Opinion
A158410
06-30-2020
In re CASEY T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Casey T., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. JV17713310)
Defendant Casey T. was tried as an adult and sentenced to 84 years and seven months to life in prison for offenses he committed in 2010 when he was 15 years old. Eight years after the offenses and while defendant's conviction was still pending on appeal, the voters and the Legislature eliminated prosecutors' authority to try 15-year-olds as adults. (Prop. 57, § 4.2, as approved by voters, Gen. Elect. (Nov. 8, 2016), eff. Nov. 9, 2016; Senate Bill No. 1391 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012).) We held this change applied retroactively to defendant's case and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for an appropriate disposition. (People v. Casey T. (March 12, 2019, A138649, A142829 [nonpub. opn.].) One month before defendant turned 25 years old, the juvenile court ordered defendant committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
Defendant contends the judgment must be modified because Welfare and Institutions Code section 1769, subdivision (d)(2) states that the DJJ must discharge minors when they reach 25 years of age or at the end of a two-year period of control, whichever occurs later. He asserts that on his 25th birthday he had already been incarcerated in state prison for more than six years, so his birthday was the latest occurring event under the statute and the trial court should have stated in his order that he was entitled to be discharged at 25 unless the state petitioned to extend his commitment under section 1800, et seq. We conclude the trial court did not and could not make any order regarding defendant's discharge and the record before us does not show that defendant was confined beyond his 25th birthday, so we cannot rule on defendant's argument. We will affirm the trial court's order, without prejudice to defendant raising his argument in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
In 2010, when defendant was 15, he fired a gun at a group of young men, killing one teenager, James Allen, and grazing two others, Damonte Starks and Burnett Raven. Defendant was charged as an adult in criminal court. In March 2013, a jury found defendant guilty of murder with the use of a firearm and two counts of attempted murder with the use of a firearm. In May 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant to 84 years and 7 months to life in prison.
"We will use the terms 'adult court' and 'criminal court' interchangeably to refer to the court system for adults and juveniles who are tried as adults, and to distinguish that system from the juvenile court system, where most juvenile matters are handled." (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303, fn. 1 (Lara).)
Defendant appealed his conviction. After issuing an opinion affirming the judgment in April 2016, we granted defendant's petition for rehearing and in December 2016 issued a second opinion affirming the judgment. We then granted defendant's second petition for rehearing, which raised a claim under then-recently enacted Proposition 57. Proposition 57 eliminated the authority of prosecutors to bypass the juvenile court and directly file charges against minors accused of certain offenses in adult court, instead requiring prosecutors to obtain a juvenile court's approval before transferring a minor's prosecution to criminal court. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 303.) In our third opinion filed in June 2017, we rejected defendant's Proposition 57 claim, holding that Proposition 57's change to the law did not apply retroactively to defendant's case.
The California Supreme Court granted review and eventually transferred the matter back to this court for reconsideration in light of Senate Bill No. 1391. Senate Bill No. 1391 amended Proposition 57 to eliminate prosecutors' ability in most circumstances to move to transfer to adult court the prosecution of a minor who was 14 or 15 years old at the time of the offense. (Sen. Bill No. 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), § 1.) In our fourth opinion in this matter, we held that Senate Bill 1391 applied retroactively to defendant's case. (People v. Casey T., supra, (A138649, A142829).) We therefore remanded this matter to the juvenile court with instructions, as relevant here, to "deem defendant's criminal convictions and enhancements to be juvenile adjudications as of the date of the verdict" and to "impose an appropriate disposition within its usual timeframe." (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court granted review in O.G. v. Superior Court (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 626, review granted November 26, 2019, S259011, to consider the constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 1391. Neither party here contends the constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 1391 is relevant to defendant's case at this point.
On remand, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing at which it considered a probation report recommending that the court commit defendant to the DJJ. The juvenile court also listened to extensive argument. Defendant argued through counsel that the court should continue the hearing for a month, until after defendant's 25th birthday, and then dismiss the matter. In support of this contention, defendant cited section 1769, subdivision (d)(2), which requires the DJJ to discharge a minor "upon the expiration of a two-year period of control, or when the person attains 25 years of age, whichever occurs later." (§ 1769, subd. (d)(2).) Defendant observed that he had already served more than eight years in custody and argued the two-year period of control requirement did not apply to him.
The minor also argued based on In re Carlos (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1, that the probation report was not sufficiently detailed to allow the juvenile court to conclude, as required by section 734, that the minor's mental and physical condition and qualifications made it probable that he would benefit by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by DJJ. The minor has not renewed this contention on appeal.
Section 1769, subdivision (d)(2) states in full: "A person who at the time of adjudication of a crime or crimes would, in criminal court, have faced an aggregate sentence of seven years or more, shall be discharged upon the expiration of a two-year period of control, or when the person attains 25 years of age, whichever occurs later, unless an order for further detention has been made by the committing court pursuant to Article 6 (commencing with Section 1800) of Chapter 1 of Division 2.5." The minor's initial criminal sentence of 84 years and 7 months to life in prison demonstrates that he faced an aggregate sentence of seven years or more in prison.
The juvenile court's disposition order followed the probation report's recommendations and ordered defendant committed to the DJJ. The juvenile court set defendant's maximum period of confinement at 84 years and 7 months to life in prison and awarded defendant credit for his previous time in custody. Defendant timely appealed the disposition order. The court later corrected the calculation of the credits.
DISCUSSION
The issue before us in this appeal is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering defendant committed to the DJJ. (In re Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 5 [" 'We review the [juvenile] court's placement decision for an abuse of discretion' "].) Defendant has not challenged the juvenile court's commitment order as an abuse of discretion or otherwise maintained the court lacked the authority to commit him to the DJJ. To the contrary, he concedes that he is not seeking reversal of the commitment order and admits that the juvenile court's order of commitment was essentially a foregone conclusion because of his offense history. Defendant's failure to attack the juvenile court's exercise of its discretion to order him committed to the DJJ essentially disposes of this appeal because it requires us to affirm the juvenile court's order.
Instead of seeking a reversal of the commitment order, defendant asks this court to modify it because the juvenile court implicitly intended to commit him for longer than was legally permissible. He contends the juvenile court intended him to remain under the DJJ's control for at least two years, but section 1769, subdivision (d)(2) required the DJJ to discharge him on his 25th birthday if the People had not taken some other action to prolong his detention because he had already served more than six years in prison. The People disagree with defendant's interpretation of section 1769, subdivision (d)(2), but maintain defendant's argument is not procedurally proper in the first instance because the juvenile court did not and could not order that defendant remain confined beyond his 25th birthday. We agree with the People that the question of defendant's eligibility for discharge is not properly before us, so we do not reach the merits of defendant's interpretation of section 1769, subdivision (d)(2).
"On direct appeal from a [DJJ] commitment, the appellate court has no knowledge of the actual term that a minor will serve for his offense. The juvenile court does not set the actual length of [DJJ] commitments. The maximum period of physical confinements for [the DJJ] is governed by the longest period of confinement possible for an adult convicted of the same offense. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. [(d)(1) & (d)(2)].) But, when such maximum period, as here, is lengthier than the ceilings set by Welfare and Institutions Code section 1769, the latter governs. [¶] The [Board of Juvenile Hearings] sets the actual length of a minor's confinement in [the DJJ] after the minor has been received. (In re James V. (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 300[, 308]; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 1765, 1766.) . . . Welfare and Institutions Code sections 1765 and 1766 require the [Board of Juvenile Hearings] to maintain a continuous study of the person under its control, determine when parole will be granted and discharge the person as soon as, in its opinion, there is reasonable probability that he or she can be given full liberty without danger to the public." (In re Thomas C. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 786, 802-803, fn. omitted; In re Carlos E. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1536 ["Once committed to [DJJ], the minor's actual term is governed by [DJJ] guidelines, within the statutory maximum."].)
The DJJ was formerly known as the California Youth Authority. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 306.) The Board of Juvenile Hearings was formerly known as the Youth Authority Board, and before that as the Youthful Offender Parole Board. (§ 1716; Stats. 2003, ch. 4, § 13; Stats. 1982, ch. 624, § 19, p. 2620.)
While he asks us to modify the juvenile court's commitment order to limit the length of his commitment, defendant admits that the juvenile court's order does not in fact address the length of his commitment to the DJJ. He instead posits the juvenile court must have concluded he could be held past his 25th birthday, because the proper application of section 1769 was the main issue defendant raised in the hearing. He also asserts it would defy logic to believe the juvenile court only intended defendant to serve one month at the DJJ.
As a practical matter, defendant may be correct that the juvenile court believed that defendant could be held beyond his 25th birthday. However, as a legal matter, the juvenile court's belief in this regard is irrelevant. Leaving aside whether it is proper for us to modify the commitment order based on an unstated understanding or premise, the juvenile court's intentions regarding the length of defendant's commitment do not matter because the "juvenile court does not set the actual length of [DJJ] commitments." (In re Thomas C., supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 802.) Only the DJJ can determine when defendant must be discharged, so if defendant has been confined beyond the legally permissible period, he must direct his challenge to the DJJ.
People v. Getty (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 101 (Getty) shows the error in defendant's approach. There, a trial court revoked a defendant's grant of probation and committed her to the DJJ "for the term prescribed by law." (Id. at p. 104.) One month later, the trial court purported to correct its commitment order nunc pro tunc to limit the defendant's commitment to six months, because the court had previously been unaware that the defendant had only been convicted of a misdemeanor. (Ibid.) The DJJ refused to release the defendant despite the court's attempt to correct its commitment order. (Ibid.) The trial court then granted a habeas corpus petition the defendant had filed, found that the original commitment order was improvidently granted, and ordered the defendant to be released and restored to probation. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the defendant's discharge. (Getty, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 107, 114.) As relevant here, the appellate court held that the trial court lacked authority to order the defendant's discharge because "after [the defendant's] commitment the court had 'no power to suspend execution of the commitment.' (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1737.)." (Getty, at p. 108.) The court noted that after the DJJ assumed custody of the defendant, sections 1765 and 1766 required it to retain the defendant under its supervision and control until it determined that control was no longer necessary. (Getty, at pp. 108-109.) The court summarized, "The superior court's attempt to limit defendant's commitment to six months was of no effect since, as indicated, ante, after commitment it is the [DJJ's] responsibility to determine when (up to various maximum age and time restrictions) persons committed to it shall be released. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 1765, 1766, 1769-1771.) Since the court was without power to issue its nunc pro tunc order . . . , the original commitment order . . . remains in effect." (Getty, at p. 111.)
Getty demonstrates that once a court orders an individual to be committed to the authority of the DJJ, that court's intentions regarding the length of the commitment are irrelevant. Just as the trial court in Getty was without power to reduce the length of the defendant's commitment after the fact, the juvenile court here could not require the DJJ to retain custody of defendant longer than legally warranted. The proper end of defendant's commitment was not an issue the juvenile court could rule upon at the time of commitment, but rather one reserved for the DJJ. Accordingly, if defendant wishes to challenge the DJJ's failure to discharge him at the legally appropriate time, he cannot do so via appeal from the juvenile court's commitment order. He must instead take some other action, such as filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (See In re Thomas C., supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at pp. 802, 804-805 [in appeal from commitment to DJJ, refusing to rule on challenge to likely length of commitment and suggesting a minor should file a habeas corpus petition if the DJJ were to confine him longer than appropriate]; In re James V., supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 308 ["We have no doubt that the [DJJ] is and will be cognizant of the statutory and constitutional limitations upon its exercise of discretion . . . . If the [DJJ] should hold defendant beyond the established limit, there is a convenient judicial remedy"].)
We acknowledge that Getty relied in part on the fact that section 1737 then prevented a committing court from suspending execution of the commitment. (Getty, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 108, fn. 5.) The Legislature has since amended section 1737, and now that statute allows a court to recall the commitment of a person to the DJJ in certain circumstances upon the recommendation of the director of the DJJ. (§ 1737.) This amendment is irrelevant here because there was no recommendation from the DJJ's director, so the juvenile court could not recall the commitment. (Ibid.) Additionally, a recall of the commitment would only permit the juvenile court to shorten the length of the minor's commitment. The minor here contends the juvenile court intended to lengthen the minor's commitment, which section 1737 does not permit under any circumstances. --------
The state of the record before us further compels us to defer consideration of defendant's legal argument until a future proceeding. Nothing in the record demonstrates that defendant has, in fact, been confined past his 25th birthday. Defendant filed his notice of appeal on September 12, 2019, three days after the trial court's commitment order and about a month before his 25th birthday. The last document in the record is a placement review memo filed September 30, 2019, which was 11 days before defendant's 25th birthday. While we assume defendant would not have continued to prosecute this appeal if he were discharged, the fact remains that at present we have no basis in the record from which to conclude that defendant has been confined beyond his 25th birthday. This defect is fatal, because we may only consider facts contained in the record. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1183 [declining to consider argument dependent on evidence not in the record because "review on a direct appeal is limited to the appellate record"].) The initiation of a new proceeding, such as the filing of a habeas corpus petition, would remedy this defect and permit an appropriate court to consider defendant's argument on the merits.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
BROWN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
STREETER, ACTING P. J. /s/_________
TUCHER, J.