The State urges this court to strike defendant's argument on this point because he has not provided the court with the photo in question, which it was his burden to do. ( People v. Edwards (1978), 74 Ill.2d 1, cert. denied (1979), 442 U.S. 931, 61 L.Ed.2d 299, 99 S.Ct. 2862; People v. Anderson (1977), 51 Ill. App.3d 621.) Alternatively, the State argues its right to prove its case against the defendant included the right to have admitted even gruesome photos as long as they are probative of an issue. ( People v. Campbell (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 804, 817; People v. Seaberry (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 718, 722-23; see also People v. Jenko (1951), 410 Ill. 478.) Further, it argues such photos are admissible even when there is other proof of the issue.

The evidence also showed that defendant did not hit his brakes, did not slow down, and did not swerve to avoid Officer Kugelman. Under the above facts, we find that the evidence supports the finding of guilty of murder because, by defendant continuing along at 80 miles per hour, the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant would have known that there was a strong probability of causing death or great bodily harm to Officer Kugelman. Defendant has argued that the instant case is analogous to this court's decision in People v. Campbell (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 804. In Campbell, the defendant had been riding in a van with several other individuals who threw rocks out of the van in the direction of other vehicles. (77 Ill. App.3d at 808.)

However, when one attaches himself to a group bent on illegal acts which are dangerous or homicidal in nature or which will probably or necessarily require the use of force and violence that could result in an unlawful homicide, he is accountable for the acts committed by the other members of the group in furtherance of the common purpose, or as a natural and probable consequence thereof, even though he did not actively participate in the overt act. People v. Campbell (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 804, 396 N.E.2d 607. In order to prove criminal accountability beyond a reasonable doubt, the State must show that: (1) defendant solicited, aided, abetted, agreed or attempted to aid another in the planning or commission of the crime; (2) defendant's participation took place either before or during the commission of the offense; and (3) the participation occurred with the concurrent, specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense.

Not only did the State refrain from making an argument such as in Sullivan, but it also established defendant's guilt overwhelmingly. Aside from the various stories defendant told to extricate himself, Rayna made a full disclosure (see People v. Campbell (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 804, 815, 396 N.E.2d 607). Rayna testified defendant told him how he could make some money, but defendant could not do it because he knew the owner. Defendant told him what to do when he arrived and where the money was kept.

• 8 Previous Illinois decisions have long held that the admission of a photograph of a murder victim is within the sound discretion of the trial court and where the photograph is probative of some material fact it is admissible despite its gruesome nature. ( People v. Campbell (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 804, 396 N.E.2d 607; People v. Lefler (1967), 38 Ill.2d 216, 230 N.E.2d 827.) When a photograph serves no purpose other than to inflame and prejudice the jury, however, it must be excluded.

RSA 626:8, III. Although the alleged conduct of the defendant is deplorable, the State's failure to indict him properly, and to prove all of the elements of accomplice liability under RSA 626:8, III and IV, requires a reversal of the defendant's conviction even though the facts alleged could support a conviction upon reindictment. See People v. Campbell, 77 Ill. App.3d 804, 812, 396 N.E.2d 607, 613 (1979). Reversed and remanded.

Under that analysis, defendant here could not be guilty by accountability of involuntary manslaughter because the evidence gave no indication he intended for Woods to die. • 2 Mikel has been refuted or ignored in (1) People v. Miscichowski (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 646, 493 N.E.2d 135, and (2) People v. Campbell (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 804, 396 N.E.2d 607. More significantly, in People v. Terry (1984), 99 Ill.2d 508, 515, 460 N.E.2d 746, 749, the supreme court held that section 5-2(c) of the Code does not require that a person to be held accountable intend that the principal commit the offense for which accountability is sought. Rather, the Terry court held that included in section 5-2(c) of the Code is the "common-design rule," which provides that "where two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance thereof committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design and all are equally responsible for the consequences of such further acts."

"Previous Illinois decisions have long held that the admission of a photograph of a murder victim is within the sound discretion of the trial court and where the photograph is probative of some material fact it is admissible despite its gruesome nature. ( People v. Campbell (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 804, 396 N.E.2d 607; People v. Lefler (1967), 38 Ill.2d 216, 230 N.E.2d 827.) When a photograph serves no purpose other than to inflame and prejudice the jury, however, it must be excluded.

• 7 Sammie and Maverick Tyler both argue the photo of Kleinworth's injury was improperly admitted, albeit without objection, because whether the victim suffered "great bodily harm" was not really an issue, nor was it disputed by the defendants. The State is entitled to introduce its full proof of the crime charged in the indictment, as long as the evidence is probative of an issue ( People v. Campbell (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 804, 817; People v. Seaberry (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 718, 722), and regardless of an offer by the defendant to stipulate to certain facts. ( People v. Rachel (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 600, 605; People v. Christen (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 192, 197-98.)

Although a defendant can be responsible for an unintended crime which was the natural consequence of the intended crime. People v. Campbell (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 804; People v. Cvetich (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 580. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when: