Opinion
E053074
12-30-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BECKY CASAREZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood and A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super.Ct.No. INF066089)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Richard A. Erwood, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood and A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found defendant Becky Casarez guilty of (1) possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and (2) transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)). The trial court found true the allegations that defendant suffered (1) four prior convictions which resulted in prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5); and (2) three prior Health and Safety Code convictions (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of 16 years.
First, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying her motion for a judgment of acquittal on the transportation of methamphetamine charge (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)). Second, defendant asserts her statements to the police should have been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of Miranda. We affirm the judgment.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. SEARCH OF THE TRUCK
On June 29, 2009, Riverside County Sheriff's Deputy Gelinas was on patrol in Rancho Mirage. Specifically, Deputy Gelinas was patrolling the north parking lot of the Agua Caliente Casino. At 2:22 a.m., Deputy Gelinas was driving alone in his patrol car, and he saw defendant and another woman by the passenger side of a Ford F-150 pickup truck. The passenger door of the truck was open. Deputy Gelinas asked the women if he could speak with them, and they agreed. The deputy asked defendant if she was on probation or parole, and she responded, "No." Deputy Gelinas asked defendant for her identification, which she gave to him. The deputy gave defendant's name to dispatch, and found that defendant was on parole.
Deputy Gelinas conducted a parole search of the truck. During the 30-minute search, the two women were in the back of the deputy's patrol car. When the deputy looked on the front passenger floorboard, by the seat, he found a large Ziploc baggie that contained a white crystallized substance, and a methamphetamine pipe, which was coated with a white substance and wrapped in tissue paper. The crystallized substance inside the large bag had a net weight of 1.68 grams. The deputy then looked under the front passenger side floor mat and found a smaller Ziploc baggie with a white crystalline substance. The white crystalline substance inside the smaller baggie had a net weight of 0.54 gram. The substance in both baggies tested positive for methamphetamine.
Next, Deputy Gelinas searched behind the front passenger seat. The deputy found a metal case with three scales inside of it (two mechanical scales and one digital scale) and more than 10 Ziploc baggies, both large and small sizes. The small baggies were approximately one-inch by one-inch in size. The deputy then searched the floorboard behind the driver's seat. In that area, Deputy Gelinas found a backpack. Inside the backpack, the deputy found a sunglass case; inside the case he found a metal spoon and a syringe filled with a brown substance. The substance in the syringe tested positive for methamphetamine. Also inside the backpack, the deputy found a "black Derringer six millimeter two-inch barrel" starter gun and an Airsoft BB gun that was unloaded, but had the orange tip "colored in black to look like a real gun." Also behind the driver's seat, Deputy Gelinas found a black pouch filled with "[l]ots and lots of costume jewelry." The woman with defendant was Cindy Deltoro (Deltoro). Deltoro told Deputy Gelinas that she was in the driver's seat and defendant was in the passenger seat "when the truck arrived at the casino." The truck belonged to Deltoro's father.
B. INTERVIEW BY DEPUTY GELINAS
Deputy Gelinas interviewed defendant in a holding cell at the Palm Desert station. At the beginning of the interview, the following exchange took place:
"Gelinas: . . . Hi [defendant], you know why you're being under arrest for? [sic]
"[Defendant]: No.
"Gelinas: No? So you, you got the warrant, right?
"[Defendant]: Uh hmm (affirmative)
"Gelinas: And all [the] methamphetamine is yours, you said it was yours, right?
"[Defendant]: Well, yeah.
"Gelinas: So, so I'm gonna read you your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Do you understand?
"[Defendant]: (Inaudible response)""
Deputy Gelinas continued reading defendant her Miranda rights. The deputy then asked defendant what items in the truck belonged to her. Defendant admitted, "the drugs are mine" and "everything [in] the bags." When asked to be specific, defendant stated "Uh, methamphetamine, I guess. (Unintelligible) It was mine." Defendant also stated that the methamphetamine pipe belonged to her. Defendant explained that she "snort[ed]" methamphetamine but would "smoke it once in awhile." Defendant stated she did not "shoot up." Defendant confessed, "All the dope is mine. All the drugs that's what I am saying, [Deltoro] didn't have no drugs, cause they are mine."
Deputy Gelinas asked defendant, "[W]hy do you have so much drugs?" Defendant responded, "It just looks like a lot. It's not really a lot. There was just bags and stuff." Defendant explained, "I ain't going out and buying a certain amount and I just use it. [sic]." Defendant also said the costume jewelry belonged to her. Defendant said, "It's all, it's all junk. That's what, I, I'm a tweeker, it's embarrassing, because that's what I do. I um, keep that like all the [costume] jewelry, I use it, I wear it, I trade it, you know, whatever." Defendant denied selling drugs.
Defendant said that the scales and backpack belonged to a person named Dalton. Defendant described him as "a youngster out in [Desert Hot Springs]." Defendant assumed the syringe in the backpack belonged to Dalton, because Dalton used intravenous drugs. Defendant stated the guns also belonged to Dalton. Defendant explained to Deputy Gelinas that Dalton had been in the truck with her and Deltoro, but then defendant wanted to go to the casino, and Dalton left his backpack in the truck. Deputy Gelinas did not attempt to contact Dalton because he "didn't have enough information." The deputy did not try to lift fingerprints from the guns or the scales.
C. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
After the prosecution rested, defendant moved the trial court to enter a judgment of acquittal for both counts. (Pen. Code, § 1118.1.) In regard to the transportation charge, defendant's trial attorney argued the prosecution failed to provide evidence that defendant "engaged in the act of transportation of methamphetamine." The prosecution responded that there was evidence showing defendant brought the methamphetamine to the casino in a truck.
The trial court said, "The fact they're standing next to the truck in the casino parking lot—and it, I believe, was owned by . . . Deltoro's father, I believe the testimony was—is circumstantial evidence to indicate that the truck was driven there. The manner of concealing the drugs, especially the drugs that were under the floor mat, indicates that they were concealed in that location for the purpose of being transported. And based upon that, I think there's substantial evidence to support a jury's finding of guilt with respect to the transportation charge."
D. DEFENDANT'S TRIAL TESTIMONY
Defendant testified in her own defense at trial, and described the events preceding her arrest in this case. Defendant stated that prior to being at the casino, she and Deltoro were at a friend's house in Desert Hot Springs. Deltoro's friend, Dalton, was also at the friend's house. Defendant and Deltoro decided to go to the Agua Caliente Casino before heading to the home they shared in Thermal. Dalton said he also wanted to go to the casino, so he entered the truck. Dalton brought the backpack inside the truck.
After leaving the friend's house, defendant, Deltoro and Dalton went to eat at Del Taco. Dalton stayed at the Del Taco, while defendant and Deltoro went to the casino. When asked how long defendant and Deltoro were at the casino before being contacted by Deputy Gelinas, defendant responded, "Not long. We just pulled up and I saw him." Defendant explained that Deltoro was by the passenger side of the truck when the deputy saw them, because when they "pulled up" Deltoro came around the truck to open defendant's door. As defendant stepped out of the truck, she saw Deputy Gelinas.
Defendant said that she had been using "a lot" of methamphetamine throughout the day, prior to her arrest. Defendant testified that when she went to the casino (1) she had the methamphetamine in the truck, and (2) she knew the methamphetamine was in the truck. Defendant also admitted, while testifying, that she was the person who brought the methamphetamine into the truck "before [they] started the evening."
DISCUSSION
A. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying her motion for a judgment of acquittal on the transportation of methamphetamine charge (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)). We disagree.
"In a case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, at the close of the evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal." (Pen. Code, § 1118.1.) "'"The purpose of a motion under [Penal Code] section 1118.1 is to weed out as soon as possible those few instances in which the prosecution fails to make even a prima facie case." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Arias (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1434.)
Health and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a), prohibits transporting methamphetamine. "'Transportation of a controlled substance is established by carrying or conveying a usable quantity of a controlled substance with knowledge of its presence and illegal character.' [Citations.] 'The crux of the crime of transporting is movement of the contraband from one place to another.' [Citations.]" (People v. Ormiston (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 682.)
"In reviewing the trial court's ruling denying a motion for judgment of acquittal, we apply the same standard used to assess whether sufficient evidence supports the conviction. [Citation.] That standard requires us to review the record '"'in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Arias, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1434.) "Where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at the conclusion of the prosecution's case-in-chief . . ., the reviewing court must view the evidence as it stood at the end of the prosecution['s] case. [Citation.]" (People v. Ringo (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 870, 880.)
The prosecution presented evidence that the truck belonged to Deltoro's father; defendant and Deltoro were standing next to the truck when Deputy Gelinas first saw them; Deltoro told Deputy Gelinas that she was in the driver's seat and defendant was in the passenger's seat "when the truck arrived at the casino"; and there was a small package of methamphetamine under the floor mat in the truck. There was also evidence of other drug paraphernalia in various locations throughout the truck. Further, during the interview with Deputy Gelinas, defendant said that when she saw the deputy, she thought "Oh fuck," because she "knew [she] had drugs."
The foregoing evidence supports the conclusion defendant transported the methamphetamine to the casino in the truck, because it can be inferred that defendant was a passenger in the truck when Deltoro drove it to the casino, due to defendant being in the passenger seat when the truck "arrived." It can also be inferred the methamphetamine was in the truck when Deltoro drove to the casino, because there were drugs in various places throughout the truck—it was not as if defendant purchased the drugs in the parking lot and quickly threw them into the truck upon seeing Deputy Gelinas; rather, it can be inferred that the drugs, especially those beneath the floor mat, had been in the truck prior to defendant's arrival at the casino. Further, it can be inferred that defendant knew of the illegal character of the drugs, because she thought "Oh fuck" when she saw Deputy Gelinas, due to the drugs in the truck; defendant knew she could be punished for the drugs. Therefore, we conclude substantial evidence supports the transportation charge (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion.
Defendant argues the prosecution's evidence does not support a finding the methamphetamine was in the truck when the truck arrived at the casino. Defendant asserts it is only speculation that the methamphetamine was in the truck prior to arrival, and the methamphetamine could have been purchased at the casino and then placed inside the truck. Defendant argues, "[T]here is no evidence o[f] transport, but only speculation that [defendant] must have transported . . . ." We disagree that there is no evidence of transportation. As set forth ante, there is circumstantial evidence supporting an inference that defendant transported the drug. Perhaps if there were just a single bag of methamphetamine lying in the truck, then defendant's argument would be more persuasive, because it could be plausible that defendant simply threw the bag in the truck upon seeing the deputy. However, in the instant case, there were drugs and paraphernalia stored throughout the truck. Thus, there is a reasonable inference that defendant came to the casino with the drugs already in the truck.
B. MIRANDA
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior to the start of trial, defendant's trial counsel moved the court to exclude defendant's statements, "unless a proper Mirandizing [could] be established." The trial court stated it would hold a hearing on the issue. (Evid. Code, § 402.) At the hearing, Deputy Gelinas testified that when he first spoke to defendant she denied being on parole. After the deputy found that defendant was on parole, he arrested her for a warrant she had. The deputy then asked defendant if she had any illegal drugs or weapons inside the truck, and defendant admitted she had methamphetamine in the front passenger seat of the truck.
Deputy Gelinas explained that he asked defendant about the contents of the truck before reading her Miranda rights, because defendant was arrested on a parole violation, so the arrest "didn't relate to what was in the car." Deputy Gelinas said that, at the police station, he asked defendant, "'[A]ll the methamphetamine was yours. You said it was yours; correct[?]'" prior to reading defendant her Miranda rights.
Defendant's trial attorney argued that defendant did not "lose[] her right to Miranda" because she was on parole, and that Deputy Gelinas conducted matters in the wrong sequence by arresting defendant and then questioning her before reading her Miranda rights. Defendant's trial attorney asked that defendant's pre-Miranda statements be excluded.
The prosecutor argued that the question about contraband in the truck related to officer safety, and was not directed at incriminating defendant. As to the other pre-Miranda statements, the prosecution argued that the same questions were posed post-Miranda and defendant said "the same thing over again. So if there's any error, it's harmless error, and it should all be allowed in."
As to the post-Miranda statements, defendant's trial counsel argued, "And in regards to the subsequent interview, I mean, yeah, trying to do my thing on that, the Miranda was unfortunately taken. And anything after that, that gets to come in." Defendant's trial counsel again asserted that the pre-Miranda statements should be excluded. The trial court concluded, "Well, I'm going to deny the motion. I think that question and answer are admissible under the Berkemer case, and I'm going to deny your objection to that."
Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420.
2. ANALYSIS
a) Contention
Defendant contends her "statements to the police should have been suppressed," because the statements were obtained prior to defendant receiving her Miranda warning. Defendant's opening brief appears to assert that only the pre-Miranda statements should have been excluded. However, in defendant's reply brief, she asserts that Deputy Gelinas deliberately used a "two-step interrogation technique" to obtain her confession. The two-step interrogation argument implies that the pre- and post-Miranda statements should have been excluded. Out of an abundance of caution, we will assume that defendant is asserting all of her statements to Deputy Gelinas should have been suppressed due to the two-step technique. We disagree with defendant's contention.
b) Post-Miranda Statements
We start with the rules and analysis related to defendant's post-Miranda statements. "In midstream Miranda cases (where a defendant is interviewed before and after the giving of Miranda warnings), a defendant's postwarning inculpatory statements are generally admissible if the prewarning statements and the postwarning statements were voluntarily made. [Citation.]" (People v. Camino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1363-1364.) "'Even when a first statement is taken in the absence of proper advisements and is incriminating, so long as the first statement was voluntary a subsequent voluntary confession ordinarily is not tainted simply because it was procured after a Miranda violation. Absent "any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise [her] free will," a Miranda violation—even one resulting in the defendant's letting "the cat out of the bag"—does not "so taint[] the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period." [Citations.] Rather "there is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where the suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary. The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made." [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 477.)
"The prosecution has the burden of establishing voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Whether a confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances. We accept a trial court's factual findings, provided they are supported by substantial evidence, but we independently review the ultimate legal question. [Citations.]" (People v. Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 480.)
When Deputy Gelinas asked defendant if she was on parole or probation, defendant replied, "No." The question about whether defendant was on parole was posed when the deputy first approached defendant, before she was arrested. Thus, it appears that the statement was made voluntarily, because defendant had just encountered Deputy Gelinas when she made the statement.
Next, Deputy Gelinas asked defendant if she had any contraband inside the truck. Defendant admitted she had methamphetamine in the front passenger seat area. It appears defendant volunteered this information of her own accord. There is nothing indicating Deputy Gelinas pressured or coerced defendant. Defendant could have responded that there was contraband in the car, without admitting it belonged to her, but defendant confessed that the drugs were hers. From the record, the statement appears to be voluntary.
When Deputy Gelinas spoke to defendant at the police station, he asked, "And all [the] methamphetamine is yours, you said it was yours, right?" Defendant responded, "Well, yeah." Again, the question by the deputy does not appear to be coercive. There is nothing in the circumstances of this statement indicating it was made involuntarily. It appears Deputy Gelinas was trying to clarify defendant's prior statement, which she made during the search of the truck. It appears that defendant could have freely changed her answer, or not responded to the deputy, with little consequence. Further, it does not appear that defendant had been held for an extremely long time, somehow creating some external environmental pressure to confess—defendant was stopped at 2:22 a.m., and interviewed at 4:44 a.m. Therefore, we conclude defendant voluntarily made the statement to Deputy Gelinas.
After defendant waived her Miranda rights, the deputy asked her what items in the truck belonged to her. Defendant said, "[T]he drugs are mine." Defendant then specified that the methamphetamine belonged to her. The deputy asked, "What about the meth pipe?" Defendant responded, "Mine." Defendant confessed to snorting and smoking methamphetamine. When asked about Deltoro, defendant stated Deltoro smoked methamphetamine, but again affirmed that the pipe belonged to defendant. Defendant denied selling methamphetamine. When Deputy Gelinas asked, "Anything else you wanna tell me?" Defendant responded, "[T]his stuff's mine."
Immediately after Deputy Gelinas read defendant her Miranda rights, defendant asked, "Um so what are my other charges, what are they? Like . . . ." It does not appear that defendant explicitly waived her rights; however, there does not appear to be a dispute that defendant implicitly waived her rights by continuing to speak with Deputy Gelinas.
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Throughout the post-Miranda interview, defendant repeatedly admitted the methamphetamine and the pipe belonged to her. The interview reflects that defendant was not merely confessing to please Deputy Gelinas, because she denied selling drugs. Further, defendant offered confessions throughout the case: when Deputy Gelinas searched the truck; when Deputy Gelinas interviewed defendant at the police station; and during the trial. Given the foregoing evidence and circumstances, we conclude that defendant's post-Miranda statements were voluntary. Since all the statements were voluntary, the trial court did not err by admitting the post-Miranda statements into evidence.
c) Pre-Miranda Statements
We now turn to defendant's pre-Miranda statements. "'A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.' [Citations.]" (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639.)
We have concluded ante, that defendant's pre-Miranda statements were voluntary. The recorded interview with defendant and Deputy Gelinas reflects that defendant continued talking to the deputy after being informed of her Miranda rights. Since defendant's pre-Miranda statements were voluntary, we conclude that the subsequent administration of Miranda rights suffice to remove the conditions that would normally preclude admission of the earlier statement. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by admitting the statements.
Nevertheless, to the extent an error could be found in admitting the pre-Miranda statements, we conclude that such an error would be harmless. "When a statement obtained in violation of Miranda is erroneously admitted into evidence, the conviction may be affirmed if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Peracchi (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 353, 363, fn. omitted.)
Prior to being given Miranda warnings, defendant denied that she was on parole and admitted to owning the methamphetamine on the front floorboard of the truck. After waiving her Miranda rights, defendant told Deputy Gelinas, "Um, the drugs are mine." When asked to be specific, defendant said, "Uh, the methamphetamine, I guess. (Unintelligible[.]) It was mine." When asked exactly what methamphetamine was hers, defendant responded, "Um, the dope that you found on the rug on the passenger side." Defendant described two plastic bags of methamphetamine that belonged to her. Defendant also admitted owning the pipe that was in the truck.
The foregoing evidence reflects that defendant made all the same statements regarding owning the methamphetamine after waiving her Miranda rights, that she made prior to waiving her Miranda rights. Thus, the jury would have heard that defendant confessed to owning the methamphetamine regardless of the pre-Miranda statements being admitted into evidence. Accordingly, any error related to admitting the pre-Miranda statements is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In regard to being on parole, defendant said during the post-Miranda interview, "I'm on parole, I thought I was getting off parole." Defendant continued, "And uh, my parole officer, when I talked to her, she was gonna be discharging me, like any day and uh, I knew I would be, eventually being on probation, 'cause Prop 36 was coming up." Deputy Gelinas testified that when he gave defendant's name to the dispatcher, it was discovered that she was on probation. When defendant testified at trial, the following exchange took place:
"[Defense Attorney]: . . . When he first stopped you, he asked you if you were on parole?
"[Defendant]: Yes.
"[Defense Attorney]: And you told him no?
"[Defendant]: Yes.
"[Defense Attorney]: Why did you tell him no?
"[Defendant]: Because I thought I was off parole.
"[Defense Attorney]: And when you thought you were off parole, did that mean you were going to be discharged completely from parole?
"[Defendant]: Yes."
The foregoing evidence reflects that regardless of the admission of the pre-Miranda statement, the jury would have still heard that defendant initially denied being on parole. Since the same evidence would have been heard, we conclude that any error in admitting the pre-Miranda statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
RICHLI
J.