Opinion
C078010
10-30-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN CARTER, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CM034744)
Defendant Christopher Stephen Carter challenges a victim restitution order requiring him to pay restitution to the victim's husband who was not her spouse at the time of the crimes. We reverse the trial court's order.
After sentencing defendant for committing numerous sex crimes against A.G., defendant's stepdaughter, over a 12-year period, the trial court ordered defendant to pay victim restitution to A.G.'s husband, Austin. A.G. was not married during the time she was molested, but she was married at the time of trial. Austin accompanied her to California from out-of-state for the trial. Once here, in addition to attending trial, he transported her to and from the airport, court, various meetings with the prosecution team, and a counseling session. He requested, and was awarded, $2,480.11 in restitution for the costs associated with his travel and lost wages.
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding restitution to Austin because he did not qualify as a victim for purposes of victim restitution. He was not A.G.'s husband at the time of the crimes nor was he a direct victim of the crimes. He was not a percipient witness. There was no evidence he lived in A.G.'s household or was A.G.'s fiancé or primary caretaker at the time of the crimes. And there was no evidence he was A.G.'s support person at trial under Penal Code section 868.5.
The Attorney General argues the court appropriately awarded restitution to Austin. He contends the costs were reasonably incurred as a result of the crime, and they were A.G.'s direct economic loss because she was married to Austin at the time of trial. In other words, the costs were a loss borne by the family unit of which A.G. is a part, and thus she bore the loss directly. That the restitution request was submitted with Austin's name on it rather than A.G.'s name does not, according to the Attorney General, change the fact the loss was borne directly by A.G. To argue otherwise, he asserts, is mere semantics. We disagree with the Attorney General.
"We review the trial court's restitution order for abuse of discretion. A restitution order that is based on a demonstrable error of law constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion." (People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 721.)
"Victim restitution is mandatory under the California Constitution. Article I, section 28, subdivision (b), to the California Constitution provides in pertinent part: '(A) It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer. [¶] (B) Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.' (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A)-(B).) . . . These constitutional provisions were enacted by the voters as part of Proposition 8, the Victims' Bill of Rights of 1982 ([People v.] Giordano [(2007)] 42 Cal.4th [644,] 652), and they were subsequently amended by the electorate in Proposition 9, Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy's Law (Marsy's Law) (Prop. 9, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) eff. Nov. 5, 2008; Cal. Const., art. I, § 28.)" (People v. Nichols (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 330, 341.)
Under Marsy's Law, a "victim" is entitled to restitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13).) For purposes of Marsy's Law, a victim "is a person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act. The term 'victim' also includes the person's spouse, parents, children, siblings, or guardian . . . ." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (e).)
The constitutional mandate for restitution is implemented through Penal Code section 1202.4 (section 1202.4). In relevant part, this statute mandates that "in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)
However, section 1202.4 defines the term "victim" with more specificity than Marsy's Law, and Austin does not qualify. For purposes of the statute, a victim is, among other definitions not relevant here, "(3) A person who has sustained economic loss as the result of a crime and who satisfies any of the following conditions:
"(A) At the time of the crime was the parent, grandparent, sibling, spouse, child, or grandchild of the victim.
"(B) At the time of the crime was living in the household of the victim.
"(C) At the time of the crime was a person who had previously lived in the household of the victim for a period of not less than two years in a relationship substantially similar to a relationship listed in subparagraph (A).
"(D) Is another family member of the victim, including, but not limited to, the victim's fiancé or fiancée, and who witnessed the crime.
"(E) Is the primary caretaker of a minor victim." (§ 1202.4, subd. (k), italics added.)
Austin does not qualify under any of these provisions. At the time of the crime, he was not married to A.G. or living in her household, he had not lived in her household for at least two years, and he was not A.G.'s fiancé.
This court faced a similar issue in People v. Crisler (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1503 (Crisler), but the case is distinguishable. There, we held the parents and stepfather of a murder victim could recover their costs of attending the defendant's trial through victim restitution. The primary issue on appeal was whether the costs, not specifically enumerated in section 1202.4, were recoverable. We held they were. The statute required victims be fully reimbursed for economic losses, and the three individuals each qualified as "victims" under section 1202.4. (Id. at pp. 1507-1509.) Trial-related expenses need not fall within enumerated categories to qualify for reimbursement, and it was reasonable the parents and stepfather would attend trial to gain some measure of closure and a sense that justice had been done. (Id. at p. 1509.)
We do not doubt that Austin's trial-related expenses qualified for reimbursement under section 1202.4 so long as Austin qualified as a victim. Unlike the parents in Crisler, however, he does not qualify as a victim. Indeed, the Attorney General makes no claim that he does.
Instead, the Attorney General contends the costs Austin incurred to attend trial were actually A.G.'s direct costs because at the time of trial, Austin and A.G. were married. The Attorney General cites to no authority to support his argument.
The existing authority is otherwise. The Attorney General asserts any distinction between A.G. and Austin in this matter is mere semantics, but the Legislature thought otherwise. "At the outset, we conclude that, under the terms of both Marsy's Law and section 1202.4, a crime victim may recover only for losses personally incurred by that victim. Thus, section 1202.4 expresses the Legislature's intent that a 'victim of crime who incurs . . . economic loss' as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct 'shall receive restitution' (id., subd. (a)(1), italics added) and provides that the court shall order the defendant to 'make restitution to the victim or victims . . . based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims' (id., subd. (f), italics added). The restitution order must 'identify each victim and each loss to which it pertains,' and must provide 'a dollar amount [of restitution] sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims' for their economic losses. (Id., subd. (f)(3), italics added.)
"The statute then defines and limits the categories of 'victim[s]' that are entitled to recover for the losses they have accrued. These include, in addition to an 'actual' ([Pen. Code], § 1204.4, subd. (k)(1)) or 'direct' (id., subd. (k)(2)) victim, the immediate surviving family of an actual victim (id., subd. (k)(1)); certain other persons who sustained economic loss as a result of the crime, including a parent, grandparent, spouse, child, or grandchild of the victim (id., subd. (k)(3)(A)), a present member, and certain former members, of the victim's household (id., subd., (k)(3)(B), (C)), another family member who witnessed the crime (id., subd. (k)(3)(D)), and the primary caretaker of a minor victim (id., subd. (k)(3)(E)) . . . .
"Similarly, article I, section 28 of the California Constitution, as amended by Marsy's Law, provides that a 'victim' is entitled to 'restitution' ([id.], subd. (b)(13)), specifies that a 'victim' is 'a person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of . . . a crime' (id., subd. (e), italics added), and additionally defines a victim to include 'the person's spouse, parents, children, siblings, or guardian, and includes a lawful representative of a crime victim who is deceased, a minor, or physically or psychologically incapacitated' (ibid., italics added). Here again, the implication is that a defined victim, and only a defined victim, is entitled to restitution on his or her own personal behalf, or on the personal behalf of the deceased, minor, or incapacitated victim he or she lawfully represents." (People v. Runyan (2012) 54 Cal.4th 849, 859-860, original italics.)
Because A.G. did not personally incur Austin's losses, Austin cannot contend that his losses were her losses. Austin could recover for his losses only if he qualified as a victim, as Penal Code section 1202.4 defines that term, and he does not.
DISPOSITION
The order awarding victim restitution to Austin is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
ROBIE, J.
HOCH, J.