Opinion
June 29, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Fertig, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Trial Judge did not improvidently exercise his discretion in denying the defendant's request for an adjournment in order to retain private counsel. The defendant had six months, which was a reasonable opportunity, to retain private counsel prior to his request for an adjournment. The Trial Judge was willing to allow the defendant one day to obtain private counsel but was unwilling to allow the defendant to further delay the proceedings (see, People v Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264; People v. Branch, 155 A.D.2d 473 ). In view of the lateness of the defendant's request, which was made during a Huntley hearing and immediately before the trial, the refusal to grant an adjournment of more than one day was proper (see, People v. Gloster, 175 A.D.2d 258; People v Branch, supra; People v. Rascio, 136 A.D.2d 575, 576). In addition, although the defendant alleged, in a conclusory manner, that he was not satisfied with the representation afforded by assigned counsel, the record demonstrates that the request was merely a dilatory tactic (see, People v. Gloster, supra, at 260; People v. Gibson, 137 A.D.2d 553).
Further, the defendant pleaded guilty knowing that he would receive the sentence ultimately imposed by the court. Under the circumstances, we find that the sentence was not excessive (see, People v. Priddle, 177 A.D.2d 736; People v. McKinnon, 173 A.D.2d 863). Thompson, J.P., Miller, Copertino and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.