People v. Calvaresi

130 Citing cases

  1. People v. Marcy

    628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981)   Cited 119 times
    Reaffirming a pre- Batchelder decision, People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316, 318

    In sharp contrast to Batchelder, we have held consistently that equal protection of the laws requires that statutory classifications of crimes be based on differences that are real in fact and reasonably related to the general purposes of criminal legislation. E.g., People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1590, 55 L.Ed.2d 808 (1978); People v. Czajkowski, 193 Colo. 352, 568 P.2d 23 (1977); People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). "Equal protection of the law is a guarantee of like treatment of all those who are similarly situated.

  2. People v. Webb

    189 Colo. 400 (Colo. 1975)   Cited 14 times
    In Webb, the court used its analysis in Calvaresi to again declare unconstitutional the application of the two culpable mental state definitions.

    HOMICIDE — Manslaughter — Subsection of Statute — Unconstitutional. Under People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316, the subsection of the statute pertaining to manslaughter — 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-3-104(1)(a) — was held unconstitutional. 2. First-Degree Murder — Not Convicted — Constitutional Challenge — Appeal — Not Considered.

  3. People v. Dominguez

    193 Colo. 468 (Colo. 1977)   Cited 18 times
    In People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54, the Supreme Court found, as it did in Calvaresi, supra, that two criminal statutes proscribed essentially the same conduct. Although the jury had convicted Dominguez of the greater offense, a retrial was ruled to be unnecessary because competent evidence established the elements of the lesser offense as well. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, and ordered the trial court to enter judgment and resentence defendant on the lesser included offense.

    II.[2,3] The defendant, citing People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975), next argues that section 18-3-202(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973, the first-degree assault statute, is unconstitutional because it imposes a higher penalty for essentially the same conduct proscribed in section 18-3-203(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973, the second-degree assault statute. We agree.

  4. People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez

    971 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1999)   Cited 48 times
    Stating that, unlike simple negligence, "gross negligence is sufficiently extraordinary to be classified as unforeseeable"

    In a written order issued on October 19, 1995, the trial court disallowed the defendant's intervening cause defense. The court found that, according to People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 283, 534 P.2d 316, 319 (1975), a defendant is entitled to an intervening cause instruction only if the improper medical care is a cause "but for which death would not have occurred." According to the trial court's reasoning, the victim would have died from the stab wound had no care been rendered.

  5. People v. Stewart

    55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002)   Cited 266 times
    Holding that the trial court erred in admitting an officer's testimony about vehicle direction, position, speed and other deductions about the accident under the guise of a lay opinion

    1999); People v. District Court, 964 P.2d 498, 500-01 (Colo. 1998); People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69, 74 (Colo. 1981); People v. Estrada, 198 Colo. 188, 191, 601 P.2d 619, 621 (1979); People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 281-82, 534 P.2d 316, 318 (1975). The statutory classification of crimes must be based on differences that are both real in fact and also reasonably related to the general purposes of the criminal legislation.

  6. State v. Bennis

    457 N.W.2d 843 (S.D. 1990)   Cited 18 times

    The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that a "sole cause of death" standard is inadequate and has adopted a "but for" test. People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). The Calvaresi court rejected a jury instruction that would not allow medical malpractice as a defense to a homicide charge unless "death results solely from erroneous treatment by another."

  7. People v. Fuller

    791 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1990)   Cited 119 times
    Finding that the defendant did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute providing for a defense of impaired mental condition, because he did not raise the defense

    Equal protection of the law requires like treatment of all those who are similarly situated. E.g., People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 281, 534 P.2d 316, 318 (1975). Statutory classification of crimes must be based on substantial differences that are based on fact and reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation.

  8. People v. Gentry

    738 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1987)   Cited 15 times

    Unlawful conduct which is broken by an independent intervening cause cannot be the proximate cause of the death of another. People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 283, 534 P.2d 316, 319 (1975). To qualify as an intervening cause, an event must be unforeseeable and one in which the accused does not participate.

  9. People v. Haymaker

    716 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1986)   Cited 63 times
    Holding that "the intent of the legislature to authorize cumulative punishment under the statutes at issue is simply unmistakable"

    The defendant argues that, when use of a deadly weapon during a first degree sexual assault results in conviction of a class 2 felony under section 18-3-402(3)(c), equal protection is denied where the use of a deadly weapon is also the basis for the imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range under section 18-1-105(9)(a)(I). In support of his argument, the defendant cites People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). However, Calvaresi does not address the situation here.

  10. People v. Bowman

    669 P.2d 1369 (Colo. 1983)   Cited 38 times
    Holding that confrontation error with respect to cross-examination of one juvenile witness made it unnecessary to consider whether cross-examination of second juvenile witness was improperly circumscribed by trial court

    Although the only expert testimony was that the space heater pilot light triggered the fire, two burnt matches were found near the door. In People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975), we approved the following statement of the law with respect to causation in homicide cases: "To warrant a conviction for homicide, the death must be the natural and probable consequence of the unlawful act, and not the result of an independent intervening cause in which the accused does not participate, and which he could not foresee.