People v. Callahan

2 Citing cases

  1. Duffy v. State

    730 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1986)   Cited 43 times

    sion), State v. Thomas, 209 Neb. 304, 307 N.W.2d 128 (1981); State v. Suggett, 189 Neb. 714, 204 N.W.2d 793 (1973), "`When the intent of the Legislature is clear, it is the duty of the courts to construe it in accordance with such intent. A sensible construction will be placed upon it to effectuate the object of the legislation rather than a literal meaning that would have the effect of defeating the legislative intent,'" quoting from Keller v. State Department of Roads, 184 Neb. 853, 172 N.W.2d 782 (1969); State v. Rubek, 189 Neb. 141, 201 N.W.2d 255 (1972); New Jersey: State v. Janiec, 25 N.J. Super. 197, 95 A.2d 762, 764 (1953), "`Only the Legislature may ordain the punishment for crime and the sentencing court may not impose a sentence inconsistent therewith. * * * "Under an indeterminate sentence law, the court cannot fix the minimum and maximum term of imprisonment to expire at the same time,"'" quoting from State v. Moore, 21 N.J. Super. 419, 91 A.2d 342, 345 (1952); New York: People v. Callahan, 19 A.D.2d 889, 244 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767 (1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 966, 84 S.Ct. 1130, 11 L.Ed.2d 983 (1964), with an indefinite term, the court cannot "add as an incident to such sentence its recommendation that defendant shall remain in prison for any definite period of time," citing People v. Tower, 308 N.Y. 123, 123 N.E.2d 805 (1954); People v. Hassin, 48 A.D.2d 705, 368 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1975); Pennsylvania: Commissioner v. Marshall, 254 Pa. Super. 275, 385 A.2d 1017 (1978); Texas: Thomas v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 587 S.W.2d 707 (1979). Nevada, in Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23, 436 P.2d 18, 23, overruled on other grounds, Bean v. State, 86 Nev. 80, 465 P.2d 133 (1968), determined that:

  2. People v. Washington

    18 N.Y.2d 366 (N.Y. 1966)   Cited 13 times
    In People v. Washington (18 N.Y.2d 366, 369), wherein a strikingly similar factual pattern was presented, Chief Judge Desmond wrote, "the word `wilfully' would seem to include and require the element of intent to do the damage complained of, or at least an intent to damage property * * *. The Legislature probably did not intend to set such severe penalties for an act that was unintentional in the sense that the perpetrator tried to assault somebody but missed his aim and damaged valuable property.

    The Hackley decision annulled a "malicious mischief" conviction under section 1433 of the Penal Law on a holding of law that "intent to injure a person, even if it were shown to be unlawful" would not satisfy the requirement of the section: "wilfully destroys or injures * * * property of another". ( People v. Callahan, 19 A.D.2d 889, cert. den. 376 U.S. 966, is a similar holding in the Second Department.) The question for us is whether we should follow People v. Hackley ( supra) which seems directly in point since the testimony of the complaining witness Williams himself is that Cannon threw the trash can (and other objects) not at the car but at complainant Williams and his companions.