Opinion
D075123
12-13-2019
In re CASSANDRA G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CASSANDRA G., Defendant and Appellant.
Pauline E. Villanueva, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Michelle Ryle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. J241162) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Aaron H. Katz, Judge. Affirmed. Pauline E. Villanueva, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Michelle Ryle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
At the conclusion of a contested adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the People's amended petition and found true two felony counts against the minor, Cassandra G.—namely, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and battery against a school employee (Pen. Code, § 243.6). Cassandra appeals, arguing that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that she did not act in self-defense. We disagree. Cassandra did not meet her burden of establishing reversible error; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We review and recite the record in a light most favorable to the judgment, presuming all facts in support of the judgment that the juvenile court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.)
The incident at issue occurred on May 18, 2018, during the lunch period for the high school students at East County Community School (Community School) in El Cajon. Because it was a community school, all of the high school students—which numbered between 20 and 28 on that day—were kept in one large classroom. The classroom had tables and desks in the middle and offices, a kitchen, and a junior high school classroom around the perimeter with doors that opened up into the large classroom. Margaret M. (Ms. M.), who had been a teacher for 28 years, taught at Community School.
During second period, Ms. M. taught an English class to the high school students at Community School. Cassandra, then a 14-year-old Community School high school student, sat in her assigned seat in the front of the classroom. On that day, Cassandra was loud, swearing, and verbally abusive during class.
The next period was lunch, and Cassandra remained in her assigned seat, talking with a new student. Among the other high school students in the classroom were two girls, A.G. and S.T., who were sitting next to each other in the back of the room at least three rows behind where Cassandra and the new student were sitting; more specifically, Ms. M.'s office was in the back of the room, and A.G. and S.T. were seated two rows outside of Ms. M.'s office. Earlier in the day, Cassandra had asked S.T. if there was "a problem," and S.T. had replied there was not.
At some point during lunch, Cassandra got up from her seat and, outside of the arrangement of desks, walked from the front of the room to the side of the room to the back of the room behind the last row of desks and in front of Ms. M.'s office. Facing the front of the room—in particular, facing the desks where A.G. and S.T. were seated two rows in front of her—Cassandra began questioning and then screaming angrily at A.G. and S.T. multiple times: " 'You going to jump me, bitch? Bitch, you going to jump me do it now.' " All the while, Cassandra gestured wildly with her hands outstretched at shoulder level, yelling so loudly the entire room could hear.
At the adjudication hearing, counsel asked Cassandra what she understood "[g]etting jumped]" to mean. The court stated that it knew, and counsel moved on to a different topic without receiving an answer from Cassandra.
Meanwhile, Ms. M. had followed Cassandra from the front to the rear of the classroom, where Ms. M. told Cassandra to return to her assigned seat in the front of the classroom. Cassandra ignored Ms. M. Instead, Cassandra grabbed a desk from the back row and flipped it over in the direction of A.G. and S.T., where it landed in between the two, knocking over food. By this point, all three girls were standing, using loud foul language, and swinging fists and throwing items (e.g., water bottles, juice boxes, food, and pencils) at their adversary(ies).
After being hit on the front of her head with S.T.'s backpack, Ms. M. backed up a few steps into the doorway of her office to get out of the way. At this point, two other adults intervened in an effort to control the physical violence. Mr. P., a teacher, rushed from the front of the classroom (near his office) toward the flipped desk, placed himself between Cassandra and the other two girls; and, with arms and hands raised, Mr. P. pushed A.G. and S.T. away from Ms. M.'s office toward the front of the classroom and into his office. Meanwhile, Ms. L., a substitute teacher, isolated Cassandra by forcing her backward a few steps through the doorway and into Ms. M.'s open office. Although the girls were separated by the length of the classroom, Cassandra remained angry, cursing and calling A.G. and S.T. names.
Still standing in the doorway of her office facing the front of the classroom, Ms. M. took a step back into her office, intending to close the door from the inside to avoid injury from the classroom. Ms. M. was unable to close the door, however, because at that point she was hit hard in the back of the head, where the skull meets the top of the neck. The force of the impact was such that her glasses flew off, and she stumbled into the door jamb—at which time another student who was standing nearby caught her, pulled her into her office, and shut the office door. Shortly thereafter, Ms. M. called 911.
No one saw who or what struck Ms. M. in the back of the head. Nonetheless, Ms. M. testified unequivocally that Cassandra was the person who hit her, explaining that Cassandra was the only person behind her in her office at that time. Consistently, Ms. B., the attendance clerk at Community School, who was two to three feet away from Ms. M. at the moment she was hit and stumbled, testified that Cassandra was directly behind Ms. M., just inches away, and the only person "within striking distance." At the time Ms. M. was hit in the back of her head, A.G. and S.T. were with Mr. P. on the opposite side of the classroom approximately 25 feet in front of Ms. M.
The juvenile court heard testimony on this issue from: Ms. M.; Cassandra; S.T.; Ms. L., the substitute teacher who pulled Cassandra into Ms. M.'s office after Cassandra flipped the desk between A.G. and S.T.; and Ms. B., the attendance clerk at Community School.
Ms. M. immediately had a headache, and when she went to urgent care later that day, the doctor diagnosed her as having suffered a concussion and a strain of the fascia tendon at the neck. Ms. M. later suffered blurred vision, eye pain, and dizziness; and at the time of the adjudication hearing almost six months after the incident, Ms. M. had not returned to school and still experienced headaches.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2018, the People filed an amended juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602), alleging three felony counts against Cassandra based on the May 2018 events at Community School during which Ms. M. was injured. Count 1 charged Cassandra with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)); count 2 charged Cassandra with battery causing serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)); count 3 charged Cassandra with battery against a school employee (Pen. Code, § 243.6); and counts 1 and 2 further alleged Cassandra inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)).
After a contested adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found true and sustained the allegations in counts 1 and 3—expressly finding that "Cassandra lashed out in a fit of violence and struck" Ms. M. In reaching this disposition, the juvenile court expressly found that Cassandra was not credible and that Ms. M. was credible. As relevant to this appeal, the court ruled: "I just don't see [self-defense] . . . as a . . . legitimate argument based on the evidence that the Court heard. This was not a situation where the Court can find that Cassandra lashed out and hit Ms. M[.] because [Cassandra] was defending herself; so I don't find the argument of self-defense to be persuasive . . . ."
The court dismissed count 2 and the additional allegation of inflicting great bodily injury in counts 1 and 3, ruling that the People did not meet their burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Cassandra inflicted great bodily injury.
At the adjudication hearing, Cassandra's principal defense was that she did not strike Ms. M. In the alternative, Cassandra's attorney argued that, "[i]f the Court does believe that Cassandra did somehow make contact with Ms. M[.]," then Cassandra was acting in self-defense of A.G. and S.T.'s attacks. Cassandra raises no issue or argument on appeal as to the juvenile court's finding that Cassandra caused Ms. M.'s injury.
At the disposition hearing in November 2018, the juvenile court declared Cassandra to be continued as a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and committed Cassandra to the Breaking Cycles program for a period not to exceed 240 days. Cassandra timely appealed.
Cassandra "continued" as a ward of the juvenile court based on a June 2018 case in which Cassandra was adjudged a ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) following a true finding of committing a battery on school property in violation of Penal Code section 243.2, subdivision (a)(1). The incident involved Cassandra's physical altercation with another student at a time when they both attended a different school.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal Cassandra argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that she "was not acting in self-defense under the doctrine of transferred intent." (Bold capitalization omitted.) Cassandra contends that, "under the doctrine of transferred self-defense, if a defendant would have been justified in attacking an aggressor in order to protect herself, the defendant will not be criminally liable if she inadvertently attacks a bystander instead." (Citing People v. Matthews (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024.) Thus, according to Cassandra, because Ms. M. was injured during the process by which Cassandra was defending herself against the attack from A.G. and S.T., the act of striking Ms. M. was neither an assault nor a battery.
We will assume without deciding that the doctrine of transferred self-defense applies as Cassandra argues. Therefore, our analysis will focus only on the substantiality of the evidence in support of the juvenile court's finding that Cassandra was not defending herself against A.G. and S.T.—not on the actions or identity of the victim.
"Our review of [Cassandra's] substantial evidence claim is governed by the same standard applicable to adult criminal cases." (In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1026; accord, In re Gary F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1080.) As we explain, Cassandra did not meet her burden of establishing reversible error. (See In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 498-499 ["A ' " 'judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct . . . , and error must be affirmatively shown.' " ' "].) A. Law
" 'When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 990.) In doing so, we " 'presume[] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' " (Ibid.)
" 'Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.' " (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 585 (Elliott).) In fact, "the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction," unless such testimony describes facts or events that are "physically impossible or inherently improbable." (Ibid.) Where " 'the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.' " (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890; accord, People v. Ghipriel (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 828, 832 [" 'It is of no consequence that the [fact-finder] believing other evidence, or drawing different inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.' "].)
In short, we may not reverse a judgment for insufficient evidence " 'unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the juvenile court's true findings]." ' " (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
The juvenile court sustained the allegations that Cassandra committed both assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and battery against a school employee. Self-defense provides a legal justification for the commission of both assault and battery. (See People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055 (Minifie) [assault with a deadly weapon]; Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 534 [battery], superseded by statute on a different point as stated in City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81-84.)
" 'To justify an act of self-defense . . . , the defendant must have an honest and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him.' " (Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1064; accord, People v. Brady (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1014 (Brady).) In addition, even where the threat of bodily injury is imminent, " 'any right of self-defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable under the circumstances.' " (Minifie, at p. 1065, italics added.) In this context, reasonableness is an objective standard, and the reasonableness requirement "is determined from the point of view of a reasonable person in the defendant's position." (Minifie, at p. 1065.) In applying this standard, the trier of fact "must consider all the ' " 'facts and circumstances . . . in determining whether the defendant acted in a manner in which a reasonable man would act in protecting his own life or bodily safety.' " ' " (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1083.)
In considering the reasonable person, the test is not whether someone "like" the minor would reasonably believe there was danger, but "whether a 'reasonable person' in [the minor's] situation, seeing and knowing the same facts, would be justified in believing he was in imminent danger of bodily harm." (People v. Jefferson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508, 519; accord, Brady, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.) In this context, the reasonable person "is an abstract individual of ordinary mental and physical capacity who is as prudent and careful as any situation would require him to be." (Jefferson, at p. 519; accord, Brady, at p. 1015.) Such a reasonable person may not rely on "personal attributes that purportedly increased his propensity to misperceive threats of violence." (Brady, at p. 1017.)
Where, as here, the defendant charged with assault or battery contends that self-defense applies, she must present sufficient evidence which, if believed by the juvenile court, is sufficient to raise the issue of self-defense. (See In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 783 (Christian S.) [a minor's evidence of self-defense is subject to all the normal evidentiary rules; in the case of an adult, for example, " '[a] trial court need give a requested instruction concerning a defense only if there is substantial evidence to support the defense' "].) If the defendant meets this evidentiary burden, then "the prosecution has the burden to prove [she] did not act in self-defense, because self-defense negates an element of the offense." (People v. Saavedra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 571 (Saavedra) [possession of weapon while imprisoned]; accord, People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461-462 [malice for murder]; People v. Lee (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1422-1423, & fn. 2 [grossly negligent discharge of firearm]; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340-341 [unlawful use of force for assault].) In such a case, the prosecution bears the burden to show the nonexistence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963-964 [entrapment]; Saavedra, at p. 570 [self-defense].) B. Analysis
The juvenile court found that Cassandra had not acted in self-defense. On two independent bases, the record from the adjudication hearing in this case contains substantial evidence to support this finding.
First, and most persuasively, at the time Cassandra struck Ms. M., Cassandra was inside Ms. M.'s office, and A.G. and S.T. were inside Mr. P.'s office—approximately 25 feet away apart. This is substantial evidence that, at the time she struck Ms. M., Cassandra did not have " 'an honest and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted' " on her by A.G. and/or S.T. (Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1064.) This evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that Cassandra did not act in self-defense, since a reasonable person in Cassandra's position would not have believed that she was in imminent danger of bodily injury from people 25 feet away from her—physically separated by two adults and rows of desks and other students.
Second, a claim of self-defense "may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault . . .), has created circumstances under which his adversary's attack or pursuit is legally justified." (Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1, italics added.) Here, the record contains substantial evidence—in the form of testimony from Ms. M.—that "the initiation of a physical assault" occurred when Cassandra grabbed a desk from the back row and flipped it over in the direction of A.G. and S.T., where it landed in between the two, knocking over food. On this independent basis, therefore, the record contains substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that self-defense was not available to Cassandra.
We acknowledge that this evidence is not uncontradicted, since at or immediately after the time Cassandra flipped the desk, all three girls were swinging fists and throwing items. However, on substantial evidence review, we consider only the evidence in support of the finding actually made and determine whether it is substantial; we do not consider whether the record contains substantial evidence to support a different finding. (Elliott, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 585; People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052 ["Even when there is a significant amount of countervailing evidence, the testimony of a single witness that satisfies the standard is sufficient to uphold the finding."].)
Finally, in her reply brief, Cassandra quotes from the juvenile court's comments at the time it found that Cassandra had not acted in self-defense, arguing that the court applied the wrong burden of proof. Cassandra tells us that "[t]he juvenile court's comments reflect a misunderstanding of the issue of self-defense in this case," suggesting that the court "erroneous[ly]" placed the burden on Cassandra to establish self-defense rather than placing the burden on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cassandra did not act in self-defense. (See Saavedra, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 570-571.) We disagree; the juvenile court correctly applied the proper standard. The court's comments establish only that Cassandra did not present substantial credible evidence of self-defense to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not act in self-defense. (See Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 783.)
Cassandra relies on the following statement of the court (italics Cassandra's): " '[T]here's been some discussion in this trial about whether or not [Cassandra] was involved defending herself or there was—that she was—this was a situation of self-defense. As the presentation of evidence was—we heard over the last—today and on Friday, I just don't find that this is one that the People need to—would be required to address self-defense because I just don't see this—that as a legitimate basis based on the evidence—or legitimate argument based on the evidence that the Court heard . . . I don't find the argument of self-defense to be persuasive, nor do I see any basis for the burden to be—for the burden to be placed on the People to prove that there was—she was not acting in self-defense.' " --------
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. GUERRERO, J.