• 1 The effect of Rule 234 as it then existed was to place the primary duty of conducting voir dire examination upon the trial court, subject to a reasonable opportunity by the parties to supplement such examination. ( People v. Carruthers (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 260.) From the early case of Donovan v. People (1891), 139 Ill. 412, up until the time of the 1975 amendment of Rule 234, the defendant had the right to question the veniremen directly. It was pointed out in People v. Lobb (1956), 17 Ill.2d 287, 301, that Donovan was based on an earlier Michigan case, and Michigan had since changed to allow the judge, in his discretion, to conduct the entire examination, and that selection of an impartial jury did not require that the parties be permitted to examine; however it has been held that direct questioning by the parties was not to be prohibited entirely. People v. Carruthers (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 261; People v. Willis (1975), 26 Ill. App.3d 518, 527; People v. Etten (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 842, 845.

( Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609, 615, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1233; People v. Burton (1969), 44 Ill.2d 53, 56, 254 N.E.2d 527.) If, however, defense counsel comments on defendant's failure to testify and offers an explanation for this failure, the defense has thereby invited the prosecution to refute defense counsel's explanation for defendant's failure to take the stand. (See People v. Ivery (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 158, 161, 390 N.E.2d 608; People v. Conner (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 234, 239, 355 N.E.2d 662; People v. Carruthers (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 266-67, 309 N.E.2d 659; see also People v. Eddington (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 953, 963, 453 N.E.2d 1383; People v. Hasting (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 724, 726, 372 N.E.2d 702.) In Conner, defense counsel in closing argument commented on his failure to call defendant to testify.

• 2 While a prosecutor normally may not comment on an accused's failure to testify, such comment may be proper when that area has been opened to fair comment by the accused's first directing the jury's attention to it himself. People v. Bolton (3d Dist. 1976), 35 Ill. App.3d 965, 343 N.E.2d 190; People v. Conner (1st Dist. 1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 234, 355 N.E.2d 662; People v. Carruthers (1st Dist. 1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 309 N.E.2d 659. • 3 The prosecutor's comments in the present case were clearly in response to arguments previously made by defense counsel.

The general rule with regard to reputation testimony is that the character of an accused is provable only by evidence of general reputation, and the personal opinion of the witness is not competent evidence as to the character of the accused. People v. Lyons (1954), 4 Ill.2d 396, 122 N.E.2d 809; People v. Carruthers (1st Dist. 1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 309 N.E.2d 659. • 13 Defendant Scales offered the testimony of a witness to establish her reputation as being a peaceful and nonviolent person.

See People v. Finney (1967), 88 Ill. App.2d 204, 232 N.E.2d 247, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936, 20 L.Ed.2d 1394, 88 S.Ct. 2304. • 3 People v. Carruthers (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 309 N.E.2d 659, which involved circumstances nearly identical to the instant case, held that where defense counsel raises the subject of defendant's failure to testify he thereby opens the subject to fair comment. We agree.

Although the foundations of the Donovan case have been questioned ( People v. Lobb, 17 Ill.2d 287, 301, 161 N.E.2d 325, 333), it appears that direct questioning of prospective jurors is not to be prohibited entirely. ( People v. Carruthers, 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 261-262, 309 N.E.2d 659, 664-665.) Illinois has not yet adopted the Federal rule regarding voir dire.

However, it has been repeatedly held that "direct questioning of prospective jurors by the parties or their attorneys during voir dire examination is not to be totally prohibited." People v. Turner, 27 Ill. App.3d 239, 326 N.E.2d 425, citing Lobb; also People v. Carruthers, 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 309 N.E.2d 659; Street v. Finney, 9 Ill. App.3d 638, 292 N.E.2d 553. See also People v. Willis, 26 Ill. App.3d 518, 325 N.E.2d 715.

• 2 Supreme Court Rule 234 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 234) states: "The judge shall initiate the voir dire examination of jurors * * *. * * * The parties or their attorneys shall be allowed a reasonable opportunity to supplement such examination, * * *." In People v. Carruthers (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 309 N.E.2d 659, we held that direct questioning of prospective jurors by the parties or their attorneys during voir dire examination is not to be totally prohibited. ( People v. Lobb (1959), 17 Ill.2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325; Street v. Finney (1973), 9 Ill. App.3d 638, 292 N.E.2d 553.) However, we also held in Carruthers that no prejudicial error occurs in the selection of jurors by such procedure where there is no evidence that thereby defendant's attorney [was] "prevented from discovering any fact or reason why a prospective juror might be biased or lack the essential qualifications for service as a juror in the case."

United States v. Hephner, 410 F.2d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 1969), United States ex rel. Miller v. Follette, 397 F.2d 363 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969); Babb v. United States, 351 F.2d 863, 867-868 (8th Cir. 1965); Adair v. State, 51 Ala. App. 651, 653, 288 So.2d 187, 190 (1973); People v. Burns, 270 Cal.App.2d 238, 247, 75 Cal.Rptr. 688, 693 (1969); People v. Boyden, 251 Cal.App.2d 798, 800, 60 Cal.Rptr. 271, 272 (1967); People v. Davenport, 240 Cal.App.2d 341, 346-7, 49 Cal.Rptr. 575, 578-579 (1966); Kurtz v. People, 494 P.2d 97, 106 (Colo. 1972); People v. Carruthers, 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 266-7, 309 N.E.2d 659, 668 (1974); State v. Sage, 162 N.W.2d 502, 504 (Iowa 1968); State v. Ergenbright, 84 N.M. 662, 665, 506 P.2d 1209, 1212 (1973); State v. Paris, 76 N.M. 291, 299, 414 P.2d 512, 518 (1966); Gaddis v. State, 447 P.2d 42, 48 (Okla. Cr. 1968); Tilford v. State, 437 P.2d 261, 267 (Okla.

The prosecution's statement in response, that Sims was the only witness that the jury had heard from, was therefore invited by defense counsel's statement. (See People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill.2d 373, 478 N.E.2d 934; People v. Smith, 127 Ill. App.3d at 632-33; People v. Carruthers (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 267, 309 N.E.2d 659 ("defendant may not predicate error on a response by the prosecutor which he himself provoked").) Finally, even if the prosecutor's statement was improper, there was no greater prejudice flowing from his remark than that which may have resulted from defense counsel's own comment.