Taylor, 245 Ill. App.3d at 607-08. Likewise, in People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App.3d 584, 585 (1992), the defendant was pulled over by a state trooper, was given a warning citation for speeding, and was told that there was nothing more to the stop. The trooper, who was accompanied by two other state troopers by this time, then asked the defendant if she had any drugs or weapons in her vehicle.
However, that the defendant and his parents signed a written consent form is not dispositive if the circumstances show that the consent was obtained by some form of coercion. ( People v. Cardenas (1992), 237 Ill. App.3d 584, 588.) Defendant claims he presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the consents were not given voluntarily.
Kratovil, 351 Ill.App.3d at 1030, 286 Ill.Dec. 868, 815 N.E.2d at 86. ¶ 15 Initial refusal to consent to search is an important factor in assessing whether later consent is voluntary. People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill.App.3d 584, 588, 178 Ill.Dec. 430, 604 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1992). The fact that a written consent form was signed is not dispositive in determining whether consent to search was voluntary when circumstances show the signature was obtained through coercion.
A search which is conducted pursuant to consent is one of the specifically established exceptions to the fourth amendment requirements of both a warrant and probable cause. People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App.3d 584, 587, 604 N.E.2d 953, 955 (1992). A driver of a vehicle has authority to consent to a search of the vehicle because he has immediate possession and control of the entire vehicle.
Accordingly, we hold that a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant's bags contained contraband did not exist upon which Agent Boirtlein could have legally carried out his threat to subject defendant's bags to an investigatory detention, and while such a determination does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that defendant's consent in the face of that threat was not voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, no countervailing circumstances exist to compel any other conclusion. In People v. Cardenas (1992), 237 Ill. App.3d 584, 604 N.E.2d 953, the police asked the defendant whether they could search her car for drugs, and she responded: " '[N]o, is that legal?' " The officer replied that it was legal, that they did it all the time, and handed the defendant a consent form, which she signed.
At least one court has recognized that "an initial refusal is an important factor in assessing whether a subsequent consent is voluntary." People v. Cardenas, 604 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992). Making an initial refusal "important" is consistent with the settled law regarding custodial interrogation.
Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 1031; see also People v. Graf, 265 Ill. App. 3d 746, 750-51 (1994) ("a police officer making a groundless threat and presenting the occupant with the choice of either consenting or suffering the consequences of the threatened course of conduct can serve to vitiate that person's consent"); People v. Griffin, 158 Ill. App. 3d 46, 52 (1987) (where the officer had no grounds to obtain a search warrant other than the items seen following the officer's illegal entry, the threat of obtaining a search warrant could not lawfully be employed). An officer's giving of false or misleading information can also vitiate the voluntariness of the consent. People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App. 3d 584, 588 (1992). Consent is involuntary where it is solely the result of acquiescence or submission to the assertion of lawful police authority.
A search that is conducted pursuant to consent is one of the specifically established exceptions to the fourth amendment requirements of both a warrant and probable cause. People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App.3d 584, 587, 604 N.E.2d 953, 955 (1992). The fourth amendment test for a valid consent to search is the requirement that consent be voluntary. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40, 136 L.Ed.2d at 355, 117 S.Ct. at 421; Cardenas, 237 Ill. App.3d at 587, 604 N.E.2d at 955.
It is well settled that an individual may consent to a search conducted without a warrant, thereby eliminating the need for probable cause and a search warrant. See People v. Phillips, 264 Ill. App. 3d 213, 217 (1994); People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App. 3d 584, 587 (1992). A consent to search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is voluntary. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 355, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996).
; People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App. 3d 584, 588, 604 N.E.2d 953, 178 Ill. Dec. 430 (1992) (initial refusal is an important factor in determining whether consent is voluntary); State v. Garcia, 250 Kan. 310, 311-12, 827 P.2d 727 (1992) (repeated requests for consent indicate consent was not voluntary); State v. Jackson, 110 Ohio App. 3d 137, 143, 673 N.E.2d 685 (1996) (once an initial request for consent is clearly and definitively denied, an encounter takes on a coercive tone where repeated requests are made and colloquy ensues on the issue of police power to search a vehicle).