Opinion
2012-11-9
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Linda CAMPANELLA, Defendant–Appellant.
The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Susan C. Ministero of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (Michael J. Hillery of Counsel), for Respondent.
The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Susan C. Ministero of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (Michael J. Hillery of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: FAHEY, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, WHALEN, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[1] [intentional murder] ). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish defendant's intent to kill the victim ( see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Moreover, viewing the evidence in light of the element of intent as charged to the jury ( see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we conclude that the verdict with respect to that element is not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).
Contrary to defendant's contention, Supreme Court did not err in permitting the Medical Examiner to testify regarding the victim's cause of death, i.e., that the victim died from complications resulting from a stab wound to the abdomen ( see People v. Odell, 26 A.D.3d 527, 529, 808 N.Y.S.2d 830,lv. denied7 N.Y.3d 760, 819 N.Y.S.2d 886, 853 N.E.2d 257;People v. Klosin, 281 A.D.2d 951, 951–952, 725 N.Y.S.2d 478,lv. denied96 N.Y.2d 864, 730 N.Y.S.2d 38, 754 N.E.2d 1121;see also People v. McCart, 157 A.D.2d 194, 197, 555 N.Y.S.2d 954,lv. denied76 N.Y.2d 861, 560 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 561 N.E.2d 900). “It is axiomatic that expert testimony is admissible where, as here, the conclusions drawn from the facts depend upon professional knowledge not within the ken of the ordinary juror” ( Odell, 26 A.D.3d at 529, 808 N.Y.S.2d 830). Indeed, expert medical testimony generally is required to establish that the defendant's conduct was a cause of death ( see People v. Eberle, 265 A.D.2d 881, 882, 697 N.Y.S.2d 218;McCart, 157 A.D.2d at 197, 555 N.Y.S.2d 954).
Defendant's further contention that the court erred in allowing the Medical Examiner to testify that the victim's death was a homicide is not preserved for our review ( seeCPL 470.05[2] ). In any event, although we note that the People correctly concede that “it was error to allow the [Medical Examiner] to ... opine that the death was a homicide, since ‘[s]uch characterization improperly invaded the province of the jury’ ” ( People v. Heath, 49 A.D.3d 970, 973, 853 N.Y.S.2d 400,lv. denied10 N.Y.3d 959, 863 N.Y.S.2d 143, 893 N.E.2d 449;see People v. Lluveres, 15 A.D.3d 848, 849, 789 N.Y.S.2d 371,lv. denied5 N.Y.3d 807, 803 N.Y.S.2d 36, 836 N.E.2d 1159), we conclude that the error is harmless. The Medical Examiner stated that he was not making a legal determination by characterizing the victim's death as a homicide and added that he used the term “homicide” only to indicate that the victim died at the hands of another person ( see Odell, 26 A.D.3d at 529, 808 N.Y.S.2d 830;cf. Lluveres, 15 A.D.3d at 849, 789 N.Y.S.2d 371). Viewing the evidence, the law and the circumstances of this case, in totality and as of the time of the representation, we also reject defendant's contention that she was denied effective assistance of counsel ( see generally People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400).
We further conclude that the court properly denied defendant's challenges for cause to two prospective jurors. “It is well settled that a prospective juror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding the ability to be impartial must be excused unless the [prospective] juror states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial” ( People v. Baker, 89 A.D.3d 1431, 1431, 932 N.Y.S.2d 403,lv. denied18 N.Y.3d 856, 938 N.Y.S.2d 864, 962 N.E.2d 289 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Chambers, 97 N.Y.2d 417, 419, 740 N.Y.S.2d 291, 766 N.E.2d 953). We conclude that the first prospective juror at issue, who owned a security business, never expressed any doubt concerning his ability to be fair and impartial ( see People v. Odum, 67 A.D.3d 1465, 1465, 890 N.Y.S.2d 241,lvs. denied14 N.Y.3d 804, 899 N.Y.S.2d 138, 925 N.E.2d 942,15 N.Y.3d 755, 906 N.Y.S.2d 828, 933 N.E.2d 227,cert. denied––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 326, 178 L.Ed.2d 212;People v. Smith, 48 A.D.3d 489, 489, 849 N.Y.S.2d 789,lv. denied10 N.Y.3d 870, 860 N.Y.S.2d 497, 890 N.E.2d 260). We reach the same conclusion with respect to the second prospective juror at issue, who acknowledged having a friend and an acquaintance in law enforcement ( see People v. Pickren, 284 A.D.2d 727, 727, 728 N.Y.S.2d 792,lv. denied96 N.Y.2d 923, 732 N.Y.S.2d 640, 758 N.E.2d 666;see also People v. Colon, 71 N.Y.2d 410, 418, 526 N.Y.S.2d 932, 521 N.E.2d 1075, cert. denied487 U.S. 1239, 108 S.Ct. 2911, 101 L.Ed.2d 943). In any event, “ [e]venassuming,arguendo, that the initial statements of the [second] prospective juror raised a serious doubt regarding his ability to be impartial, we conclude that [he] ultimately stated unequivocally that he could be fair” ( Baker, 89 A.D.3d at 1432, 932 N.Y.S.2d 403 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Chambers, 97 N.Y.2d at 419, 740 N.Y.S.2d 291, 766 N.E.2d 953). Finally, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.