In the absence of specific statutory guidance, we conclude it is appropriate to apply longstanding principles drawn from the speedy trial context regarding the effect of delay on the running of the section 1370(c)(1) time limit. (See Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.3th 354, 385, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 490, 534 P.3d 484 (Camacho) ["In general, delays sought by the defendant’s counsel weigh against the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation."]; id. at p. 393, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 490, 584 P.3d 484 [concluding that petitioner failed to show a violation of his due process right to a timely trial when only "the length of the delay" strongly supported his claim]; id. at p. 394, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 490, 584 P.3d 484 [and "the defense, rather than the state, [bore] more responsibility for the delay"]; see also People v. Carter (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1092, 1100, 320 Cal. Rptr.3d 883, 548 P.3d 294 [applying speedy trial principles to assessing trial delay under the Sexually Violent Predator Act and stating " ‘delays sought by the defendant’s counsel weigh against the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation’ "]; Hernandez-Valenzuela v. Superior Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1108, 1124, 291 Cal. Rptr.3d 154 [Under section 1382, "delay caused by the conduct of the defendant constitutes good cause to deny his motion to dismiss [for speedy trial violation].
After this matter was submitted, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Carter (May 20, 2024, S278262) ___Cal.5th ___ , in which it conditionally reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that "[h]aving both motions before it, the trial court should have considered Carter's Marsden motion in the context of his proposed motion to dismiss.