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People v. Carter

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Jan 11, 2012
D057679 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012)

Opinion

D057679 Super. Ct. No. SCD224574

01-11-2012

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MELVIN LEE CARTER, Defendant and Appellant.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert F. O'Neill, Judge. Affirmed.

Melvin Carter fatally strangled his girlfriend, Christina Jones, after threatening her with violence and refusing to allow Christina and her cousin (Jennifer Bradford) to leave the apartment for about seven hours. The prosecution charged Carter with first degree murder and various other offenses committed against Christina, Bradford, and two young children who were in the apartment when Carter killed Christina. At trial, Carter admitted he killed Christina, but urged the jury to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than first degree murder.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Carter guilty of: (1) second degree murder of Christina; (2) false imprisonment of Christina by violence; (3) false imprisonment of Bradford by violence; and (4) two counts of assaulting Bradford with a deadly weapon or force likely to cause great bodily injury. The jury also found Carter personally used a deadly weapon when committing the false imprisonment and assault crimes. The jury found Carter not guilty of felony child abuse charges. The court imposed a sentence of 15 years to life, plus a determinate term of six years four months.

As his primary appellate argument, Carter contends the court erred by allowing the prosecution to show a photograph of Christina while she was alive. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph. We also reject Carter's contentions pertaining to the court's denial of his mistrial motion and an asserted Penal Code section 654 sentencing error. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND


Prosecution Case

Carter and Christina dated for several years and had two children together. During their relationship, Carter frequently physically abused Christina. In November 2009, Carter was arrested for beating Christina. While in custody, Carter was angry at Christina for refusing to bail him out of jail. Christina wanted him to stay in custody because she was very afraid he would harm her. Shortly before he was released, Carter said: " 'When I get out, I going to kill that mother-fucker [referring to Christina].' "

After spending about three weeks in jail, Carter was released and immediately went to Christina's apartment and waited outside. Christina's 20-year-old cousin (Jennifer Bradford) was staying with Christina to help care for Christina's children.

At about 4:00 p.m., when Bradford opened the front door, Carter charged into the apartment, slamming and locking the door behind him. During the next seven hours, Carter terrorized Christina and Bradford, refusing to permit the women to leave the residence. Carter acted in an angry, irrational, and highly emotional manner, and threatened to kill both women.

At one point, Carter closed the blinds and turned up the volume on the television. Carter then grabbed a knife from the kitchen and swung it at Bradford. Bradford was able to move out of the way. After calming him down, Christina convinced Carter to drop the knife. Carter was shaking and crying during this incident.

Carter later grabbed a skillet from the kitchen and swung it at Christina's face. Christina was able to duck and avoid being hit. Carter also swung the skillet at Bradford's face, but she too was able to avoid being hit. Carter was crying while he was attempting to hit the women. Christina talked Carter into dropping the skillet and calmed him down.

Later in the night, Carter was talking on the phone with his sister. He told his sister: " 'I want you to let my kids know their momma did this to herself.' "

Towards the end of the seven-hour period, Christina went into the bathroom, locked herself inside, and attempted to call the police for help. Carter became enraged, pounded on the bathroom door, and yelled for Christina to come out. Carter looked like "[he] was just losing it completely." Carter was swearing and acting extremely angry.

During the commotion, Bradford ran out the front door. She called 911, telling the operator that Carter was attempting to break down the bathroom door. Bradford repeatedly told the dispatcher to "hurry" because Carter would "kill" Christina if the police did not come quickly.

The police arrived a few minutes later. Carter answered the door to the apartment and was placed under arrest. The police found Christina's lifeless body on her bedroom floor. An autopsy revealed that she had been strangled to death. Police officers discovered the bathroom door had been destroyed. Carter's and Christina's two young children were found unharmed on a bed in the front room.

Defense

Carter did not testify at trial. His sole defense witness was a police detective, who testified that when he interviewed Carter about Christina's murder, Carter cried several times and was dry heaving and spitting into a trash can.

Closing Arguments

During closing arguments, the prosecutor urged the jury to find Carter guilty of first degree murder based on a premeditation and deliberation theory. The prosecutor emphasized the evidence supporting this theory, including Carter's statements made in jail that he intended to kill Christina, Carter's conduct and statements made during the seven-hour ordeal in the apartment, the length of time Carter had to consider his actions, and the manner of the killing (requiring three to five minutes of pressure to cause death).

In defense, Carter's counsel acknowledged that Carter killed Christina, but argued that the jury should find him guilty only of voluntary manslaughter, and not murder. Defense counsel argued that the killing was a result of Carter's "bizarre behavior" which occurred when Carter acted impulsively from anger and passion rather than reason.

Jury Verdict

The jury returned a second-degree murder verdict, and found Carter guilty of false imprisonment with violence against Christina. The jury also found Carter guilty of false imprisonment with violence against Bradford and two counts of assaulting Bradford with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury. The jury found Carter personally used a deadly weapon while committing each of the false imprisonment and assault crimes. The jury found Carter not guilty of the felony child abuse charges.

DISCUSSION


I. Photograph of Christina While Alive and Without Injuries

Carter contends the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to exclude a photograph of Christina while she was alive.

A. Background

At the hearing on in limine motions, Carter moved to exclude various photographs of Christina, including one where she is sitting alone on a couch and she has no visible injuries. Carter's counsel argued the photograph did not have any probative value. The prosecutor responded that he intended to use the photograph for witnesses to identify Christina without having to look at Christina's autopsy photographs or photographs depicting Christina's prior domestic violence injuries.

The court excluded some of the prosecutor's proffered photographs (including one of Christina with her children), but denied Carter's motion with respect to the photograph of Christina sitting alone on the couch. The court stated it was exercising its discretion to admit the photograph because the picture served several purposes, including "for the people to identify a photograph as the person about whom they are testifying" and "to show the victim as she was depicted when she was alive." The court also noted "there is nothing prejudicial about the photograph . . . ."

During trial, the prosecutor showed the photograph to two witnesses (Christina's twin sister (fraternal twin) and Bradford) for purposes of having these witnesses identify Christina.

B. Analysis

A photograph of a murder victim while the victim was alive should not be admitted if its sole purpose is to generate sympathy for the victim. (See People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1230.) However, a photograph is admissible if it is relevant to an issue, such as identification of the victim by testifying witnesses. (See People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 115.) "[T]he admission of photographs of the victim lies within the discretion of the trial court and the exercise of discretion will not be disturbed unless the probative value of such photographs is clearly outweighed by their prejudicial effect." (Id. at pp. 114-115.)

In this case, the photograph was shown to two witnesses to allow the witnesses to identify Christina. Although Christina's identification was not disputed, it was appropriate for the witnesses and the jury to view the photograph for this foundational purpose. (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 676-677; People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1230.)

Carter argues the photograph created undue sympathy for Christina. This contention is unsupported. The photograph reflects Christina sitting alone on a couch. The record does not disclose that either witness displayed any emotion when identifying Christina from this photograph. Moreover, the jury likely felt sympathy for Christina not because of the photograph but because of the facts of the case showing Carter admitted to the senseless strangling of this young defenseless mother after terrorizing her for seven hours while her young children were in the apartment. Further, the jury was shown numerous photographs of Christina that were much more likely to elicit an emotional reaction, including several autopsy photographs and photographs of injuries previously inflicted by Carter, depicting Christina with a black eye, bruised arms, and lip and face injuries. Carter does not challenge the relevance and admissibility of any of these photographs.

Notwithstanding the emotional facts presented at trial, the jury displayed commendable objectivity and the ability to understand the legal and factual nuances of the case. Despite strong evidence of premeditation and deliberation, the jury rejected the prosecution's first degree murder theory and found Carter guilty of second degree murder. Further, the jury acquitted Carter of the felony child abuse charges. These verdicts support that the jury understood and complied with its duty to independently evaluate the evidence without undue sympathy towards Christina.

The court did not err in admitting the photograph. Additionally, any error was harmless. There is no possibility the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to Carter if it had not seen the photograph. (See People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 477; People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1230-1231; People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 962-963.)

II. Request for Mistrial

Carter contends the court erred in denying his request for a mistrial because a juror inadvertently saw him in restraints in a courthouse elevator.

A. Background Information

Following closing arguments and before the jury began deliberating, the prosecutor notified the court that during the last break, he and one of Carter's defense attorneys were standing near the courthouse elevator as Juror No. 12 (Juror 12) waited for the elevator. When the elevator door opened, Carter was inside the elevator with restraints in the custody of a law enforcement official. The juror made brief eye contact with Carter, and then immediately walked away and took the stairs.

Based on this incident, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Counsel noted that Carter was "chained around his waist" and "around his feet" and was held by a deputy. The prosecutor countered that the brief contact was not grounds for a mistrial, and asked the court to question the juror and instruct her to disregard the contact and not to discuss it with the other jurors.

The court then brought Juror 12 into the courtroom. During the questioning, the juror acknowledged she saw Carter in the elevator in restraints, but she "looked down right away" and that it lasted "maybe half a second, if that long." The juror said the incident would not affect her decision in the case and that she would not mention it to any of the other jurors. With respect to Carter being chained and being escorted, the juror noted that we "are in a courthouse. It is to be expected, I think."

The court then gave the following admonitions to Juror 12:

"The Court: [Y]ou understand that there is a jury instruction that indicates you cannot consider that the defendant has been arrested, charged with a crime or brought to trial as evidence in this case."
"Juror No. 12: Right."
"The Court: That's one of the instructions, words to that effect. Do you think you can follow that instruction."
"Juror No. 12: I do."
"The Court: Do you think notwithstanding what you may have observed in the elevator, you can still be fair and impartial in this case?"
"Juror No. 12: I think so."
"The Court: And you may recall, there is an instruction that says you can't discuss the case among anyone else, form any opinions, and it would be improper for you in jury deliberations to bring up this subject with any of the other jurors. Do you understand that?"
"Juror No. 12: Uh-huh, yes."
"The Court: And do you assure the court you will not do so?"
"Juror No. 12: I do."
The court then denied the mistrial motion and declined to release the juror.

B. The Trial Court Properly Denied Carter's Motion for a Mistrial

A trial court should grant a mistrial when a party's chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged. (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 372.) We apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial court's ruling denying a mistrial. (Ibid.)

The court did not abuse its discretion. The facts show that Carter was not restrained while he was in the courtroom. Although one juror briefly saw Carter in restraints while he was being transported in a public portion of the courthouse, the court had a reasonable basis to accept the juror's representations that this viewing would not affect her in any way. This scenario is materially different from the cases relied upon by Carter, in which a trial court orders a defendant shackled and handcuffed throughout the trial. (See Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 633, 635; People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-291.)

Carter contends there was an inherent risk of prejudice because viewing a defendant in shackles " 'is likely to lead the jurors to infer that he is a violent person disposed to commit crimes of the type alleged.' " However, Carter admitted at trial he strangled his girlfriend after terrorizing her with a knife and other objects for a lengthy period. Given this admission, it is not reasonable to conclude a juror would have expected to see Carter in a public elevator without being restrained, and/or would have been prejudiced against him because he was restrained. There was no danger that the jury would improperly conclude that Carter was a violent and dangerous criminal, because even under his version of the events, he was violent and dangerous.

Moreover, shortly before Juror 12 saw Carter in the elevator, the court had instructed the jury that: (1) the jurors could consider only "the evidence that is presented in the courtroom"; (2) "The fact that the defendant was arrested, charged with a crime, or brought to trial is not evidence of guilt"; and (3) the jurors "must disregard anything you see or hear when the court is not in session." (Italics added.) The court repeated its admonitions to Juror 12 after the encounter and the juror specifically stated she would follow the court's instructions.

On this record, the court acted well within its discretion when it denied Carter's motion for a mistrial.

Carter alternatively contends his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting the court to ask the other jurors whether they had seen Carter in restraints. This argument is without merit. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Carter must demonstrate that his trial counsel both: (1) provided representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) this deficient representation subjected Carter to prejudice, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failings, he would have received a more favorable result. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 908-909.)

Courts must exercise deferential scrutiny in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because "the reasonableness of defense counsel's conduct must be assessed 'under the circumstances as they stood' at the time of counsel's acts or omissions." (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 449.) This "highly deferential" scrutiny prohibits "second-gues[sing]" counsel's assistance and employs a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689.)

Under these principles, Carter has not met his burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel. Carter's trial counsel had a valid tactical reason for not requesting inquiry of the entire jury panel—to avoid the potential of exposing the entire jury to the fact that Carter had been in restraints in the courthouse. Additionally, it is unlikely that any other juror saw Carter because defense counsel also viewed the contact and stated that only Juror 12 was observed during the brief encounter. Juror 12 assured the court that she would not share what she saw with the other jurors. Moreover, there was no indication of any out-of-the-courtroom contact between Carter and the jurors at any other time.

Further, even if there was an inquiry and the court learned that one or more of the jurors also saw Carter in restraints, there is no reasonable likelihood this incident would have affected the jury verdict. The evidence supporting the convictions was tremendously strong, and the jury's rejection of the prosecution's first degree murder theory shows the jury complied with its duty to independently evaluate the evidence and apply the law without any improper bias towards Carter.

III. Penal Code Section 654

The court imposed a prison term that included 15 years to life for the murder count and a consecutive eight-month determinate sentence for the false-imprisonment-of-Christina count. Carter contends the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on these counts under Penal Code section 654 (section 654). This contention fails because substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Carter had separate and distinct objectives for each of those crimes.

Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for a single act or indivisible course of conduct. (§ 654, subd. (a); People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 591.) When a defendant is convicted of two offenses that are part of an indivisible course of conduct, the sentence for one of the offenses must be stayed. Section 654 ensures that a defendant's punishment is commensurate with his or her culpability. (People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1252.)

Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible allowing multiple punishment under section 654 depends on whether the defendant had a separate objective for each offense. (People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944, 951-952.) "If all of the crimes were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, a defendant may be punished only once." (People v. Perry (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1525.) In contrast, if the defendant "had several independent criminal objectives, he may be punished for each crime committed in pursuit of each objective, even though the crimes shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct." (Ibid.)

When there is a temporal or spatial separation between offenses, giving the defendant time to reflect and renew his or her intent, the defendant's decision to continue a course of criminal conduct supports a finding that the defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives. (People v. Kwok, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1253-1257; People v. Surdi (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 685, 689.) This time-for-reflection principle may apply even when the multiple crimes share the same objective. (People v. Kwok, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1253-1257.) Further, an offense may "at some point . . . become so extreme [that the offense] can no longer be termed 'incidental' and must be considered to express a different and a more sinister goal than mere successful commission" of the other offense. (People v. Nguyen (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 181, 191; People v. Saffle (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 434, 439-440.)

Whether a defendant harbored a single intent is a factual question for the trial court. (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) The trial court's determination will be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731.)

In this case, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Carter harbored separate and distinct objectives in committing the false imprisonment and second degree murder crimes. Carter's objective when he strangled Christina was to kill her. Although Carter may have had this same intent in falsely imprisoning her, the evidence supported that Carter's objectives also included his intent to punish her for refusing to bail him out of jail, scare her and threaten her, and keep her in the apartment while he figured out what he was going to do and how he was going to do it. If Carter intended to simply murder Christina, he could have committed the act sooner than seven hours after he burst through her front door. This is supported by the jury's second degree murder verdict, indicating that it rejected the theory that Carter went to Christina's apartment with a deliberate and premeditated plan to kill.

Ascertaining a defendant's intent and objective is primarily a question of fact for the trial judge whose finding that the crimes were divisible will be upheld on appeal if there is evidence to support it. (People v. Nelson (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 634, 638; see also People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1583.) The evidence supports the court's finding that Carter had independent criminal objectives in committing the murder and the false imprisonment crimes.

DISPOSITION

Judgment affirmed.

__________

HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________

HUFFMAN, Acting P.J.

__________

AARON, J.


Summaries of

People v. Carter

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Jan 11, 2012
D057679 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012)
Case details for

People v. Carter

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MELVIN LEE CARTER, Defendant and…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Jan 11, 2012

Citations

D057679 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012)