The Wilson rule deems the preponderance standard to be inadequate and replaces it with the clear and convincing evidence standard. See People v. Case, 218 Ill. App. 3d 146, 155 (1991). It must be remembered that a standard of proof is concerned only with the quantum and quality of evidence that a party must present to prevail on an issue.
See People v. Traylor, 331 Ill. App. 3d 464, 468, 771 N.E.2d 629 (2002) (where the trial court made an express finding that the defendant was injured while in police custody triggering the heightened burden of proof on the part of the State). But compare People v. Case, 218 Ill. App. 3d 146, 155, 577 N.E.2d 1291 (1991) (where the reviewing court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was not "clearly established" that the injuries suffered by the defendant occurred while in police custody). It is the trial court's duty to resolve conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses.
The test is whether the statement was made freely and without compulsion or whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time so as not to be the product of a rational intellect and free will. ( People v. McCleary (1990), 208 Ill. App.3d 466, 567 N.E.2d 434.) Under ordinary circumstances, the voluntariness of a confession only needs to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Lego v. Twomey (1972), 404 U.S. 477, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618, 92 S. Ct. 619; People v. Case (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 146, 577 N.E.2d 1291.) The standard of review is different where it is conceded or clearly established that the defendant received injuries while in police custody, and the only issue is how and why they were inflicted. Under those circumstances the burden of establishing that the injuries were not administered in order to obtain the confession can be met only by clear and convincing testimony as to the manner of their occurrence.
At this hearing, it was the trial court's duty to resolve conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. ( People v. Case (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 146, 154.) This court is required to defer to the findings of the trial court where that court has assessed credibility, demeanor, and all the relevant facts. (218 Ill. App.3d at 154.)
The State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a confession was voluntary if a defendant claims it was coerced. People v. Case, 218 Ill. App. 3d 146, 154, 577 N.E.2d 1291 (1991). In deciding whether a statement was freely given, a trial court is to look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement.
Because the record notes that a follow-up appointment was scheduled, and because the next record is dated December 30, 1986, it is possible to interpret these records as supporting the argument that defendant's first complaint of police mistreatment was not made until several months after the interrogation took place in July 1986, an interpretation which weighs against defendant's allegations of police misconduct. (See, e.g., Peoplev. Case (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 146, 156 (failure to complain of injuries at prison intake examination evidence that defendant was not injured while in police custody).) In addition, because of the reference to a "2d fight" in the record dated April 7, 1987, it is possible to interpret the medical records as supporting the argument that defendant suffered injuries while in prison, and that those injuries were the source of his hearing loss.
The State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a confession was voluntary if a defendant claims it was coerced. People v. Case, 218 Ill. App.3d 146, 154, 577 N.E.2d 1291, 1297 (1991). In deciding whether a statement was freely given, a trial court is to look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement.
For a confession to be admissible in evidence, the trial court must determine that it was made voluntarily without compulsion or inducement. People v. Case, 218 Ill. App.3d 146, 577 N.E.2d 1291 (1991). The standard of voluntariness requires a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision to confess.
Likewise, the defendant's failure to immediately report the alleged beating, while not necessarily dispositive of his claim he was brutalized, should be considered by the trial judge. See People v. Case, 218 Ill. App.3d 146, 156, 577 N.E.2d 1291 (1991). While it will be the trial court's initial task to determine what evidence will be heard, we believe the question of whether the arresting officers possessed shotguns at the time Cannon claimed they did should be revisited.
In order to consider defendant's contentions regarding her confessions, we must consider the evidence presented at her suppression hearing and at trial, for in reviewing the propriety of the court's rulings on the admissibility of defendant's confessions, a reviewing court may also consider the evidence adduced at trial. People v. Case (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 146, 577 N.E.2d 1291. With the exception of Special Agent Clarence Banks, all of the witnesses who testified at the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress also testified at trial.