Opinion
01-05-2017
Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York (Richard E. Mischel of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Malancha Chanda of counsel), for respondent.
Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York (Richard E. Mischel of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Malancha Chanda of counsel), for respondent.
Judgment, New York County (Juan M. Merchan, J.), rendered May 17, 2012, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of perjury in the first degree and offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree, and sentencing him to a conditional discharge for a period of three years, unanimously affirmed.
The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations. The falsity of defendant's statements was amply corroborated, notwithstanding any minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the People's witnesses.
The court providently exercised its discretion in imposing reasonable limits on cross-examination (see People v. Corby, 6 N.Y.3d 231, 234–235, 811 N.Y.S.2d 613, 844 N.E.2d 1135 [2005] ) that did not violate defendant's constitutional rights (see Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689–690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 [1986] ; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678–679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 [1986] ). In one of the instances at issue, the court providently precluded elicitation of a purported inconsistency that lacked any probative value and was potentially confusing to the jury. In the other instance, the court providently excluded hearsay testimony because, although not offered for its truth, its relevance essentially depended on its being true.
ACOSTA, J.P., MAZZARELLI, ANDRIAS, FEINMAN, WEBBER, JJ.