Opinion
A133034
03-16-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GEMA FABELA CASILLAS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Mendocino County Super. Ct. Nos. SCUK-CRCR-06-73020)
Gema Fabela Casillas, the appellant, appeals from her plea and sentence to felony child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273 a, subd. (a)), and to misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs with a blood-alcohol level greater than .08 percent (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)). Appellant's counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised, and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel states in a declaration that appellant has been notified that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal, and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Appellant was also advised of her right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues she chooses to bring to this court's attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally.
Appellant was originally charged by criminal complaint filed on August 21, 2006, by the Mendocino County District Attorney with three counts of child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273 a, subd. (a)), one count of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), and one count of driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)). She initially pleaded not guilty and was released from custody with conditions.
On October 19, 2006, appellant entered a change of plea, pleading guilty to one count of child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273 a, subd. (a)), and to one count of driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)). She was represented by counsel in connection with her plea, and was advised of all applicable trial rights she was waiving by entering her plea. The matter was referred to the probation department for a sentencing recommendation.
On November 22, 2006, sentencing was suspended and appellant was granted formal probation for 60 months, with conditions, including that she serve 90 days in county jail (to be credited against any residential substance abuse program appellant enters), with credit for 2 days previously served.
Thereafter, a notice of probation violation was filed alleging that on November 4, 2010, appellant was arrested for driving with a blood-alcohol level of more than .08 percent. On May 24, 2011, appellant admitted the probation violation, and the matter was again referred to the probation department for its review and recommendation. At the time she entered her admission to the probation violation, appellant was represented by counsel, advised of the constitutional rights she was waiving by making the admission, and voluntarily waived those rights.
At sentencing on June 24, 2011, the court followed the recommendation of the probation department by revoking probation, and by sentencing appellant to the mitigated term of two years in state prison. However, the sentence was recalled six days later on June 27. At a new sentencing hearing held on July 15, 2011, the court granted probation once again, this time for 36 months, and ordered appellant to serve 440 days in county jail, with appellant agreeing to waive custody credits and to any objection to the length of the county jail term. The court also indicated that if appellant entered a substance abuse program, she would receive day-for-day credit against her jail sentence.
Conclusions Based Upon Independent Record Review
We discern no error in the sentencing or plea disposition. The revocation of probation, recall of sentence, and subsequent resentencing, including the sentencing choices made by the trial court, were supported by substantial evidence, and were well within the discretion of the trial court. The conditions of the grants of probation, including fines and penalties imposed, were supported by the law and facts. At all times appellant was represented by counsel. Upon our independent review of the record we conclude there are no meritorious issues to be argued, or that require further briefing on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RUVOLO, P. J. We concur: REARDON, J. SEPULVEDA, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.