Opinion
C097794
09-07-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHAWN LAMONT CARBIN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 22F3509
RENNER, J.
Defendant Shawn Lamont Carbin pled no contest to robbery and admitted a prior strike conviction in exchange for a stipulated term of eight years in state prison. At sentencing, the trial court advised defendant that he would be subject to a parole period not to exceed three years upon his release from prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing a three-year parole term. He argues, and the People agree, that we should modify the judgment to impose a two-year parole term under Penal Code section 3000.01. While we agree defendant's parole may not exceed two years, we disagree that the trial court erred and affirm.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2022, defendant was charged with robbery (§ 211-count 1), burglary (§ 459-count 2), three counts of inflicting a corporal injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)-counts 3, 7, 9), three counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)-counts 4, 8, 10), vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1)-count 5), possession of a controlled substance (Health &Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)-count 6), and providing false information to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)-count 11). It was further alleged that defendant had a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12).
In December 2022, defendant pled no contest to first degree residential robbery and admitted the strike prior in exchange for a stipulated midterm of four years in state prison, doubled to eight years for the strike prior, and dismissal of the remaining charges with a Harvey waiver. The parties stipulated to the police report as the factual basis for the plea. In imposing the stipulated term at the sentencing hearing, the trial court "advised [defendant that] he will be released on parole for a period not to exceed three years." Defendant timely appealed.
People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing a three-year parole term, and argues the judgment must be modified to reduce the period of parole supervision to two years under section 3000.01. While the People agree, we do not.
When the trial court imposes a determinate term under section 1170, like it did here, the court is required to inform a defendant at sentencing that, after the expiration of his or her prison term, he or she may be on parole for a period as provided by section 3000 or 3000.08. (§ 1170, subd. (c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.433(e)(1).) The trial court is also required to advise a defendant pleading guilty to a felony that a period of parole is a direct consequence of such a plea. (In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 352353; People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 609.)
Although the trial court is required to advise the defendant of the parole period, the Legislature and the parole authority or Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation establish the duration and conditions of parole. (People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 95-96; In re Lira (2014) 58 Cal.4th 573, 584; § 3000, subd. (b)(7); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 2510, 2515, subd. (a), 2525.) The sentencing court does not have authority to set or alter the applicable term of parole so established. (In re Moser, supra, 6 Cal 4th at p. 357; People v. Renfro (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 223, 232 ["Parole is a statutorily mandated element of punishment, and neither the prosecution nor the sentencing court has authority to impose a prison sentence without parole or to alter the applicable period of parole established by the Legislature and imposed by the Board of Prison Terms"].)
Section 3000.08 requires parole supervision for defendants released from state prison on or after July 1, 2013, if the person served prison time for a serious or violent felony. (§§ 3000.08, subd. (a)(1), (2), 1192.7, subd. (c) [defining serious felonies]; § 667.5, subd. (c) [defining violent felonies].) In August 2020, the Legislature limited the parole period to two years absent certain exceptions not applicable here. (§ 3000.01, subds. (a), (b)(1); Stats. 2020, ch. 29, § 18.)
Here, defendant was convicted of first degree residential robbery, a serious and violent felony (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(19), 667.5, subd. (c)(9)), and the trial court informed defendant that upon his release from state prison he would be subject to a period of parole supervision. Although the court mentioned what it (erroneously) thought was a likely parole term, we assume the trial court was aware that it had no authority to set a parole term different than that imposed by section 3000.01. (See People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 ["we apply the general rule 'that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law' "].) Given this limited authority, we interpret the trial court's statement as merely an attempt to inform defendant of the additional consequences of his no contest plea, albeit with incorrect information, rather than imposing a specific and incorrect parole term. With this understanding, no modification of the judgment is required.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ROBIE, Acting P. J., KRAUSE, J.