Opinion
H044447
02-02-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTHONY CAMPA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Benito County Super. Ct. No. CR1601280)
Defendant Anthony Campa appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §459). The trial court found that defendant had one prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and five prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 11 years in state prison. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence about his prior conduct. We affirm.
I. Statement of Facts
At about 3:15 a.m. on September 10, 2016, Officer Mafafumi Yamamoto responded to the report of a burglary at the Los Cuates Market. Juan Godinez, the owner of the store, was notified of the burglary by the alarm company at about the same time. Godinez went to the store to meet the police and discovered that a glass entry door had been broken.
The store had surveillance cameras. The following morning, Godinez and Officer Yamamoto reviewed the surveillance video from the previous night. The video showed two men breaking the door and taking beer and cigarettes. Godinez recognized defendant as one of the men in the video, because he had attempted to obtain cash from an empty cash card at his store. Godinez had also previously seen defendant three or four times when he was sleeping in a truck on the street. Officer Yamamoto identified defendant as one of the men, because he had had approximately 30 previous contacts with him. The officer recognized defendant based on his facial features and the distinctive way he walked. On the day of the burglary, defendant had a "big mustache and a little bit of a beard" like the man in the video. The officer also noted that the individual in the video was wearing Nike shoes and defendant was wearing the same shoes when the officer contacted him later that day.
II. Discussion
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence that he had attempted to commit a prior theft.
A. Background
After Godinez testified that he recognized defendant as one of the men in the surveillance video, the prosecutor asked whether this person was in the courtroom. Godinez responded, "I -- when I -- it seems to be him. When I've seen him, he has a lot -- he wears a big mustache, mustache and goat[e]e." The following exchange occurred: "Q. Where is that person seated? [¶] A. I think it's him. I don't know. [¶] Q. I'm just asking, Where is he? Where is that person seated that you're talking about? [¶] A. On - - to the left of you on the corner. [¶] THE COURT: Indicating the place where the defendant is seated. [¶] . . . [¶] [BY THE PROSECUTOR] Q. And you said previously you've interacted with him; is that right? [¶] A. Yes. One time he came and he wanted -- he wanted to get money from the cashiers with a card that doesn't have any money in it." Defense counsel objected under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court concluded the evidence was admissible on the issue of identification and overruled the objection. Godinez then testified that he "called the police" on the prior occasion, he told defendant "not to get in any more trouble," and defendant "had just gotten out of jail." When defense counsel attempted to object to this testimony, the trial court stated that he could "establish an objection without going into the details of it." Godinez also testified that he had seen defendant three or four times, because defendant slept in a truck on the street. Godinez agreed with the prosecutor that he remembered the prior incident in his store "very graphically."
B. Analysis
Evidence Code section 351 provides that "all relevant evidence is admissible." Relevant evidence is defined as evidence "having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (Evid. Code, § 210.) However, "[t]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (Evid. Code, § 352.) "The prejudice which exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence. '[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the defendant's case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is "prejudicial." The "prejudice" referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying section 352, "prejudicial" is not synonymous with "damaging." ' " (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638 (Karis).) In determining whether evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as unduly prejudicial, we note that "[t]he potential for such prejudice is 'decreased' when testimony describing the defendant's uncharged acts is 'no stronger and no more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offenses.' [Citation.]" (People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 144.)
This court will not disturb a trial court's exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding evidence "except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice." (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.) A reviewing court should declare a miscarriage of justice only when the court concludes it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)
Here, as defendant points out, the only issue at trial was whether defendant was one of the men shown in the video from the surveillance camera. Defendant argues that the testimony about the prior attempted theft incident lacked any probative value, because it was undisputed that Godinez was familiar with his appearance. Not so. Godinez was initially hesitant about identifying defendant at trial, but then described the prior attempted theft incident. When the trial court overruled the defense objection, this was the only evidence regarding why Godinez remembered defendant and was thus able to identify him in the video. Accordingly, the evidence was highly probative as to Godinez's ability to identify defendant. It was only after this evidence was admitted that Godinez testified without objection that he had also previously seen defendant three or four times.
Defendant contends that the evidence was highly prejudicial because it portrayed him as a thief.
In our view, the challenged testimony did not tend to "evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual . . . ." (Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 638.) The evidence was admitted not to show that defendant had committed a prior bad act, but to provide context for Godinez's identification. Moreover, attempting to withdraw money from an empty cash card was far less inflammatory than burglarizing a closed store. Though the evidence may have been damaging, it was not unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect.
Even assuming that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, defendant has failed to establish prejudice. Godinez testified that he recognized defendant, because he had previously seen defendant three or four times when defendant slept in a truck on the street. Officer Yamamoto testified that he was able to identify defendant as one of the men in the video, because he had had approximately 30 previous contacts with defendant. The officer also recognized defendant based on his facial features and the distinctive way he walked. The officer further noted that the man in the video was wearing Nike shoes and had facial hair and a beard and defendant was wearing the same shoes and had a "big mustache and a little bit of a beard," when the officer contacted him later that day. Based on this record, it is not reasonably probable that there would have been a more favorable verdict if the evidence had been excluded. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
Defendant also claims that the admission of the evidence violated his federal constitutional rights. "[T]he admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair. [Citations.]" (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.) Even assuming error in the admission of the evidence, there was no violation of defendant's federal constitutional rights. Given Officer Yamamoto's testimony, the trial in the present case was not fundamentally unfair.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Mihara, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Elia, Acting P. J. /s/_________
Bamattre-Manoukian, J.