Opinion
G062182
07-17-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEPHEN PAUL CARLSTROM, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Beles & Beles, Robert J. Beles and Paul McCarthy for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 06CF3677 Sheila F. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Beles & Beles, Robert J. Beles and Paul McCarthy for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
O'LEARY, P. J.
Stephen Paul Carlstrom, Jr., appeals from the trial court's postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. Carlstrom argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction for second degree murder under an implied malice theory. We disagree and affirm the postjudgment order.
Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered Penal Code section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For purposes of clarity, we refer to the statute as section 1172.6 throughout the opinion. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS
A complete recitation of the facts can be found in our prior opinion People v. Guillen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 934 (Guillen).
We granted respondent's request for judicial notice of the appellate record in case No. G046163. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
Suffice it to say, John Derek Chamberlain was arrested for possession of child pornography and was housed in Theo Lacy Jail; Carlstrom was also a resident of the jail. Chamberlain and Carlstrom were housed in F Barracks West (F West).
In the center of F Barracks, bisecting F West and F Barracks East, was an enclosed guard station. F West had dormitory cubes lettered A through H. The dormitory cubes had four-foot privacy walls. Because of the design of the dormitory cubes, there were spots not visible from the guard station. One of the blind spots was on the east side of D cube. F West had a dayroom where during the designated time 146 inmates could roam.
Inmates at the jail formed race-based groups called "CARs," Classification According to Race. In F West, there were three CARs: the Woods (Caucasians), the Paisanos (Mexican nationals), and the South-Siders (Hispanic-Americans). Each CAR had a leader, a "shot caller," a second in command, a "right-hand man," an enforcer, a "torpedo," and a person waiting in command, a "mouse." A CAR mouse would typically approach a new inmate and ask to see the inmate's court documents or "paperwork" to learn the inmate's charges. There was also a "house mouse" for the entire barracks who was in charge of cleaning the barracks, distributing commissary slips, and communicating with the deputies about the barracks' needs. Inmates were aware of who occupied the roles and when a change occurred after someone left the barracks.
The shot caller and the right-hand man were responsible for determining which inmates were disciplined or "taxed." A common form of taxing was "the wall," where two inmates held an inmate against a wall for a specified period of time and hit him below the neck and above the waist. The shot caller authorized the taxing of inmates who did not follow jail rules or inmate rules. The shot callers used torpedoes to carry out the taxings. It was common for inmates to assault other inmates with "sensitive charges" such as child molesters (called "Chesters") and informants. All the CARs viewed the assault of inmates perceived to be child molesters or informants favorably.
At the time, Jared Petrovich was the shot caller, Garrett Aguilar was the right-hand man and torpedo, and Carlstrom was the mouse for the Woods. For the Paisanos, Raul Villafana was the shot caller, Salvador Garcia was the right-hand man, and Miguel Guillen was the mouse. Deputy Kevin Taylor, Deputy Jason Chapluk, and a sheriff special officer were assigned to F Barracks. Taylor was in command of F Barracks.
The Orange County Sheriff's Department (OCSD) did not condone deputies utilizing the CAR system but because of the number of inmates, deputies used the shot callers to control the inmates. Taylor met with the shot callers almost daily and used them to control the barracks, discuss issues, and obtain information. In turn, deputies rewarded the shot callers. Deputies knew a shot caller would tax an inmate for violating the rules.
Soon after Chamberlain arrived at the jail, Carlstrom, the Woods mouse, approached Chamberlain and asked him for his paperwork. Chamberlain said he did not have any.
There was evidence that OCSD personnel told Petrovich that Chamberlain was a child molester and to assault him. Because the South-Siders ran F Barracks, Petrovich had to get its shot-caller's permission to tax Chamberlain and to show respect. Petrovich told the South-Siders shot-caller "Stretch" that Chamberlain was a child molester and to "do whatever." Stretch thanked Petrovich for letting him know. Petrovich returned to his cube and told everyone that Chamberlain was a child molester.
Later that day, during evening day room time, Aguilar entered D cube and told Andrew Corral, a South-Sider, to leave because they had business to conduct. Corral moved to the other side of D cube. Corral overheard Petrovich tell Aguilar they were going to beat a "'Chester'" who admitted he likes them young, and Aguilar left D cube. Petrovich, the Woods shot caller, remained in D cube, while Villafana, the Paisanos shot caller, and "Stretch," the South-Siders shot caller arrived in D cube. Corral heard them say they were going to beat and rape Chamberlain.
Aguilar went upstairs to J cube to bring Chamberlain to D cube. Aguilar escorted Chamberlain to D cube. As they entered D cube, Aguilar pushed Chamberlain to the floor and the attack began.
Multiple witnesses observed about four groups, totaling at least 30 inmates, enter D cube and assault Chamberlain for about 20 to 45 minutes. Corral, who was still in D cube, saw Aguilar hitting, kicking, and stomping Chamberlain. After Corral left D cube, he saw Aguilar repeatedly exit D cube, speak with Petrovich, and return to D cube.
Luis Palacios, a Paisanos, saw inmates going in and out of D cube, three or four groups of three or four inmates, taking turns hitting and kicking Chamberlain. Palacios saw Petrovich hit Chamberlain first. Palacios saw Aguilar grab hold of a bunk, elevate himself about three feet, and stomp on Chamberlain. Aguilar also hit him. Palacios also saw Guillen enter D cube, get on his knees, and make a couple downward striking motions during the beginning or middle of the attack. Aguilar threw water on Chamberlain to wake him up and beat him more.
Robert Mayfield witnessed four waves totaling at least 12 inmates assault Chamberlain; the first few waves each lasted a couple minutes but the last wave lasted a "ridiculous" amount of time. The first wave was the Woods. Aguilar struck downward with his fists and used the bunk for leverage as he stomped up and down on something behind a short wall. Aguilar and other inmates put rubber-soled jail shoes over their hands before hitting Chamberlain. Carlstrom held onto the bunk while he violently jumped up and down on something behind the wall. Carlstrom passed water to Aguilar, and Aguilar threw the water on Chamberlain to revive him for the beating to continue.
Richard Reilly was upstairs and saw Carlstrom forcefully kick Chamberlain at least once. He also saw Aguilar kick Chamberlain.
While waves of inmates hit, kicked, stomped, and did other abhorrent things to Chamberlain over the course of about 30 minutes, three OCSD personnel sat in the guard station approximately 68 feet away.
Eventually, Aguilar stood on a table and waved a white cloth to get the deputies' attention. Aguilar told deputies there was a man down in D cube and said, "'he told us his charges and it got out of hand.'"
Taylor and Chapluk entered D cube and found an unconscious Chamberlain. Deputies called for medical assistance and administered aid. When the paramedics took over, Chamberlain had no heart rate. Chamberlain was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced dead.
Chamberlain's cause of death was multiple severe blunt impacts leading to failed chest mechanism, asphyxia, and cardiac arrest. Nearly every region of Chamberlain's body had blunt force trauma injuries. Chamberlain had a total of 43 rib fractures and most of his ribs were severely misplaced; 21 of his 24 ribs were broken. His lung was punctured. Chamberlain's injuries could be equated with injuries suffered from a high-velocity car accident or a fall from multiple stories. Except for one rib fracture that caused a lung laceration, no single injury was fatal. Chamberlain would not have died without the head and rib injuries.
Investigators interviewed all 146 F West inmates that evening and the following morning, and some multiple times over the following weeks and months. Investigators interviewed 30 or more additional people, including over 20 OCSD personnel.
The night of the assault, investigators interviewed Carlstrom, who said he did not know much. Carlstrom said he was playing dominoes when he heard a commotion, went to D cube, and saw Chamberlain lying on the ground bleeding. He thought someone was being taxed. A group of people were standing around him yelling profanities and "'baby raper.'" Carlstrom went back to playing dominoes. He estimated the assault lasted "a good 15 minutes." He did not see anyone hit Chamberlain and denied any involvement. Carlstrom said Chamberlain was a loner and he did not know his charges.
The next day, investigators interviewed Carlstrom again and advised him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). After repeating his story that he had been playing dominoes, Carlstrom claimed he was the house mouse and asked Chamberlain for his paperwork when he first arrived, but he did not have it. Carlstrom said he did not know why Chamberlain got taxed but also said, "I don't know where everybody - everybody got the information from." Carlstrom stated Petrovich was the Woods "rep" and would have given the "green light" to tax Chamberlain. He stated, "Everybody had a chance to have a turn" hitting and kicking Chamberlain. Carlstrom admitted he kicked a hunched over Chamberlain once in the back or butt sending him towards the wall. He admitted that when he kicked Chamberlain, "He was pretty messed up." Carlstrom denied he hit Chamberlain.
Over the course of a few interviews, Petrovich recounted how deputies told him Chamberlain was a child molester and to assault him. Petrovich essentially admitted he was Woods shot caller, he orchestrated Chamberlain's taxing, and he knew inmates were going to savagely beat Chamberlain.
A jury convicted Carlstrom and others of second degree murder of Chamberlain. The trial court sentenced Carlstrom to 15 years to life in prison. As to Carlstrom, we affirmed the judgment. (Guillen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1033-1034.)
Five years later, Carlstrom filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court summarily denied the petition. We reversed the court's postjudgment order denying Carlstrom's petition and remanded with directions for the court to issue an order to show cause (OSC) and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate his conviction. (People v. Carlstrom (Feb. 2, 2022, G059738) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the trial court issued an OSC. The prosecution moved to admit the transcripts from Carlstrom's trial and filed a brief. Carlstrom filed a brief.
At a hearing, the trial court admitted the transcripts into evidence. The parties argued, and the court took the matter under submission. At a later hearing, the court denied Carlstrom's petition for resentencing. The court made its ruling without considering codefendants' statements.
We provide the entirety of the trial court's ruling because of the nature of Carlstrom's arguments on appeal. The court explained as follows:
"[T]he trial [c]ourt evaluate[d] the evidence and the [c]ourt is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that [the prosecution] ha[s] introduced evidence that show[ed] that . . . Carlstrom is still liable under the laws as of today in that he committed an implied malice second-degree murder.
"I would note that I looked at all of the evidence, particularly in light of [Carlstrom's counsel's] argument that there was insufficient evidence to prove that . . . Chamberlain was alive while he was being beaten or while he was being beaten by . . . Carlstrom, and I do find that there is sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . Chamberlain was alive when . . . Carlstrom inflicted his violent actions [on] . . . Chamberlain. And I base that . . . upon . . . Carlstrom's statement describing the movement of . . . Chamberlain at the time of him inflicting what he described as a single kick on the body of . . . Chamberlain. The fact that Dr. Cohen [a forensic pathologist] testified during the trial to the wide range of injuries, and the fact that they were inflicted before the death of . . . Chamberlain. He described them as antemortem, prior to Chamberlain's death, in light of the bleeding that occurred during those injuries, as well as the testimony that indicated that there were multiple waves during this attack on . . . Chamberlain and that the members from the Woods CAR participated initially.
"As well as testimony that . . . Carlstrom was deliberately taking action to assist others by virtue of obtaining the water and passing it to others that was being thrown on . . . Chamberlain during this prolonged assault to presumably keep him awake while additional violence was inflicted upon him.
"And I would note that the violence that was inflicted upon . . . Chamberlain was incredibly violent, incredibly prolonged. As Dr. Cohen testified, it was tantamount to the same type of injuries one would expect from either a high-speed motor vehicle collision or falling from multiple stories.
"The trial [c]ourt is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . Chamberlain was beaten to death and that . . . Carlstrom directly engaged in acts that -- in beating . . . Chamberlain.
"The testimony established that he was observed actually grabbing on to bunk beds and violently and forcefully jumping on . . . Chamberlain or inflicting violent strikes on . . . Chamberlain.
" . . . Chamberlain was beaten so badly it broke nearly every rib in his body, all but three, many . . . times and resulted in the condition that resulted in the loss of his life.
"And so when I look at the actual evidence, it does appear to the trial [c]ourt that . . . Carlstrom is liable for implied malice murder. That he did by his conduct aid in the commission of the life-endangering act, and that he did so intentionally and with knowledge that others intended to commit those same acts. And he intended to aid in the commission of those acts with knowledge that the acts were dangerous to human life and that he not only directly participated in the attack that caused the death of . . . Chamberlain, he intended to aid and abet those others knowing that they intended to do so as well, and that he did have that actual knowledge that leads the [c]ourt to believe he acted with implied malice.
"So based upon . . . Carlstrom's actual actions, his knowledge, and his intent, the [c]ourt does find he would still be liable under the law as of today for second-degree implied malice murder.
"Accordingly, . . . Carlstrom, I am denying your request to be resentenced pursuant to . . . section 1172.6."
DISCUSSION
Carlstrom argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction for implied malice murder. Not so.
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) "The primary difference between express malice and implied malice is . . . the former requires an intent to kill but the latter does not. [Citation.]" (People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 976.) Implied malice murder instead requires the killing be proximately caused by an act, "'"'the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.'"' [Citation.]" (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).) Proximate causation requires the act to have been a substantial factor contributing to the death. (Ibid.) And conscious disregard for human life refers to a state of mind in which the person knows the conduct is dangerous to others but does not care if someone is hurt or killed. (People v. Murphy (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 713, 726.)
The guilt of an aider and abettor to a crime is based on the direct perpetrator's acts and the aider and abettor's own acts and own mental state. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.) Accordingly, a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder must, by words or conduct, aid the perpetrator's commission of a life-endangering act with the knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and the aider and abettor must act in conscious disregard for human life. (Ibid.) Implied malice thus includes an objective component-an act that is dangerous to life-and a subjective component-the defendant's awareness of and disregard for that objective danger. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 153-154, 157 (Knoller).)
In Reyes, our California Supreme Court clarified the type of act committed by an aider and abettor that is dangerous to human life for the purposes of implied malice murder. An act that merely creates a dangerous situation in which death is possible, depending on how circumstances unfolded, standing alone will not satisfy the proximate causation requirement of implied malice murder. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.) Rather, implied malice murder requires a high degree of probability death will result; the danger to life cannot be merely vague or speculative. (Ibid.)
Generally, a trial court's denial of a section 1172.6 petition is reviewed for substantial evidence. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) Under this standard, we review the record "'"'in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'"' [Citations.]" (Ibid.) "The conviction shall stand 'unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]."' [Citation.]" (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
At the outset, we must address Carlstrom's assertion the trial court found him "to be an actual killer of Chamberlain." To support his assertion, Carlstrom cites to the court's statement he "directly engaged in acts" to conclude the court found he caused Chamberlain's death. What the court said was, "The [c]ourt is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . Chamberlain was beaten to death and that . . . Carlstrom directly engaged in acts that -- in beating . . . Chamberlain." The court did not find Carlstrom was the actual killer. The court did find that Carlstrom beat Chamberlain. Indeed, later in its ruling the court opined Carlstrom "directly participated in the attack that caused the death of . . . Chamberlain" and "he intended to aid and abet those others knowing that they intended to do so as well." When read in their entirety, the court concluded Carlstrom was an aider and abettor, not the actual killer.
Reviewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion Carlstrom directly aided and abetted second degree implied malice murder. With respect to the objective element, there was substantial evidence Carlstrom's acts involved a high degree of probability that they would result in death. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.) Carlstrom, the Woods mouse, was one of the first inmates to assault Chamberlain. The evidence established that Carlstrom participated in the initial group of individuals who beat Chamberlain by striking downward and holding onto the bunk while violently jumping up and down on Chamberlain. The evidence also supported that he forcefully kicked Chamberlain at least once. Carlstrom's participation in the vicious attack that ultimately killed Chamberlain was not insignificant or theoretical and supports a finding of second degree implied malice murder. (People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 443 [defendant's presence at scene, participation in the attack, companionship with other perpetrators, conduct before and after the crimes, and motive of retaliation for disrespect all support finding that he aided and abetted an implied malice murder].) The evidence demonstrated Carlstrom struck and violently kicked Chamberlain in unison with other Woods inmates. And Carlstrom passed water to Aguilar, who threw it on Chamberlain to revive him to prolong the beating. Carlstrom's brutal conduct belies his claim he merely assaulted Chamberlain.
As for the subjective element, there was substantial evidence Carlstrom acted with an awareness he was endangering Chamberlain's life. (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 143, 153-156.) Carlstrom knew his conduct was dangerous to human life. As the Woods mouse, i.e., shot caller in waiting, Carlstrom was a member of the Woods' leadership structure and thus was intimately familiar with inmate culture. In his role as mouse, he asked inmates, including Chamberlain, what their charges were and reported to the shot caller. Carlstrom understood that not having proof of charges was enough reason to be taxed by the Woods. He also knew that Petrovich had to make the decision to "green light" Chamberlain's taxing. The evidence demonstrated that as a member of the Woods' power structure, he was aware that as an alleged child molester, Chamberlain would not be subject to a normal taxing on the wall. Indeed, Carlstrom said a lot of people were hitting and kicking Chamberlain and everyone had a chance to have a turn. And Carlstrom passed water to Aguilar, who threw it on Chamberlain to revive him for the beating to continue.
Carlstrom's violent jumping on the defenseless Chamberlain, his handing water to Aguilar to throw on Chamberlain to prolong the attack, and his knowledge of the extent of the taxing established he knew the conduct was dangerous but did not care if Chamberlain was killed. One cannot review this record and conclude the danger to Chamberlain's life was merely vague or speculative. Carlstrom knew he was putting Chamberlain's life in particular danger. The evidence affirmatively demonstrates Carlstrom was aware of the danger posed and that he acted in conscious disregard of the danger. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding Carlstrom directly aided and abetted second degree implied malice murder and thus, the court properly denied his section 1172.6 petition.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, J. MOTOIKE, J.