Opinion
2013-06-5
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Erica Horwitz of counsel), for appellant. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Keith Dolan, and Holly L. Serrette of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Erica Horwitz of counsel), for appellant. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Keith Dolan, and Holly L. Serrette of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Mondo, J.), rendered May 16, 2011, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Under the particular circumstances of this case, including the “age, experience and background” of the defendant ( People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022), the record does not demonstrate that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal ( see People v. Bradshaw, 18 N.Y.3d 257, 938 N.Y.S.2d 254, 961 N.E.2d 645;People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145). Therefore, review of the defendant's contention *890that the Supreme Court should have afforded him youthful offender treatment is not precluded ( see People v. Charles S., 102 A.D.3d 896, 961 N.Y.S.2d 197).
However, the defendant's contention that he should have been granted youthful offender treatment is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v. Meriwether, 51 A.D.3d 823, 824, 859 N.Y.S.2d 208;People v. St. Hilaire, 48 A.D.3d 834, 851 N.Y.S.2d 362). In any event, under the circumstances of this case, including the defendant's repeated failure to comply with the conditions of his plea agreement, the denial of youthful offender treatment was a provident exercise of the Supreme Court's discretion ( seeCPL 720.20[1]; People v. Meriwether, 51 A.D.3d at 824, 859 N.Y.S.2d 208;People v. Kinloch, 7 A.D.3d 734, 735, 777 N.Y.S.2d 185;People v. Gonzalez, 265 A.D.2d 216, 696 N.Y.S.2d 152).