Opinion
F048952
12-5-2006
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VALERIE MICHELLE CASON, Defendant and Appellant.
Sarah F. Pattison, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Brian Alvarez and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After her motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) was denied, defendant Valerie Michelle Cason was convicted of transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). On appeal, defendant argues the methamphetamine found in her car should have been suppressed because the search of the car was not incident to her lawful arrest or the lawful arrest of her passenger. We hold the motion to suppress was properly denied, and affirm the judgment.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Defendant was convicted of the instant offenses in her second trial. The clerks transcript reflects the first trial, in which defendant was tried jointly with codefendant Arthur Smith, resulted in a mistrial due to the jurys inability to reach a verdict.
FACTS
The facts are gleaned from the hearing on defendants motion to suppress. On January 31, 2005, Deputy David Barker of the Kern County Sheriffs Department stopped defendants car for a cracked windshield and expired registration tags. The deputy was personally familiar with defendant and recognized her as the driver when he approached the car.
The deputy also recognized defendants passenger as "Arty Smith," an individual he had pursued during a vehicle pursuit on December 4, 2004. During the previous incident, Smith ultimately abandoned his pickup and fled on foot. Afterwards, the deputy learned that the abandoned pickup was registered to Smith. The deputy also saw booking photographs of Smith.
After stopping defendants car, Deputy Barker approached the drivers side and spoke with defendant. As he was looking down into the car, the deputy saw Smith in the passenger seat. The deputy went around to the passengers side and asked Smith his name. Smith replied that his name was "Justin Myke."
About five minutes after the initial traffic stop, Deputy David Benson arrived. When he arrived, Deputy Barker was speaking with defendant and checking defendants license and registration. Deputy Benson went over to the passengers side and asked the passenger what his name was. Smith answered "Justin." Deputy Benson also recognized Smith, and told Deputy Barker he agreed with him that the passenger was Arty Smith.
Deputy Barker went to his patrol vehicle to conduct a records check of the name "Justin Myke." When Deputy Barker returned, it appeared Deputy Benson had taken Smith out of defendants car and sat him on the curb.
Deputy Barker talked with Smith again. Smith told Deputy Barker he had an Arizona drivers license. Deputy Barker ran a second records check for an Arizona license but again found no information for the name Smith provided.
Deputy Barker confronted Smith with his suspicion of Smiths real identity and mentioned the previous incident in which he chased Smiths gray pickup. Smith told the deputy he was mistaken and that he was not that person. They "continued back and forth." Deputy Barker then "detained" Smith for giving false information.
Deputy Barker handcuffed Smith and placed him in the back of the patrol car. The deputy told Smith he was being detained because the deputy did not "believe he was telling the truth about his name because all that information wasnt matching up, and every time [the deputy] asked him about something that didnt match up he changed his story to accommodate that not working."
After handcuffing Smith, Deputy Barker continued to tell Smith he did not believe what he was saying. Smith said, "`Okay, I admit it, I am Arty Smith." Deputy Barker told Smith that, at this point, the only thing Smith had to worry about was lying about his name. As far as Deputy Barker knew, he had no other reason to arrest Smith.
Deputy Barker asked Smith about the December 2004 incident. Smith told the deputy he ran from his pickup because he did not have a drivers license. He also told the deputy that he was on parole.
Meanwhile, Deputy Benson spoke with defendant. When Deputy Benson asked defendant if she knew the name of her passenger, defendant said, "Justin." The deputy told defendant he knew the passenger was Smith, and that if defendant was going to lie about who her passenger was, she was going to be arrested for interfering with the deputies investigation.
Deputy Barker told defendant that she was also under arrest for violating section 148.9, for furnishing false information to a police officer. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car of Senior Deputy Diana Craig, a third deputy who had arrived on the scene.
Deputy Benson went to defendants car to retrieve defendants purse from the center console to get her identification. When he lifted her purse, Deputy Benson saw a glass pipe for smoking methamphetamine.
At trial, Deputy Bensons testimony recounted how, after finding the methamphetamine pipe, he performed a more thorough search of the cars interior. When he popped down the panel for the sunroof, two bags of methamphetamine fell out.
The parties during the suppression hearing presumably recognized that the discovery of the methamphetamine pipe in the passenger compartment provide justification for a more extensive search of the car. Thus, only testimony regarding events up to the discovery of the pipe was elicited during the suppression hearing. We cite the trial evidence for background purposes only.
DISCUSSION
"The standard of appellate review of a trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial courts factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]" (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) When, as here, "there are no express findings of fact, it is implied that the trial court ... made whatever findings were necessary to support the judgment or order. [Citations.]" (Winton v. Municipal Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 228, 236.)
We conclude that the court properly denied defendants motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5, because substantial evidence supports the courts implied finding that there was probable cause to arrest defendants passenger for falsely identifying himself to a peace officer in violation section 148.9, subdivision (a). As defendant recognizes on appeal, when a law enforcement official has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of a vehicle, he or she may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the vehicle. (New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454, 460.)
Defendant argues that Smiths arrest was unlawful because all his false statements occurred prior to his detention by Deputy Barker; once Smith was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car, he truthfully identified himself. Accordingly, defendant argues the deputy lacked probable cause to arrest Smith for violating section 148.9, subdivision (a), which provides: "Any person who falsely represents or identifies himself or herself as another person or as a fictitious person to any peace officer ... upon a lawful detention or arrest of the person, either to evade the process of the court, or to evade the proper identification of the person by the investigating officer is guilty of a misdemeanor." (Italics added.) Defendant notes that section 148.9 applies only to "lawful detentions and lawful arrests," not consensual encounters. (In re Voeurn O. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 793, 796.) Relying heavily on Deputy Barkers testimony that he "detained" Smith when he handcuffed him and placed him in the patrol car, defendant asserts that the preceding portion of the encounter was consensual and that Smith was not detained as a result of the traffic stop. We disagree with defendants analysis.
This court has held that a typical traffic stop results in the detention of any passenger in the vehicle. (People v. Grant (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1451, 1460-1461 (Grant), citing Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 653.) Other California courts have similarly concluded that a passenger is detained for Fourth Amendment purposes because he or she is present in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. (See e.g., People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 760-765 [typical traffic stop detains any passenger in vehicle]; People v. Hunt (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 498, 505 [passenger is lawfully detained when vehicle is lawfully stopped].) As the prosecutor noted below, the deputys testimony as to when he "detained" Smith was not dispositive. Under the authorities just cited Smith was initially detained, along with the driver as a result of the traffic stop.
Defendant relies on a line of cases endorsing the contrary view that the passenger is not initially detained because the vehicle in which he or she is riding is stopped for a routine traffic violation. (See e.g., People v. Fisher (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 338, 344 [passenger not seized or detained when vehicle is stopped for traffic violation]; People v. Gonzalez (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 381, 384 [passenger not seized until officer issues verbal command and passenger is no longer free to withdraw from encounter].) We decline to follow this line of cases, finding instead that Smith was initially detained as a result of the traffic stop and the detention was properly prolonged for investigative purposes after he provided a false name.
Specifically, the prosecutor argued: "Your Honor, its been characterized by Sergeant Barker that the detention occurred at the point suggested by [defense counsel]; however, in reality, thats a legal conclusion and, in fact, if you look at the case and the evidence that was before the Court, when Sergeant Barker saw that the defendant was, in fact, someone he believed had fled from him in a previous pursuit and he asked questions about that previous pursuit, I think he had reasonable suspicion at that point to detain Mr. Smith regardless of what his subjective intention was or what his subjective conclusion was as to whether or not there was a detention or not, but at that point, as soon as he recognizes Mr. Smith for who he was or has reason to believe Mr. Smith is who he is, he has reasonable suspicion to detain him at that point ...."
Defendant makes no claim that the traffic stop was invalid. "A traffic stop is justified at its inception if based on at least reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. [Citation.]" (People v. Bell, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 761.) Deputy Barkers request for Smiths name did not require justification separate from that warranting the initial traffic stop of the driver. (Grant, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d. at p. 1460.) Nor did the request amount to an additional detention apart from the initial, lawful detention of the traffic stop. (Id. at p. 1462.) Moreover, once Smith answered with a false name, Deputy Barker was justified in prolonging the detention to investigate the name Smith gave him, particularly in light of Deputy Barkers testimony that when he saw Smith, he recognized him as the suspect who had fled from him and abandoned his pickup during a vehicle pursuit just the month before. Notwithstanding defendants assertion to the contrary, there is no indication that during the encounter Smith was ever "free to leave." Rather, Smith quickly became the focal point of the deputies investigation, which is apparent from the facts that he was made to leave defendants car and sit on the curb by one deputy while the other deputy checked the false information he provided, and was directly confronted with the deputies suspicion that he was, in fact, Smith and was the one involved in the previous incident with Deputy Barker.
By the time Smith was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car, he had provided so many deceitful answers — including volunteering additional false information that he had an Arizona drivers license, ostensibly to explain why there were no California records of a "Justin Myke" — that Deputy Barker clearly possessed probable cause to arrest Smith for falsely identifying or representing himself in violation of section 148.9, subdivision (d). Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts would give a reasonable person "an honest and strong suspicion" that the defendant committed a crime. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410.) Because defendants car could be properly searched incident to the lawful arrest of defendants passenger, we hold the court properly denied her motion to suppress evidence. Having so decided, we need not reach defendants contention challenging the validity of her arrest.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We Concur:
HARRIS, Acting P.J.
CORNELL, J.