half minutes after Feix arrived on the scene, he arrested defendant.
¶ 10 After arguments, the circuit court took the matter under advisement. It later issued a written order granting defendant's motion to rescind. The order found that there was no probable cause to arrest defendant under either the original or amended citation. The court further indicated that it found Feix's testimony unpersuasive, inconsistent, and not corroborated by the video evidence. It also took note that Feix did not conduct any standard field sobriety or breath tests and that he spent less than four minutes evaluating defendant at the scene before arresting him.
¶ 11 The court also found that the police did not have the authority to amend the citation from a section 501(a)(5) violation to a section 501(a)(2) violation. The State appealed the court's ruling on the petition to rescind.
¶ 12 With this first appeal pending, defendant argued a motion to dismiss, again alleging that Feix did not have probable cause and therefore no authority to arrest him. The motion also included allegations that his due process rights were violated through Feix's impermissible amendment to his citation and that there were additional discovery items that the State had not provided to him, thereby prejudicing him in the proceeding. The discovery allegedly not tendered consisted of the original citation and report and emails between officers regarding the incident.
¶ 13 At the hearing on defendant's motion, the State said that while it disagreed with the court's ruling, "in a procedural sense I think that *** the ruling on the motion to dismiss the underlying DUI necessarily follows from the Court's ruling on the petition to rescind. So [I] will not belabor the point other than simply to rest on the arguments previously made, ***, as well as the authorities that I previously cited."
¶ 14 The court issued a written order granting defendant's motion to dismiss. In its order, the court relied on the reasons set forth in its order rescinding defendant's statutory summary suspension and further explained that Feix's amendment of the traffic citation was contrary to state law and that he did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence.
¶ 15 The State now appeals.
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 A. Probable Cause
¶ 18 The State first argues that the circuit court improperly dismissed the charges against defendant because there was sufficient probable cause to continue in its prosecution. Generally, the circuit court may not dismiss criminal charges against a defendant unless permitted by statute. People v. Guido, 11 Ill.App.3d 1067, 1069 (1973). The statutory grounds on which a court may dismiss charges are listed in section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code). 725 ILCS 5/114-1 (West 2020). Our supreme court has carved out an exception to this rule, finding that "a trial court does have an inherent authority to dismiss an indictment in a criminal case where there has been a clear denial of due process even though that is not a stated ground in section 114-1." People v. Lawson, 67 Ill.2d 449, 455 (1977). Accordingly, a court may only dismiss criminal charges prior to trial for the reasons set forth in section 114-1 of the Code or where there has been a clear denial of due process that prejudiced defendant. People v. Schroeder, 102 Ill.App.3d 133, 135 (1981). As no part of section 114-1 has been raised on appeal, we will focus on whether defendant has been prejudiced or otherwise experienced a denial of due process.
¶ 19 Defendant here argues that the circuit court's finding that Feix lacked probable cause to arrest necessarily prevents the prosecution from going forward with charges against defendant because there must be a valid arrest for defendant to stand trial. Our supreme court addressed this very issue in People v. Bliss, 44 Ill.2d 363 (1970). In Bliss, the Court held:
"The general rule is that if a defendant is physically present before the court on an accusatory pleading, either because held in custody after arrest or because he has appeared in person after giving bail, the invalidity of the original arrest is
immaterial, even though seasonably raised, as far as the jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the case is concerned." Id. at 369.As a legal arrest is not a prerequisite to prosecution, it follows that lack of probable cause to arrest does not act to bar the prosecution or as an effective dismissal of the charges. Therefore, we must reject defendant's argument that, if Feix did not have probable cause to arrest, the State must not have probable cause to prosecute.
¶ 20 As charged here, the offense of DUI is a Class A misdemeanor. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (West 2020). The State is not required to establish probable cause to proceed on a misdemeanor charge. People v. Davis, 397 Ill.App.3d 1058, 1059 (2010). Thus, the failure to do so is not grounds for dismissal. Id. We further note that even if the State must demonstrate probable cause to proceed with the case, a finding that Feix lacked probable cause to arrest is not equivalent to a finding that the State did not have probable cause to charge or further prosecute defendant. See People v. Atchison, 2019 IL App (3d) 180183, ¶ 35. As a showing of probable cause is not required in this situation, the State's alleged lack of probable cause to arrest did not constitute a prejudicial denial of defendant's due process rights. See id. Here, the outcome of the petition to rescind is a separate matter that requires a different analysis, and the State is free to continue the prosecution of defendant and to produce other evidence that may not have been known to defendant or the court at the time the motion to dismiss was filed.
¶ 21 B. Amendments to the Citation
¶ 22 The State also argues that People v. Dunskus, 282 Ill.App.3d 912, 916 (1996), supports its second argument that Feix committed no error when he amended defendant's citation. The appellate court in Dunskus found that such an amendment is not improper in the context of a traffic citation because it "does not unduly infringe upon the rights of the individual." Id. at 916. Further, section 111-5 of the Code allows for a complaint to be amended, via motion by either the State or defendant, to correct formal defects, including a "miswriting, misspelling, or grammatical error." 725 ILCS 5/111-5(a) (West 2020). The State contends that the subsection defendant was originally charged under was merely a miswriting, thus Feix's amendment to the citation was permissible.
¶ 23 As we have determined the matter must be reversed on other grounds, we will not address this issue here. We note, however, that nothing in this order prevents the State from moving to amend the original citation on remand as permitted by the Code. 725 ILCS 5/111-5(a) (West 2020).
¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 25 Accordingly, we find that the circuit court erred in dismissing the charge against defendant because the court's finding that there was no probable cause to arrest did not operate as a dismissal of the DUI charge. We must therefore reverse the circuit court's dismissal of the charge and remand for further action.
¶ 26 Reversed and remanded.