In sharp contrast to Batchelder, we have held consistently that equal protection of the laws requires that statutory classifications of crimes be based on differences that are real in fact and reasonably related to the general purposes of criminal legislation. E.g., People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1590, 55 L.Ed.2d 808 (1978); People v. Czajkowski, 193 Colo. 352, 568 P.2d 23 (1977); People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). "Equal protection of the law is a guarantee of like treatment of all those who are similarly situated.
HOMICIDE — Manslaughter — Subsection of Statute — Unconstitutional. Under People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316, the subsection of the statute pertaining to manslaughter — 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-3-104(1)(a) — was held unconstitutional. 2. First-Degree Murder — Not Convicted — Constitutional Challenge — Appeal — Not Considered.
II.[2,3] The defendant, citing People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975), next argues that section 18-3-202(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973, the first-degree assault statute, is unconstitutional because it imposes a higher penalty for essentially the same conduct proscribed in section 18-3-203(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973, the second-degree assault statute. We agree.
In a written order issued on October 19, 1995, the trial court disallowed the defendant's intervening cause defense. The court found that, according to People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 283, 534 P.2d 316, 319 (1975), a defendant is entitled to an intervening cause instruction only if the improper medical care is a cause "but for which death would not have occurred." According to the trial court's reasoning, the victim would have died from the stab wound had no care been rendered.
1999); People v. District Court, 964 P.2d 498, 500-01 (Colo. 1998); People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69, 74 (Colo. 1981); People v. Estrada, 198 Colo. 188, 191, 601 P.2d 619, 621 (1979); People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 281-82, 534 P.2d 316, 318 (1975). The statutory classification of crimes must be based on differences that are both real in fact and also reasonably related to the general purposes of the criminal legislation.
The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that a "sole cause of death" standard is inadequate and has adopted a "but for" test. People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). The Calvaresi court rejected a jury instruction that would not allow medical malpractice as a defense to a homicide charge unless "death results solely from erroneous treatment by another."
Equal protection of the law requires like treatment of all those who are similarly situated. E.g., People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 281, 534 P.2d 316, 318 (1975). Statutory classification of crimes must be based on substantial differences that are based on fact and reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation.
Unlawful conduct which is broken by an independent intervening cause cannot be the proximate cause of the death of another. People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 283, 534 P.2d 316, 319 (1975). To qualify as an intervening cause, an event must be unforeseeable and one in which the accused does not participate.
The defendant argues that, when use of a deadly weapon during a first degree sexual assault results in conviction of a class 2 felony under section 18-3-402(3)(c), equal protection is denied where the use of a deadly weapon is also the basis for the imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range under section 18-1-105(9)(a)(I). In support of his argument, the defendant cites People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). However, Calvaresi does not address the situation here.
Although the only expert testimony was that the space heater pilot light triggered the fire, two burnt matches were found near the door. In People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975), we approved the following statement of the law with respect to causation in homicide cases: "To warrant a conviction for homicide, the death must be the natural and probable consequence of the unlawful act, and not the result of an independent intervening cause in which the accused does not participate, and which he could not foresee.