Opinion
02-10-2017
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Glenwood E. CARR, Jr., Defendant-appellant.
Michael G. Cianfarano, Oswego, for Defendant–Appellant. Gregory S. Oakes, District Attorney, Oswego (Amy L. Hallenbeck of Counsel), for Respondent.
Michael G. Cianfarano, Oswego, for Defendant–Appellant.
Gregory S. Oakes, District Attorney, Oswego (Amy L. Hallenbeck of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CURRAN, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[3] ), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant "in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice" (People v. Nicometo, 137 A.D.3d 1619, 1619–1620, 26 N.Y.S.3d 916 [internal quotation marks omitted] ), and that defendant "understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty" (People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 ; see Nicometo, 137 A.D.3d at 1620, 26 N.Y.S.3d 916). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant's challenge to the severity of his sentence (see Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d at 255–256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 ; Nicometo, 137 A.D.3d at 1620, 26 N.Y.S.3d 916; cf. People v. Maracle, 19 N.Y.3d 925, 928, 950 N.Y.S.2d 498, 973 N.E.2d 1272 ).
Defendant's further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v. Sparcino, 78 A.D.3d 1508, 1509, 911 N.Y.S.2d 523, lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 746, 917 N.Y.S.2d 628, 942 N.E.2d 1053 ). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see generally People v. Gibson, 140 A.D.3d 1786, 1787, 32 N.Y.S.3d 413, lv. denied 28 N.Y.3d 1072 ), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, defendant's contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant's own self-serving statements (see People v. Green, 122 A.D.3d 1342, 1343–1344, 995 N.Y.S.2d 897 ), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v. Manor, 121 A.D.3d 1581, 1582, 993 N.Y.S.2d 424, affd. 27 N.Y.3d 1012, 35 N.Y.S.3d 272, 54 N.E.3d 1143 ). Second, " ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time period does not amount to coercion’ " (People v. Green, 140 A.D.3d 1660, 1661, 32 N.Y.S.3d 782, lv. denied 28 N.Y.3d 930, 40 N.Y.S.3d 358, 63 N.E.3d 78 ). Third, "the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted" (People v. Pitcher, 126 A.D.3d 1471, 1472, 6 N.Y.S.3d 352, lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 1169, 15 N.Y.S.3d 301, 36 N.E.3d 104 ). Finally, we conclude that "there is no indication in the record that defendant's ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medication" (People v. Jackson, 85 A.D.3d 1697, 1698, 925 N.Y.S.2d 746, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 817, 929 N.Y.S.2d 806, 954 N.E.2d 97 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.