Opinion
July 20, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jones, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We find unpersuasive the defendant's contention that the hearing court should have suppressed his statements and certain physical evidence as the fruit of his unlawful arrest. Having observed that the defendant was operating a vehicle with a damaged windshield, the police possessed a reasonable basis upon which to follow and attempt to detain him (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 Veh. Traf. [22]; People v. Diaz, 232 A.D.2d 289; People v. McGriff, 219 A.D.2d 829; see generally, People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 420). The defendant's failure to pull over, his reckless operation of the vehicle, his commission of several additional traffic infractions, and the receipt by police of information that the vehicle had been reported stolen, provided ample probable cause for the defendant's arrest following his flight from the vehicle (see, People v. Ellis, 62 N.Y.2d 393; People v. Shepherd, 239 A.D.2d 445; People v. Ardila, 159 A.D.2d 710).
Furthermore, we perceive no error in the court's determination that the defendant's statements were voluntarily made (see, People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 38-39).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reason able doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Friedmann and McGinity, JJ., concur.