Opinion
4-23-1372
10-11-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. XAVIER ALEXANDER CAMPER, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County No. 20CF960 Honorable Peter W. Church, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GRISCHOW delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
GRISCHOW JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding (1) defendant properly preserved his speedy- trial claim and his right to a speedy trial was not violated when the trial court attributed certain delays in the proceedings to defendant; (2) the trial court did not commit structural error in granting defendant's motion to waive a jury trial after the trial had commenced; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to a term of natural life in prison.
¶ 2 Defendant, Xavier Alexander Camper, appeals from his conviction of one count of first degree murder accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, for which he was sentenced to a term of natural life in prison. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2020); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 2020). He raises three issues on appeal. First, defendant argues his conviction should be vacated because the State violated his right to a speedy trial by attributing certain delays in the proceedings to the defense, and if deemed not properly preserved, his counsel was ineffective for failing to renew his objection and demand trial when the last trial date was scheduled. Next, defendant contends the trial court committed structural error in granting his request to waive the jury trial after the trial had commenced. Finally, defendant argues his sentence of natural life in prison was an abuse of discretion because the court failed to consider his age, rehabilitative potential, and mental health during sentencing. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On November 18, 2020, defendant, who was 20 years old at the time, was charged by information with one count of first degree murder for the death of Kerry Dyer, who was 53 years old. According to the information, on November 17, 2020, defendant "knowingly and without legal justification, bludgeoned and stabbed Kerry Dyer, knowing such act or acts created the strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Kerry Dyer and thereby causing the death of Kerry Dyer," and further, that Dyer's "death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty." See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 2020). Defendant was arrested on November 17, 2020, and remained in custody for the duration of the proceedings. Defendant filed a speedy-trial demand on November 20, 2020. We otherwise limit our recitation of the facts to what is necessary to understand the dispositive issues.
¶ 5 A. First Fitness Hearing (delay from October 1 to 21, 2021)
¶ 6 At the pretrial conference held on August 26, 2021, the State raised the issue of defendant's fitness to stand trial based upon the State's belief that his fitness was an issue in a prior burglary case. Defense counsel stated that he did not have a concern regarding defendant's fitness, but "the facts and circumstances of the case would and probably will lead to an evaluation for insanity at the time of the incident." The trial court determined that a fitness evaluation should be conducted, instructed the attorneys to prepare an order to that effect, and confirmed the next status date of September 23, 2021. On September 8, the State filed a motion for a fitness evaluation pursuant to section 104-13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/104-13 (West 2020)). At the status hearing, the State clarified that defendant had not in fact been evaluated for fitness in the prior case, but there was currently support for having him evaluated. Defense counsel reiterated he had no position on the matter. The court found the State was being "prudent" in seeking a fitness examination. On September 24, the order granting the State's motion was entered and Dr. Chad Brownfield was appointed to examine defendant to determine whether a bona fide doubt as to his fitness could be raised. The order expressly stated "speedy trial is tolled" pursuant to section 103-5(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/13-5(a) (West 2020)) and cited People v. Sonntag, 128 Ill.App.3d 548 (1984). The matter was set for status on October 21.
¶ 7 At the status hearing on October 21, 2021, defendant's attorney asked for and was granted a continuance until November 4, 2021, to allow time to review Dr. Brownfield's report with defendant and address other discovery matters. In his report, filed earlier that same day, Dr. Brownfield concluded defendant's mental conditions did not significantly interfere with his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings or impair his ability to assist in his defense.
¶ 8 B. Defendant's Change of Counsel and Second Fitness Evaluation
¶ 9 On November 4, 2021, defendant was assigned a new attorney. Defendant was granted several more continuances, and the case remained set for a jury trial to commence on July 18, 2022. On June 28, 2022, defendant's counsel filed a motion for a fitness evaluation because defendant's recent demeanor raised a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand trial. This was one day before the hearing on all pretrial motions in the case. After examining defendant and considering a confidential discussion held by the attorneys in chambers, the trial court found there to be a bona fide doubt as to defendant's fitness and ordered a new evaluation. The order entered that day appointed Dr. Brownfield to conduct another fitness examination and set the matter for a status hearing on July 27. The court further ordered, in accordance with section 103-5(a) of the Code, "[s]peedy trial is hereby tolled." See 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2020).
¶ 10 Dr. Brownfield filed his second fitness evaluation on July 26, 2022. The matter was set for a contested hearing on September 6, where Dr. Brownfield testified. The trial court found defendant fit to stand trial. The court also acknowledged a pending matter regarding discovery of defendant's medical records. The court reserved the issue for a later hearing and noted, "One of the reasons that I assume you would think that you would be entitled to your client's own medical records would be if you intend to file an affirmative defense and use those records with regard to that affirmative defense." The court admonished that defendant's case needed to remain on the calendar. The matter was set for a pretrial hearing on September 22, 2022, with the delay in scheduling attributed to defendant.
¶ 11 C. Appointment of Defendant's Expert Witness
¶ 12 On September 9, 2022, defendant filed a motion for appointment of an expert witness, asking the trial court to appoint Dr. Luis Rosell as an expert relating to involuntary intoxication and insanity defenses. On the next court date, which was the pretrial conference on September 22, defense asked for a continuance to October 20. That rescheduled hearing was held over to the next day due to the delay of defense counsel. At that time, the parties agreed to set a hearing on defendant's request for appointment of an expert witness on November 2 and a pretrial hearing on November 17; defense counsel acknowledged the delay was attributed to defendant.
¶ 13 On October 27, 2022, defendant filed a motion to continue the expert witness hearing. No hearing was held, but the next day an order was entered granting defendant's motion for the appointment of Dr. Rosell as his expert witness. In the order, the trial court found that "[t]he public's interest in a speedy trial requires a resolution to this cause soon" and ordered defense counsel to file a status update on or before December 1 regarding the anticipated dates of the following: Dr. Rosell's meeting with defendant, "Dr. Rosell's report, if one should be forthcoming," and trial availability of Dr. Rosell in March, April, and May 2023.
¶ 14 On December 1, 2022, the case was set for a jury trial to commence on May 22, 2023. The standard form order provided, inter alia, that the State must furnish all discovery, except for lab or scientific reports, to the defense within 21 days; defendant must furnish all discovery to the State at least 10 days before trial; and counsel must exchange a complete list of witnesses and exhibits no later than seven days before trial. When the State asked for the status of defendant's expert witness information, defendant's attorney stated, "The expert witness that we've retained has spoken to [defendant]. He has not yet prepare[d] a record and possibly will have to do a follow-up visit. I will provide further update in January." At the status hearing on January 12, 2023, the matter was continued again, with defendant acknowledging the delay attributed to him. The court set the case for monthly status meetings beginning in February.
¶ 15 At the status hearing on February 24, 2023, defendant's counsel stated, "By agreement, we're getting an order entered that the defense expert may have full and unredacted access to all discovery to complete report," and "I expect to have the report soon. He's already met with the defendant, prepared a preliminary report, but he wants an order allowing him to look at some of the additional discovery, Facebook, videos, et cetera, from contemporaneous with the time." The continued delay was attributed to defendant.
¶ 16 At the status hearing on March 24, 2023, the State noted that its pretrial motions filed in June 2022 were set for hearing on April 21, 2023, and defendant had filed no response. Noting that it had not yet received any expert-witness report from defendant, the State requested April 6, 2023, as a deadline for disclosure of the report. Defense counsel stated that the expert had been hired, met with defendant, reviewed some of the discovery, and had access to the rest of the discovery to review. He explained further that his expert was out of the country. Under these circumstances, defense counsel asked that "the deadline be April 10th, which would give [Dr. Rosell] two weeks after being back in the country essentially to finish his report, so that I can incorporate anything from that report in my responses to motions." He explained he wanted the weekend of April 8 and 9 to supplement his response to the State's motions "with anything limited only to the things that reference the expert's report." The trial court set the deadline for April 6 for defendant's "response to the State's motions and the expert report." A hearing on the motions was set for April 21, with the delay attributed to defendant.
¶ 17 D. Motions Relating to Defendant's Expert (delay from May 12 to September 11, 2023)
¶ 18 On May 8, 2023, defendant filed a "Motion to Vary Order of Proof," stating that defendant's expert had limited availability during the week the case was set for trial and asking that Dr. Rosell be allowed to testify earlier, even if the State has not yet rested. On May 10, the State filed a response to defendant's motion, objecting to the request to interrupt its case-in-chief with a defense witness, refusing to concede that Dr. Rosell should be allowed to testify, and informing the court that a motion to bar his testimony would be filed soon.
¶ 19 On May 11, 2023, the State filed "People's Motion to Bar Testimony & Self-Serving Hearsay, and to Produce." The State explained that on April 6, 2023, the date defendant's expert witness's report was due, it "received an e-mail from Defense counsel stating that 'There will not be a report prepared by Dr. Rosell.'" The State also received an e-mail from defense counsel stating that he was providing a "non-exhaustive list of defenses including: 'selfdefense, involuntary intoxication, temporary insanity, and any defense that is mentioned or reasonably ascertainable from any other pleading or discovery.'" The State alleged that because it had not previously received any information from defense counsel about Dr. Rosell's anticipated testimony and defendant now stated that no report was being prepared, the State assumed Dr. Rosell would not be testifying. However, the State explained further that, in an email it received from defense counsel on May 8, Dr. Rosell was listed on a preliminary witness list. As a result, the State contended it began attempting to contact Dr. Rosell without success and sent a subpoena duces tecum to his office with electronic return to the court by May 17. The State asked, inter alia, that the court bar Dr. Rosell from testifying without defense counsel providing the State a detailed summary of Dr. Rosell's expected testimony, defense counsel be required to provide an offer of proof at the hearing on the motion regarding Dr. Rosell's expected trial testimony, the court consider the State's request for Dr. Rosell's records via subpoena duces tecum, and the court order Dr. Rosell to appear in person or via Zoom for an interview with the State prior to trial, with "enough time so that the State can prepare a written report that would be useful for cross-examination and potentially something a State's expert could review if the State seeks and obtains a continuance."
¶ 20 On May 12, 2023, defendant filed a second demand for a speedy trial, and a hearing was held on the pending motions. Defendant argued the discovery order entered in December 2022 required him to furnish discovery to the State at least 10 days before trial. The State never asked to modify that order, did not file any other motions, and did not seek to obtain its own expert witness, despite knowing that defendant's mental health was at issue. Defendant stated there was no report of his expert and there was no requirement to have a report to testify. After a discussion about discovery, the trial court stated the State was entitled to know the expert's expected testimony and normally that is accomplished by preparing a written report. The court concluded, "everything from my perspective flows from the fact that there's no report." When discussing the deadlines relating to the trial date of May 22, the following colloquy took place:
"THE COURT: So the disclosure on the doctor's report would have been due under the order-
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Today.
THE COURT: -today. I am anticipating that there won't be any report filed today or tendered to the State.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It can be done.
[THE STATE]: Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
[THE STATE]: [Defense counsel] e-mailed me March-April 6th saying there would be no report. [The State] assumed that that meant Dr. Rosell would not be testifying. If we had known that, we would have been able to anticipate that to try to keep the trial on schedule by having our own expert appointed. The State's position is [Defense counsel] sandbagged the State.
We don't know how to proceed, Judge. I would at this time [sic] you ask [Defense counsel] to proffer what Dr. Rosell's opinion is so we kind of have a basis for going forward from here.
THE COURT: I think [the State] makes a good point. He's asking for testimony to be barred. I don't even know what I would be barring. How do I make a ruling on that without having some sort of basis for knowing what the anticipated testimony is actually going to be?
Because the Court's inclination would be this is a-it's going to be late after 5 o'clock today or 4:30 today when the clerk's office closes, or if it's not filed by the end of the day it's not a timely disclosure. I think you understand where I'm at with the issue of disclosure. We are not going to trial without a disclosure as to the anticipated scope of that testimony.
You can appeal that if you want if there's an appealable issue, but that's where I'm at with the actual report.
So can you get it on file today?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't know if I can have a report from Dr. Rosell because he's not prepared one. I have my obligations as counsel which are to provide the disclosures on file and intend to have those on file, but if the State is seeking for a continuance which they asked for in their motion to bar testimony for their own expert then there would be time for him to prepare a report. But he's not prepared one because there's no requirement to prepare one."
¶ 21 The State then proposed to the trial court that defense counsel be required to reveal on the record Dr. Rosell's anticipated testimony. The trial court asked defense counsel if he was "prepared to make an offer of proof as to what the anticipated scope of Dr. Rosell's testimony would be." Defense counsel replied: "He spoke with my client. He's reviewed discover[y], what I view as relevant portions of discovery, and would be giving testimony about involuntary intoxication and the effects on the mind and body, and his mental health at the time based on the circumstances that he knows." The court found this insufficient. Defense counsel then stated. "I can file a written [report], Your Honor, but, no, I'm not prepared on [the State's] motion that was filed yesterday to orally respond to those questions." The court was inclined to require defendant to file the expert's written report by the end of the day. After further discussion, defense counsel, the State, and the court concluded the court could not require an expert to submit a written report. Defense counsel stated, if the State had an expert, he likely would have requested their expert prepare a written report, too. The State explained it did not know it needed an expert until it received defendant's witness list on May 8.
¶ 22 The trial court then made the following determination:
"Whether it was intentional or not, I think the State is making a reasonable point which is this. If I were the State and I had received an e-mail saying there's no report forthcoming, my interpretation of that is this person is not going to by testifying. We always have reports in these cases. We also always have the experts prepare the report.
I understand there's case law that I can't order the report to be prepared, but I can order that the State be provided reasonable discovery so that they can prepare their case for trial. It's not a one-way street. The State has to turn everything it has over to the defense. The defense, within Constitutional
limitations set forth as specifically say in the Rule, has to do the same. So if you don't want or the doctor is not going to prepare a written report, then he can sit for an interview. So these are the options."
The court continued the case, with the delay attributed to defendant, acknowledging defendant's objection and stating, "[T]he primary focus is going to be due process."
¶ 23 On May 19, 2023, a hearing was held regarding admission of certain crime scene and autopsy photos, as well as the expert witness discovery issues. Noting that the "ordinary course" of cases involving expert witnesses is for written reports to be filed, the trial court reaffirmed it could not order a written report be filed; therefore, an alternative would be that the expert be available for an interview. Defense counsel stated that Dr. Rosell would be preparing a report. A schedule was set for defendant's expert witness report and any request by the State to appoint its own expert witness. (Dr. Brownfield was later appointed as the State's expert.) In setting the matter for trial, the court proposed the week of August 14, but defense counsel stated he had another commitment. The parties agreed to setting the matter for trial beginning on September 11, 2023. In the written order, the court noted "delay to defense."
¶ 24 E. The State's Case
¶ 25 1. The First Responders to the Scene
¶ 26 The State called five officers from the Moline Police Department who were dispatched to the scene on November 17, 2020, based on a 911 call reporting an altercation between defendant and Dyer at Dyer's apartment. Upon arriving at Dyer's apartment building, Officer Cesar Lopez observed an individual walking away from the area. He knew the 911 caller had stated defendant was leaving the apartment, so he notified Detective Steven Murphy, a patrol officer at the time, and sent him to locate defendant. Detective Murphy found defendant and detained him without incident. He observed defendant's clothes were covered in blood and he had thrown to the ground a paper towel with what appeared to be blood on it. A search of defendant revealed he had a cell phone and two kitchen knives in his possession. Defendant appeared coherent and gave responsive answers to the officer's questions.
¶ 27 Officer Lopez and Detective Cody Parmenter conducted an initial sweep of the apartment and found Dyer deceased on the floor. Officer Lopez described the room where Dyer was found as splattered with blood on the walls and ceiling and the apartment appeared to be "ransacked." Detective Parmenter observed Dyer was covered in blood and his face was distorted, as though he had been beaten. He described blood spattered on the walls and ceiling and stated there was a cooking pot on the floor next to Dyer, which was dented and coated in blood.
¶ 28 Demetrius Ash, a firefighter and paramedic, testified that when he arrived at the apartment to examine Dyer, he found no pulse or respiration, and he determined that Dyer was deceased. He observed blood throughout the apartment. Dyer's face was covered in dried blood, and he appeared to have been hit with an object.
¶ 29 2. Testimony About the Incident
¶ 30 Shawn Wherry, who was 21 years old at the time, had been defendant's friend since middle school. He testified that his relationship with defendant was "vaguely parental" and that he "took care of [defendant] as best [he] could." Wherry explained that defendant and Dyer were "somewhat friends" and defendant implied that they had a sexual relationship. At that time, Wherry lived with his former girlfriend, Carolynn Whitaker. Defendant lived with them for most of 2020, but he also occasionally lived with Dyer that year. For a couple of days before the incident, defendant stayed with Wherry because of a recent fight between defendant and Dyer.
¶ 31 Wherry testified that on the day of the incident, he and defendant were hanging out and cleaning Wherry's apartment. Defendant asked Wherry about the best way to hide or dispose of a body, to which Wherry replied," '[P]robably burn it.'" The conversation made Wherry feel uncomfortable. Wherry stated defendant had been communicating with Dyer that evening and around 10 p.m., he left to go to Dyer's apartment. Defendant had been drinking vodka at some point while at Wherry's apartment and took the bottle with him.
¶ 32 Defendant later called Wherry and began a Facebook chat video call with him. Defendant was at Dyer's apartment and turned the camera so Wherry could see Dyer, who was on his hands and knees on the floor and appeared "very clearly injured." Wherry testified that defendant was excited and said "he had beaten [Dyer] very badly with a frying pan and that he was most likely dying. He seemed to want to show it off." Defendant explained to Wherry that his argument with Dyer began when Dyer insulted defendant's girlfriend while defendant was speaking with her on the phone. Wherry stated that defendant was talking to Dyer and saying," 'You feel really stupid now, don't you, [Dyer]?'" Wherry heard Dyer, who appeared "out of it," say" 'Leave me alone, please.'" Wherry testified that he was extremely upset and ended the video call, but before doing so, he took a couple of screenshot photos. Those photos were admitted into evidence. The Facebook chat video call ended at 10:31 p.m. and lasted for one minute and 36 seconds. After that video call, Wherry and defendant exchanged a series of text messages and phone messages. Defendant pleaded with Wherry to come meet him because he needed Wherry to help him "clean up." During one of the phone calls to Wherry, defendant said Dyer was "quote 'drunk.'" Wherry explained that when he and defendant were younger, they developed a "code" after watching crime shows. The code for killing or murder was "[d]rinking," and when someone was dead the code word was "drunk." Wherry stated he did not want anything to do with this situation and called 911. The recording and transcript of that 911 call were entered into evidence.
¶ 33 Carolynn Whitaker, who was 19 years old at the time, was with Wherry on the evening of the incident and testified about her observations of the Facebook chat video call from defendant. She heard defendant say he had beaten Dyer, and he mentioned that he used a frying pan. She stated he sounded "calm and mean" and said he was going to continue to beat Dyer. She heard Dyer asking defendant to stop and observed that he sounded scared. When the Facebook chat video call ended, she was with Wherry when he used her phone to call 911. During the 911 call, Wherry called defendant back on his phone and suggested defendant leave the apartment and meet him at a nearby school. The 911 operator was able to listen to that conversation through Whitaker's phone.
¶ 34 Alexandra "Lexie" Beal testified that she met defendant on the Tinder dating app and then became close friends with him over Facebook, but they were not dating and had never met in person. In November 2020, she lived in Davenport, Iowa, with her parents. She communicated with defendant by audio and video calls, Facebook messages, and texts. Beal testified that defendant was homeless and "bounced around from place to place, one of which being [Dyer's] house." She never met Dyer, but he was present during some speakerphone conversations with defendant, and she recognized his voice. In November 2020, defendant told her he would be staying with Wherry because he had "beat [Dyer] up" during an altercation. On November 16, 2020, Beal entered a rehabilitation facility but was able to make outgoing phone calls. On November 17, she spoke with defendant on the phone three times. During the first two calls, defendant was angry and "arguing with people," and he seemed intoxicated to her because "he was slurring his words slightly" and "[h]is sentences just weren't fluent and cohesive." She testified that she spoke to him later that evening. She was on speakerphone, so she heard both Dyer and defendant and knew they were at Dyer's apartment. Beal said the conversation "devolved" and Dyer angrily yelled at her calling her a "dope w***" and "useless b***." Defendant yelled back at Dyer to defend Beal, and she heard them continue to yell at each other. Beal testified that she heard a "banging in the background, like metal, against something hard and kind of hollow." She stated it sounded like they were fighting, possibly rolling around, because she heard things falling and being pushed around. She heard this for a minute or two and then ended the call. Beal called back 15 or 20 minutes later. Defendant answered the phone, and he was no longer angry, he seemed "almost relieved almost of like any stress or anxiety." She heard defendant speaking aggressively to Dyer, said he sounded "still angry or irritated," and heard him tell Dyer that he needed to apologize. Dyer got on the phone and apologized to Beal. Beal stated Dyer "sounded like he was speaking through liquid, like he was almost gurgling or choking on something. He sounded very weak and strained." Defendant told Beal he and Dyer fought and that he broke an alcohol bottle over Dyer's head. Beal recalled defendant "stated something about a frying pan, as well." She decided to end the conversation, and she described defendant as sounding "very loving, and kind, very joyful at the same time, just warm." She did not have any reason to believe that Dyer's life was in danger.
¶ 35 3. The Investigation
¶ 36 Sergeant Dan Beaudry was the lead investigator assigned to this case. When he interviewed defendant at 1:24 the morning after Dyer's death, defendant did not appear to be intoxicated. Defendant told him that the blood on his clothing and the cut on his hand were the result of being attacked by an individual outside a restaurant in downtown Moline and he had to defend himself. A search of the property surrounding the restaurant and review of the surveillance footage revealed no evidence of an altercation that evening.
¶ 37 Dr. Mark Peters, the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on Dyer, was called to testify. He testified that Dyer had 16 separate stab wounds to his chest, numerous other smaller stab wounds and incised wounds on his body, and lacerations and blunt force injuries to his head. He had injuries around his left eye, forehead, and nose which included contusions, lacerations, and abrasions. Dyer had injuries to his hands and forearms consistent with defensive wounds. Dr. Peters stated that the six stab wounds to the left chest, which penetrated Dyer's lung and resulted in bleeding into the chest cavity, were fatal wounds. The head injuries Dyer sustained could have been fatal as well because there were skull fractures, brain contusions, and subdural bleeding. Dyer had a blood alcohol level of 0.221 or 0.223 and had trazodone in his system.
¶ 38 Autopsy photos, crime scene photos, DNA swab evidence, and photos of physical evidence were admitted into evidence. Extensive Facebook messaging records of defendant, Dyer, Wherry, and Beal were reviewed and entered into evidence.
¶ 39 Rhonda Carter, a forensic scientist in the Illinois State Police Biology DNA Unit conducted DNA testing in this case. Her tests showed that Dyer was the single source DNA profile from swabs of blood taken from numerous sources, including defendant's wrists, several items of defendant's clothing, the blade of a knife found on defendant when he was arrested, the blade of two other knives found in Dyer's apartment, and the metal cooking pot found next to Dyer's body.
¶ 40 Detective Jeremy McAuliffe, a certified forensic computer examiner, examined data extractions of cell phones owned by Dyer, defendant, and Wherry. He testified that the cell phone defendant had in his possession when he was arrested belonged to Dyer. He reviewed a series of text messages between defendant and Isaac Tarango that were exchanged on November 16 and 17, 2020, where defendant described his relationship with Dyer. The messages revealed defendant lived with Dyer for two weeks. In the messages, defendant described Dyer as rude, said Dyer told others defendant was using him, and implied that he injured Dyer for that reason. Defendant wrote that Dyer wanted him back in his life and that he would consider acting like he wanted to just so he could get the rest of his items back from Dyer and hurt him again in retaliation for something Dyer allegedly did to his friend (referring to defendant's friend who had stayed with them, during which time defendant said Dyer touched the friend while he slept). Detective McAuliffe read messages defendant sent to his brother on November 14, 2020, which said defendant "accidentally almost beat [Dyer] half to death." In messages to Whitaker on the same day, defendant wrote that he planned to "break a bottle on his face" as soon as he walked in and that he would beat Dyer until he was able to retrieve all his belongings.
¶ 41 F. Dismissal of the Jury
¶ 42 After the State rested, defense counsel asked for a brief recess to speak to defendant. Defendant then moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. Defense counsel then indicated he had spoken with defendant and he requested the court allow him to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial. The State had no objection. The trial court admonished defendant:
"You have both the right to continue with this trial and to continue to have the jury hear evidence. You also have an absolute right to waive the remainder of the trial being heard by the jury, converting this to what is called a bench trial, or a trial by the judge."
The court asked defendant if he understood the request, had thought about it, and had spoken with his attorney, to which the defendant replied, "I mean, I wish I could have like another day, but, yeah, a little bit." When asked to restate his decision, defendant said, "Yes, I want to convert it to a bench trial." The court found this to be a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" waiver. When releasing the jury, the court informed them defendant had exercised his "absolute right" to waive a jury trial.
¶ 43 G. Remainder of the Trial
¶ 44 Defendant called Dr. Rosell to testify as an expert witness in both clinical and forensic psychology. His written report was admitted into evidence. Dr. Rosell diagnosed defendant with bipolar disorder, which was "moderate with psychotic features." He explained that "during these manic episodes individuals may experience psychotic features such as hallucinations, or delusions of paranoia." Dr. Rosell testified defendant appeared to have some symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, most notably hypervigilance and defensiveness. He ruled out schizoaffective disorder. Dr. Rosell stated someone like defendant, who has experienced significant trauma in the past, may react differently in a fight-or-flight response. He explained that "[i]t's possible that [defendant] did not have the ability to stop and think things through through [sic] its conclusion on that day." Dr. Rosell pointed to numerous factors that could have caused this, including defendant feeling like he was being used by Dyer, experiencing memories of childhood trauma, and being under the influence of substances that impaired his judgment. He opined that defendant's mental health and substance abuse issues could prevent him from having a substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. On cross-examination, Dr. Rosell acknowledged he never formed an opinion that defendant had a manic episode on the evening of Dyer's death.
¶ 45 In rebuttal, the State called several witnesses including Dr. Brownfield who testified as the State's expert in forensic psychology. He opined that defendant did not meet the criteria for insanity at the time of the offense. Dr. Brownfield stated defendant's symptoms of mental illness, including auditory hallucinations, were possibly related to stress or substance use, which defendant admitted to engaging in at the time. Despite defendant's existing mental health conditions, Dr. Brownfield found his evaluation and the evidence suggested defendant appreciated the criminality of his conduct, including his use of code words with Wherry, his efforts to dispose of the bloody paper towel in his hand when approached by police, and his story to police on two separate occasions about being attacked elsewhere as a way to explain his appearance that evening.
¶ 46 H. The Verdict and Sentencing
¶ 47 The trial court found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt defendant committed first degree murder and his behavior in doing so was exceptionally brutal or heinous and indicative of wanton cruelty. The court found defendant did not meet his burden of proving the affirmative defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. Defendant's motion for new trial was denied.
¶ 48 Defendant was sentenced to a term of natural life in prison. The trial court reviewed the evidence presented at trial, the presentence investigation report (PSI), letters from family members and other concerned individuals, victim impact statements from Dyer's relatives, and the testimony of Wherry as a witness in aggravation. In rendering the sentence, the court stated it considered the statutory factors in mitigation and aggravation. The court did not find defendant's mental illness as a mitigating factor because defendant was capable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time the offense was committed. The court concluded that based on its observations and all of the evidence presented at trial and during the sentencing hearing, defendant is "irretrievabl[y] depraved" and could not be rehabilitated.
¶ 49 This appeal followed.
¶ 50 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 51 Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) his right to a speedy trial was violated because the trial court abused its discretion by attributing certain delays in the proceedings to the defense, and if deemed not properly preserved, his counsel was ineffective for failing to renew his objection and demand trial when the last trial date was scheduled; (2) the trial court committed structural error in granting his request to waive the jury trial after the trial had commenced; and (3) his sentence of natural life in prison was an abuse of discretion because the court failed to consider his age, rehabilitative potential, and mental health during sentencing. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 52 A. Speedy-Trial Claims
¶ 53 The record reveals many delays in the proceedings in this case from when defendant was arrested on November 18, 2020, until his trial finally commenced on September 11, 2023. Defendant takes issue with two of the numerous delays attributed to him, arguing those delays resulted in his trial being held outside the applicable 120-day speedy-trial term. The two delays defendant raises issue with are: (1) the 20 days from October 1 to 21, 2021, and (2) the 122 days from May 12 to September 11, 2023. We note the State contends the second delay in question should be calculated from the original trial date (May 22, 2023) to the rescheduled trial date (September 11, 2023), resulting in a delay of 112 days. However, the trial court's decision to delay the trial occurred on May 12, 2023, and attributed the delay to defendant; thus, it is the appropriate date for calculating the delay.
¶ 54 Under section 103-5(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2020)), a defendant in custody must be tried within 120 days after his arrest unless certain circumstances result in delay:
"Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act [(725 ILCS 5/104-13 (West 2020))], by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act [(725 ILCS 5/114-4 (West 2020))] after a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record."
¶ 55 A delay in the proceedings is "any action that slows down the criminal justice process and often-directly or indirectly-delays the trial or the mere possibility of a trial." People v. Cross, 2021 IL App (4th) 190114, ¶ 82. Delays enumerated in section 103-5(a) of the Code, which include delays occasioned by the defendant or agreed to by the defendant, toll the speedy-trial term. "The defendant bears the burden of affirmatively establishing a speedy-trial violation, and in making his proof, the defendant must show that the delay was not attributable to his own conduct." People v. Kliner, 185 Ill.2d 81, 114 (1998). Great deference is afforded to a trial court's determination as to which party is responsible for a delay of the trial, and such decisions will not be overturned absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion. Cross, 2021 IL App (4th) 190114, ¶ 77.
¶ 56 1. Delay from October 1 to 21, 2021
¶ 57 Defendant first argues that the 20-day delay from October 1 to 21, 2021, was not attributable to him. A review of the record reveals that this time period was not, in fact, attributed to defendant. Instead, the delay was one of the exceptions set forth in the statute, namely, a delay occasioned by an examination for fitness. See 725 ILCS 5/13-5(a) (West 2020). On September 24, 2021, the trial court entered an order granting the State's motion for a fitness evaluation, appointing Dr. Brownfield to examine defendant and expressly stating "[s]peedy trial is tolled" pursuant to section 103-5(a) of the Code. See 725 ILCS 5/13-5(a) (West 2020). The case was set for a status hearing on October 21, 2021. At that hearing, defendant's attorney asked for and was granted a continuance until November 4, 2021, to allow him time to review Dr. Brownfield's report with defendant and address other discovery matters. Because the fitness examination of defendant remained pending throughout this time period, there can be no question that the trial court properly deemed the speedy-trial term tolled.
¶ 58 2. Delay from May 12 to September 11, 2023
¶ 59 Before addressing the merits of defendant's argument regarding the second delay in dispute, we first address his assertion that this court should find he properly made a speedy-trial demand and objection to the continuance entered on May 12, 2023. Whether a defendant's speedy trial demand was sufficient is a question of law subject to de novo review. People v. Resser, 2023 IL App (3d) 210462, ¶ 24. "[W]hile no magic words are required to constitute a speedy-trial demand, there must be some affirmative statement requesting a speedy trial in the record and the demand should not be disguised in ambiguous language." People v. Peco, 345 Ill.App.3d 724, 734 (2004). Defendant filed a written demand for speedy trial on May 12, 2023, and made it perfectly clear he objected to the delay being attributed to him at the hearing that day. The fact that the trial court did not actually schedule the new trial date until a subsequent hearing and indicated that the date was "by agreement" is of no consequence. At the time the delay was ordered on May 12, 2023, defendant made an unambiguous demand for a speedy trial and objected to the delay. Defendant subsequently raised this issue again in his posttrial motion, thereby properly preserving this matter for appeal. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186 (1988).
¶ 60 Defendant argues that the last continuance of the trial date from May 12 to September 11, 2023, was erroneously attributed to him because that delay was caused by the State's own assumption that Dr. Rosell would not be testifying because he did not create a written report. He argues he notified the State on April 6, 2023, that his expert would not be writing a report, there is no requirement that a witness reduce an opinion to writing before testifying at trial, and he had otherwise complied with the discovery rules and orders issued by the trial court. Defendant states his deadline for turning over discovery was" 'at least 10 days before trial,'" and he acknowledges this date was May 12, 2023. The State counters that defendant's motion for appointment of an expert witness relating to involuntary intoxication and insanity defenses was filed on September 9, 2022, and on numerous occasions thereafter, the State inquired as to the status of that expert's report. Defense counsel gave numerous assurances that a report would be forthcoming until he informed the State in an e-mail on April 6, 2023, that no report would be prepared by Dr. Rosell. After being informed of this, the State believed Dr. Rosell would not be testifying. When Dr. Rosell was included on defendant's preliminary witness list, which was e-mailed to the State late in the evening on May 8, 2023, the State began taking action to obtain discovery of Dr. Rosell's anticipated testimony so it could assess the need for obtaining its own expert witness. The State argues that the resulting delay of the trial to accomplish this was properly attributed to defendant. We agree.
¶ 61 On December 12, 2020, the State provided its initial discovery to defendant and filed a motion to compel discovery pursuant to applicable rules. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 412 (eff. Mar. 1, 2001); R. 413 (eff. July 1, 1982). Rule 413(c) provides:
"Subject to constitutional limitations, the trial court shall, on written motion, require that the State be informed of, and permitted to inspect and copy or photograph, any reports or results, or testimony relative thereto, of physical or mental examinations or of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons, or any other reports or statements of experts which defense counsel has in his possession or control, including a statement of the qualifications of such experts." Ill. S.Ct. R. 413(c) (eff. July 1, 1982).
The order appointing Dr. Rosell as defendant's expert on October 28, 2022, required, inter alia, defendant to file a status update that included the date Dr. Rosell would be meeting with defendant and "[t]he anticipated date of Dr. Rosell's report, if one should be forthcoming." A subsequent order set a deadline for defendant's expert witness report for August 6, 2023.
¶ 62 There is generally no requirement that a witness reduce his opinion to writing before testifying at trial, absent a showing of bad faith. People v. Coulter, 230 Ill.App.3d 209, 220 (1992). However, a defendant is obligated to inform the State of any reports, results, or testimony regarding mental examinations and any other reports or statements of experts which defense counsel has in his possession or control. In this case, defendant had an obligation to inform the State of the results of Dr. Rosell's examination of defendant and his anticipated testimony regarding that examination. Defense counsel gave numerous assurances that this would be accomplished with a report. Although the discovery deadline for defendant was not until at least 10 days before trial (May 12, 2023), defendant gave numerous assurances that the report would be forthcoming long before that time (December 1, 2022, February 24, 2023, March 24, 2023). It was not until April 6, 2023, the day defendant's expert's report was due, that defendant informed the State there would be no report. It was not until defendant submitted a preliminary witness list on May 8, 2023, that the State realized defendant was still planning to have Dr. Rosell testify.
¶ 63 On May 12, 2023, the trial court heard argument on the motions related to discovery of defendant's expert's testimony. This was also the day defendant's discovery was due. The court noted, "everything from my perspective flows from the fact that there's no report" and the State was entitled to discovery of the anticipated testimony of Dr. Rosell. The court considered several ways to accomplish it. When asked whether he would be filing a report that day, defense counsel said, "It can be done." Referring to the report, the court stated, "[I]f it's not filed by the end of the day it's not a timely disclosure. I think you understand where I'm at with the issue of disclosure. We are not going to trial without a disclosure as to the anticipated scope of that testimony." When asked again if he could get the report filed that day, defense counsel said, "I don't know if I can have a report from Dr. Rosell because he's not prepared one. I have my obligations as counsel which are to provide the disclosures on file and intend to have those on file." He then offered if the State was seeking a continuance to find its own expert, then there would be time for his expert to prepare a report. Defense counsel was then given an opportunity to comply with the discovery order by making an offer of proof regarding the expected testimony of Dr. Rosell. This offer of proof was deemed insufficient.
¶ 64 In deciding that a delay was required, the trial court stated:
"Whether it was intentional or not, I think the State is making a reasonable point which is this. If I were the State and I had received an e-mail saying there's no report forthcoming, my interpretation of that is this person is not going to be testifying. We always have reports in these cases. We also always have the experts prepare the report.
I understand there's case law that I can't order the report to be prepared, but I can order that the State be provided reasonable discovery so that they can prepare their case for trial. It's not a one-way street. The State has to turn everything it has over to the defense. The defense, within Constitutional limitations set forth as specifically says in the Rule, has to do the same. So if you don't want or the doctor is not going to prepare a written report, then he can sit for an interview. So those are the options.
I am going to continue the case. It's going to be delay to the defense."
¶ 65 Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that this decision was an abuse of discretion. On the day defendant's discovery was due, counsel failed to provide adequate information about the anticipated testimony of Dr. Rosell despite knowing the deadline. Defense counsel stated that he "intend[ed] to have those on file," but he did not tender the disclosure because of the State's motion to continue. We find this disingenuous. At the hearing, defense counsel was asked if a report would be filed that day, and he said it could be done. When pressed further, he said he could not file a report because one had not been written. He was then given the opportunity to present an offer of proof regarding Dr. Rosell's expected testimony and gave a general statement deemed insufficient by the trial court. The court made the decision to continue the trial "[r]eluctantly" but admonished that the "primary focus is going to be due process." A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is "fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it." People v. Ortega, 209 Ill.2d 354, 359 (2004). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to attribute the delay of the trial to defendant.
¶ 66 Because we previously determined defense counsel properly made a speedy-trial demand and objection to the continuance entered on May 12, 2023, we need not address defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this regard.
¶ 67 B. Jury Waiver
¶ 68 Defendant next argues when the trial court granted his request to waive a jury trial at the close of the State's case as a matter of right instead of as an exercise of its discretion, the court committed structural error. In doing so, defendant acknowledges this issue was not properly preserved for appeal because although he raised the matter in a posttrial motion, he failed to object when the alleged error occurred. See Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186. Defendant argues instead this court should review the matter under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine. The State argues this issue was forfeited and if considered by this court, any error that occurred was harmless and does not rise to the level of substantial error. We agree with the State.
¶ 69 The plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider a forfeited error affecting substantial rights in two circumstances:
"(1) when a clear and obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) when a clear or obvious error occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of
the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence." People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 20.
¶ 70 The second prong of the plain-error rule is considered "structural error." An error is structural only if it necessarily renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or is an unreliable means of determining guilt or innocence. People v. Glasper, 234 Ill.2d 173, 197-6 (2009). "Put another way, these errors deprive defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence *** and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 29 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999)). The United States Supreme Court has recognized an error as structural only in a very limited class of cases, including "a complete denial of counsel, trial before a biased judge, racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, denial of self-representation at trial, denial of a public trial, and a defective reasonable doubt instruction." People v. Thomson, 238 Ill.2d 598, 609 (2010) (citing Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 n.2 (2006)).
¶ 71 In this case, the trial court admitted it mistakenly considered defendant's request to waive his right to a jury trial as a matter of right instead of an exercise of the court's discretion. In fact, the State, defense counsel, and the court acknowledged they were mistaken as to the standard at the time of the waiver. Once a jury has been sworn, a defendant no longer has an absolute right to forgo the jury and choose a bench trial, and the decision to grant waiver under such circumstances becomes a matter of the court's discretion. People v. Jordan, 2019 IL App (1st) 161848, ¶ 20. However, this mistake in no way rises to the level of structural error for several reasons. First, the court considered defendant's waiver of a jury trial as a matter of right, erroneously employing a standard more favorable to defendant than the abuse of discretion standard. Second, upon acknowledgement of the error, the trial court stated that "the result would have been the same because I would have exercised my discretion to allow [defendant] to waive the right to the jury and have a bench trial." Third, and most significantly, the State, defendant, and the court all acknowledged defendant got what he wanted-his request to waive the jury trial was granted. Defendant has failed to explain how the trial court's decision to grant his request resulted in fundamental unfairness to him or impeded the integrity of the judicial process.
¶ 72 Defendant's reliance on the policy considerations examined when a jury waiver is requested after a jury is sworn is inapposite. In People v. Zemblidge, 104 Ill.App.3d 654, 656 (1982), the appellate court discussed why a jury-waiver decision becomes discretionary once a jury is sworn:
"Practically speaking, every attorney would advise his client to elect a jury trial and at the conclusion of the evidence, if things did not look favorably, a defendant would be urged to waive this method of trial. We believe this strategy would impede the prompt and fair administration of justice, would be an improper utilization of jurors' time, and a waste of State resources and expenditures."
These are all considerations that might lead the trial court to use its discretion to deny a defendant's motion to waive a jury trial, as they seek to minimize the concern that criminal proceedings could become "subject to the whims of defendants." Zemblidge, 104 Ill.App.3d at 656. Although the court may not have weighed these policy considerations, we cannot find that granting defendant's motion without doing so resulted in any fundamental unfairness to him or impeded the integrity of the judicial process in this case.
¶ 73 Defendant also seems to imply that the trial court failed to consider his mental health at the time he asked the jury to be waived. However, the record reveals the court examined defendant and found the waiver to be "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." It bears repeating that everyone agrees defendant got what he asked for-his motion to waive a jury was granted. Under the circumstances, we find no structural error occurred.
¶ 74 C. Sentencing
¶ 75 Defendant argues the trial court's decision to sentence him to a term of natural life in prison was an abuse of discretion because the court failed to adequately consider his youth, rehabilitative potential, and mental health. Defendant asks this court to reduce his sentence to a term of years. After our careful review of the record, we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a natural life sentence in this case.
¶ 76 Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill.2d 205, 212 (2010). Although a reviewing court has the power to reduce a sentence imposed by the trial court (Ill. S.Ct. R. 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967)), this power should be exercised "cautiously and sparingly." People v. O'Neal, 125 Ill.2d 291, 300 (1988). It is well established that "[a] trial court has wide latitude in sentencing a defendant, so long as it neither ignores relevant mitigating factors nor considers improper factors in aggravation." People v. Roberts, 338 Ill.App.3d 245, 251 (2003). The trial court is in the best position to observe "the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age." People v. Stacey, 193 Ill.2d 203, 209 (2000). A reviewing court will not reweigh the factors considered by the trial court and may not alter a sentence imposed by the trial court absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Pippen, 324 Ill.App.3d 649, 651 (2001). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court imposes a sentence that "is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." Stacey, 193 Ill.2d at 210.
¶ 77 Defendant contends the trial court failed to consider his age at the time of the offense (20 years) and his potential for rehabilitation, pointing to Dr. Rosell's report as evidence of his "capability to change." However, the trial court confirmed that it considered defendant's age when discussing it at the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence when it explained: "I understand that there has [sic] been developments in the area of jurisprudence as pertains to younger individuals accused of serious crimes, but the Court notes that [defendant] was 20 at the time alleged or at the time the offense occurred." The record also reflects that the trial court carefully reviewed the evidence presented at trial and during sentencing to consider defendant's potential for rehabilitation. In considering rehabilitative potential, "[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant will be the governing factors." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Flores, 404 Ill.App.3d 155, 159 (2010). Here, the brutal nature of the attack on Dyer and defendant's callous and calculating conduct leading up to, during, and immediately following the attack, along with the reports of both expert witnesses and the PSI, were among the things considered by the court in making its determination. When announcing the sentencing decision, the trial court commented most definitively on defendant's rehabilitative potential, stating:
"Having spent time in the courtroom throughout [defendant's] time before this Court, having observed him at trial, having all the evidence at trial, considering what was said at the sentencing hearing, it's the Court's opinion that, in fact, [defendant] is irretrievably depraved. In other words, he can't be rehabilitated. He remains and will always remain a threat to the community."
Contrary to defendant's contention, the trial court weighed his age and potential for rehabilitation as factors in sentencing; therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.
¶ 78 Defendant also contends the trial court erred in declining to consider his mental health as a mitigating factor during sentencing. Defendant's mental health was at the forefront throughout the pendency of this case-he was found fit to stand trial after two separate fitness evaluations and two expert witnesses testified regarding his mental capacity at trial, where defendant raised insanity as a defense. The evidence available to the court included the reports of two doctors and the PSI providing substantial information regarding defendant's mental-health history. The trial court explained defendant's mental health would be a factor "if he's unable to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law as a result of that mental health condition." See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(16) (West 2020) (enumerating serious mental illness as a mitigating factor if "[a]t the time of the offense, the defendant was suffering from a serious mental illness which, though insufficient to establish the defense of insanity, substantially affected his or her ability to understand the nature of his or her acts or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law"). It was within the trial court's discretion to determine that despite his mental-health issues, defendant was able understand his conduct and conform to the law; thus, his mental health did not warrant mitigation of his sentence.
¶ 79 A sentence within the statutory limits provided by the legislature is presumed to be proper (People v. Wheeler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160937, ¶ 38) and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion (People v. Fern, 189 Ill.2d 48, 54 (1999)). The trial court determined, and the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant's conduct was exceptionally brutal or heinous and indicative of wanton cruelty, justifying the sentence enhancement allowing the court to impose a sentence of natural life in prison. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 2020). The evidence revealed defendant had previously injured Dyer in an altercation, was angry with him, communicated with others about his intentions to physically confront and harm Dyer again, went to Dyer's apartment, viciously attacked Dyer with multiple weapons over a period of time, placed a Facebook video call to Wherry to show him what he had done, called Wherry to ask for his help to "clean up," and walked away from the gruesome crime scene covered in his victim's blood. Under the circumstances, we find the trial court's decision to sentence defendant to natural life in prison was not "greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." Stacey, 193 Ill.2d at 210. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. Therefore, we affirm.
¶ 80 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 81 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 82 Affirmed.