Opinion
A169696
09-30-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARIO GARCIA CASTINEDA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 18CR009627.
STREETER, J.
Petitioner Mario Garcia Castineda appeals from the superior court's summary denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now renumbered as § 1172.6). He contends the court erroneously denied relief based on an improper factual finding at the prima facie stage of this resentencing proceeding. We see no error and therefore affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. BACKGROUND
In April 2023, Castineda, representing himself, filed his petition in Alameda County Superior Court. In his check-the-boxes form seeking resentencing relief, Castineda alleged that an information filed against him in 2018 allowed the prosecution to try him under a felony-murder theory or the natural and probable consequences doctrine; that he was convicted of first degree murder under that theory or doctrine; and that he could not now be convicted of first degree murder because of the subsequent changes to sections 188 and 189. He failed to check an "if applicable" box alleging he was not the actual killer. With his petition, Castineda requested appointment of counsel.
The People contend the correct spelling of Castineda's surname is "Castaneda" based on a 2020 unpublished appellate opinion issued by a panel in this Division stating he had represented at trial that this was the correct spelling. (People v. Castaneda (Dec. 11, 2020, A156689).) We use the spelling "Castineda" because it is what is used throughout the record, including on the signature page of Castineda's petition. We mean no disrespect by doing so.
In a brief in support of his petition, Castineda recounted that the Alameda County District Attorney's Office filed an information in 2018 charging him with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and alleging he had personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). He contended that at a subsequent jury trial, the prosecution relied solely upon a felony-murder theory. He was found guilty of the charges and of having suffered four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). He was serving a sentence of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole, he alleged.
Castineda described the incident leading to his convictions as follows: Someone called out to a man, John Maurice Bell, that the person who had stolen Bell's bicycle was outside Bell's tent at a homeless encampment in Oakland, California. According to Castineda, "BELL went outside to confront this person. BELL was stabbed twice in the abdomen[]. No one saw who [had] done it. BELL made a confused identification suggesting that Petitioner may have stabbed him." He further stated that Bell "was tragically stabbed twice in the abdomen on May 26, 2018. BELL was treated for these stab wounds and released from the hospital. BELL apparently had collateral complications from the previous treatment of the stab wound, but BELL refused multiple attempts to return to the hospital for further medical treatment. Sad[]ly, BELL succumbed to peritonitis several days after the initial incident-these are the known facts."
Castineda also contended he should not have been prosecuted for murder under section 187, subdivision (a) because "there were no underlying felonies in this case," and that homicide is excusable "when committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, on a sudden and sufficient provocation," and the like. He further asserted, "In arguendo, Petitioner having asserted there was an actual and reasonable belief in the need to defend oneself, out of necessity of defending against an imminent danger of death of or great bodily injury." He described the law of voluntary manslaughter, including the absence of malice, and contended his defense counsel should have argued he was provoked to engage in the conduct in which he was believed to have engaged.
The superior court appointed Castineda counsel and set a briefing schedule to consider whether he made a prima facie showing for relief. The prosecution filed a response to Castineda's petition, to which it attached the abstract of judgment and jury instructions in Castineda's case.
In its opposition, the prosecution noted Castineda's jury was instructed on felony murder with CALCRIM No. 540A, which it contended was the felony-murder instruction given "for the actual killer" because it instructed Castineda was guilty of murder if he" 'caused the death of another person' while 'committing or attempting to commit a robbery.'" Moreover, the prosecution asserted, the jury was not instructed "on the traditional, imputed malice version of felony murder." As a result, in the prosecution's view, "[t]here is no likelihood [Castineda] was convicted under a theory of vicarious liability or imputed malice" and his petition should be denied.
The version of CALCRIM No. 540A given to the jury stated in relevant part as follows: "The defendant is charged in Count One with murder, under a theory of felony murder. "To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder under this theory, the People must prove that: "1. The defendant committed or attempted to commit a robbery; "2. The defendant intended to commit a robbery; "AND "3. While committing or attempting to commit a robbery, the defendant caused the death of another person. "A person may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing was unintentional, accidental or negligent." The instruction further stated, "It is not required that the person die immediately, as long as the act causing death occurred while the defendant was committing the felony."
Castineda, through counsel, filed a reply, to which he attached the information filed in his case. He argued the information charged him with murder without specifying the theory and therefore allowed the prosecution to proceed on any theory, including the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. He argued the court considering his petition was required to take as true his allegations of fact, which he claimed met his burden of making a prima facie showing for relief. He also filed a supplemental brief addressing recent modifications to CALCRIM No. 540A and contending that "causing" the death of another was not the same as being the "actual killer."
The superior court denied Castineda's petition after hearing. It noted the record of conviction before it was sparse. Citing case law relied upon by Castineda (see People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 151 (Garcia), and People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 4 (Lopez)), the court acknowledged there was a distinction between causing someone's death and actually killing the person. Despite the distinction, the court concluded that Castineda had failed to make a showing of prima facie entitlement to relief because the record indicated he was the only person with Bell during the incident that led to his convictions.
Taking issue with this conclusion, Castineda's counsel contended the court was "getting dangerously close to fact-finding, which is probative at this stage, and I think that if the Court's basing their ruling based on a finding that there were no other actors, I think that could be problematic procedurally at this stage." The court answered, "Well, . . . [t]he information charges one person. The jury instructions refer to one person. The verdict forms refer to one person." It added, "even on this limited record of conviction, there's just nothing in here that gets any viability to the notion that somehow the jury convicted him on felony murder for causing the death in some sort of indirect way that the law now prohibits." It ruled that the record of conviction rebutted the petition.
Castineda filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Law
As we recently explained in People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227 (Beaudreaux), "Senate Bill 1437 amended 'the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.' (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).)
"Among the amendments enacted by Senate Bill 1437 was the addition of section 188, subdivision (a)(3), providing that principals must act with express or implied malice in order to be convicted of murder, with the exception of the felony-murder rule as stated in an amended section 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) In addition, section 189, subdivision (e), as amended, states that in order to be convicted of felony murder, a defendant must be the actual killer; a person who, with the intent to kill, aided or abetted the actual killer in the commission of the murder in the first degree; or a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
"Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure for defendants already convicted of murder under the former law to obtain retroactive resentencing in the trial court. That procedure permits these defendants to petition for resentencing if they could not currently be convicted under the newly amended sections 188 and 189. It calls for a series of adjudication steps, starting with a determination of prima facie sufficiency under section 1172.6, subdivision (c); followed, where necessary, by an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 subdivision (d); and finally, where the petitioner prevails at the evidentiary hearing, by redesignation of the conviction at issue under section 1172.6, subdivision (e). (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
"In People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, the panel explained the prima facie determination stage of this process as follows: '[T]he time for weighing and balancing and making findings on the ultimate issues arises at the evidentiary hearing stage rather than the prima facie stage, at least where the record is not dispositive on the factual issues. Thus, absent a record of conviction that conclusively establishes that the petitioner engaged in the requisite acts and had the requisite intent, the trial court should not question his evidence. The court may . . . consider the record of conviction at the prima facie stage, but may not evaluate the evidence, make credibility findings adverse to the petitioner, engage in factfinding or exercise discretion. [Citation.] The record should be consulted at the prima facie stage only to determine "readily ascertainable facts," such as the crime of conviction and findings on enhancements.' (Id. at p. 815.)" (Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1235-1236.)
"We independently review the denial of a resentencing petition at the prima facie stage ...." (Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1238.)
Further, "[w]e' "review the [trial court's] ruling, not the court's reasoning, and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm." '" (Id. at p. 1239.)
B. Analysis
Castineda argues, again relying on Garcia and Lopez, that the superior court prejudicially erred in denying his petition because it based its ruling on a factual finding that was inappropriate at the prima facie stage of review. That is, he contends the court inferred from a record of conviction that was silent on the subject that he was the only person involved in murdering Bell and was Bell's actual killer. He speculates that another perpetrator could have been charged in another case, not been identified, or passed away. Given that possibility, he contends, the record fails to show he necessarily was the only person involved in Bell's murder, and the superior court was wrong to make a factual finding otherwise.
The People disagree, contending the superior court appropriately determined from a conclusive record of conviction, particularly the information and the jury instructions, that Castineda was Bell's actual killer and therefore ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law.
The People have the better of the argument. While the record is sparse, it includes enough to conclusively refute the allegation in Castineda's resentencing petition that "I could not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019." Of particular note, (1) when called upon to plead the elements of a prima facie case for relief in his resentencing petition, Castineda failed to deny that he was Bell's actual killer, (2) Castineda admitted in a brief supporting his petition that there was evidence at trial of a statement by Bell identifying him as the person who committed the fatal stabbing, and (3) in that brief, Castineda raised the defenses of self-defense and provocation, impliedly incriminating himself in the stabbing while attempting to argue he had a legal excuse.
The causation language in the jury instructions is also highly relevant. Castineda's jury was instructed that "the People must prove that the defendant caused the death of another person." And there was a special instruction on causation tailored to the circumstance that Bell died several days after he was stabbed. Under this instruction, the jury was told that "[t]here may be more than one cause of death." In a multiple causation scenario, the instruction read, "[a]n act causes death only if it is a substantial factor causing death." Further elaborating on the concept of substantial causation, the special causation instruction added that, "if the injury inflicted by the defendant was a substantial factor causing the [victim's] death, then the defendant is legally responsible for the death."
At trial, these causation instructions put in issue whether Castineda personally inflicted an injury on Bell that was a substantial factor in killing him, even if Bell died after the robbery from some other contributing cause. Because they required the jury to decide whether Castineda committed what the law considers to be the fatal act (under the substantial factor test), and because Bell's identification of Castineda as the stabber gave Castineda an incentive to contest his personal involvement in the killing, we conclude that the record conclusively shows the jury must have found Castineda to be Bell's actual killer-as further confirmed by his failure to deny it in attempting to plead entitlement to resentencing relief.
Castineda points out that the felony murder instruction his jury received, CALCRIM No. 540A, which read, "while committing or attempting to commit a robbery, the defendant caused the death of another person," was modified in 2023. It now reads, "[w]hile committing or attempting to commit a robbery, the defendant personally committed an act that directly caused the death of another person." And the next paragraph of CALCRIM No. 540A reads "A person who was the actual killer may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing was unintentional, accidental, or negligent." This replaced the previous language of "caused" the death of another person with "the defendant personally committed an act that directly caused the death of another person." The Judicial Council's clarification of CALCRIM No. 540A is not material here, given the special causation instruction that was given in Castineda's case. There is no magic to the phrase "personally committed" on this record. The phrase "injury inflicted by the defendant" is equivalent.
As he did in the trial court, Castineda relies heavily on cases that draw a distinction between "causing" a person's death and "personally committing" an act that brings about a person's death. (See Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 16-19; Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 151-152.) These cases are distinguishable. In Lopez, there was no direct evidence that the defendant personally killed the victim (Lopez, at pp. 4-9), and in Garcia, the prosecutor argued in the underlying trial that, under the proximate cause instruction given there, it was not necessary to find that the defendant actually inflicted harm on the victim (Garcia, at p. 154). Thus, in both cases, there was a plausible scenario in which the defendant was found guilty of murder even though he was not the actual killer.
Not so here. The evidentiary context Castineda admits, explicitly by acknowledging Bell's identification of him as the stabber, and implicitly by suggesting he would like to pursue defenses of self-defense and provocation, refutes his claim of entitlement to relief. On this record-especially given the jury instruction on causation and Castineda's failure to allege he was not the actual killer-the trial court did not err in rejecting the possibility that the jury could have found he merely brandished a knife, with someone else committing the fatal act. (See Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1247-1248.) That speculative contention is foreclosed by the record of conviction under the doctrine of issue preclusion. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451-452 (Curiel).)
The only possible escape hatch for Castineda is the change-in-the-law exception to issue preclusion, which was recognized in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698. But for us to apply Strong would be an overreading of that case. We declined to apply Strong in Beaudreaux, another case in which a section 1172.6 resentencing petitioner failed to persuade us he should be given a pointless evidentiary hearing to explore whether some other person was the actual killer of his victim, on a record where the charges and jury instructions plainly showed a prior jury determination against him on that issue. We explained: "Curiel squarely rejects the contention that section 1172.6 petitioners may avoid prior jury findings simply by pointing to the fact that Senate Bill 1437 retroactively changed the law of murder generally. . . . If such a broad-brush approach were appropriate, the equitable exception for intervening changes in the law would swallow the doctrine of issue preclusion in section 1172.6 proceedings entirely, rendering issue preclusion wholly inoperative in that context." (Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1243.)
The relevant legal change here, to be sure, is not the whole set of reforms to the law of murder brought about by Senate Bill 1437. Rather, it is the new actual killer limitation in section 189, subdivision (e)(1). But the fact we are dealing with a more specific change in the law than was at issue in Curiel makes no difference. Under prior law, and under the law of murder as revised by Senate Bill 1437, the evidence identifying Castineda as the person who inflicted the fatal wound gave him a strong incentive to present evidence that "some other dude did it"-if such evidence was available. Having elected not to pursue this line of defense, Castineda is barred as a matter of law from relitigating the issue.
III. CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION
There is no denying either the importance of the reforms our Legislature put in place with the passage of Senate Bill 1437 or of our role in faithfully ensuring the implementation of those reforms in the resentencing process. Under the rigorous standard enunciated in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, there is also no question that allegations pleaded by resentencing petitioners must be accepted and evidentiary hearings must be held in many cases.
But where a prima facie case for resentencing relief has not been pleaded, or where the record of conviction irrefutably defeats some element or elements of a petitioner's attempt to plead a prima facie case, summary denial remains appropriate. This is such a case.
It would be wasteful and pointless for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing here, since the result is legally foreordained: Castineda-who has not denied he is Bell's actual killer, apparently because he cannot do so-is blocked as a matter of law from relitigating the issue. Whether we look at the case as one in which Castineda has simply failed to plead a requisite element of his prima facie case for relief, or through the lens of a preclusion analysis, we must affirm.
The order appealed from is affirmed.
I CONCUR: BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J., concurring.
I agree with the majority's conclusion that Castineda did not establish a prima facie case for relief. I join in the majority's analysis except for the discussion of issue preclusion. In my view, that discussion is unnecessary to the result; unlike in People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, the record here does not include trial transcripts; and the parties did not address issue preclusion in their briefs.