Opinion
A157502
06-24-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHARLES BYRD, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 168839)
Charles Byrd was charged with murder as an aider and abettor based on his participation in a robbery and carjacking. He pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in exchange for the dismissal of the murder charge. Following legislative changes to the law concerning felony murder and murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, Byrd petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition, finding Byrd ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 because he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, not murder. Byrd contends this was error. We disagree and shall affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
BACKGROUND
Because this appeal presents a narrow question of law, we summarize the relevant facts only briefly. In 2011, Byrd was charged with murder for driving a group of people in the direction of Albert Pringle, knowing the group wanted to rob and carjack him and that one person in the group had a gun. After Byrd left them, the group shot Pringle and stole his car. Byrd had told the group not to do it. Byrd accepted a plea offer of voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to 11 years in prison. No one else was charged in the killing.
In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 to revise the felony murder rule and natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1.) At the same time, the Legislature enacted section 1170.95, which allows individuals to petition for resentencing based on the change in law. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Byrd petitioned for resentencing under this statute. The trial court denied Byrd's petition for failing to set forth a prima facie claim for relief. (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).)
The trial court considered Byrd's petition together with two others, all raising the same question of whether a defendant who was sentenced after a plea to voluntary manslaughter in exchange for the dismissal of a murder charge based on the felony murder rule or natural and probable consequences doctrine is eligible for relief under section 1170.95. Appeals from those rulings were filed in other divisions of this court. In one of the appeals, our colleagues in Division One issued an unpublished opinion reaching the same result we reach here; the other appeal remains pending. (See People v. Paige (A157494, app. pending); People v. Lockeaphone (Apr. 28, 2020, A157520) [nopub. opn.].)
Byrd timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Byrd contends he is eligible for relief under section 1170.95 because he pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter rather than face a likely conviction for murder at trial. The trial court disagreed, siding with the People's position that the statute only permits those convicted of murder to petition for resentencing. After Byrd prepared his opening brief in this case, our colleagues in the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal issued opinions in three separate cases rejecting most of the arguments Byrd advanced in his opening brief. (People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428 [Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One] (Turner); People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985 [Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One] (Flores); People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884 [Second District Court of Appeal, Division 6] (Cervantes).) As we agree with those decisions, we reject most of Byrd's arguments. The one argument Byrd raises that those decisions did not address concerns the rule of lenity. We conclude that rule is not applicable here and therefore affirm the trial court's order.
I. Relevant legal principles and standard of review
Senate Bill No. 1437 "redefined malice under section 188 to require that the principal acted with malice aforethought. Now, '[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.' (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Senate Bill [No.] 1437 also amended section 189, which defines the degrees of murder, by limiting the scope of first degree murder liability under a felony-murder theory. (§ 189, subd. (e).)" (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) These changes were prospective, but the Legislature also created a mechanism in section 1170.95 for certain defendants whose criminal cases proceeded under the prior versions of the statutes to petition for resentencing.
Subdivision (a) of section 1170.95 states, "A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
If a defendant files a petition setting forth a prima facie case that he or she meets these requirements, then the trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing. (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).) At that hearing, "the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges." (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) "If petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to this section, murder was charged generically, and the target offense was not charged, the petitioner's conviction shall be redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for resentencing purposes." (§ 1170.95, subd. (e).)
Because Byrd's argument that he met section 1170.95's requirements presents a pure question of law, we independently review the trial court's ruling. (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 435.) "As with any question of statutory interpretation, 'our primary task is to give effect to the Legislature's intended purpose in enacting the law.' [Citations.] 'We begin with the statute's text, assigning the relevant terms their ordinary meaning, while also taking account of any related provisions and the overall structure of the statutory scheme. [Citation.] Essential is whether our interpretation, as well as the consequences flowing therefrom, advances the Legislature's intended purpose. [Citation.] Where the statutory text admits of more than one reasonable interpretation, we may consider various extrinsic aids—including the legislative history—to the extent they are helpful in illuminating that purpose.' " (Ibid.)
II. Analysis
Byrd raises five main arguments why he is eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95: (1) the text of the statute permits him to file a petition; (2) preventing him from being resentenced conflicts with the purpose of the statute; (3) the statute must be construed to allow him to petition for resentencing to avoid constitutional issues; (4) resentencing is permitted for voluntary manslaughter because it is allowed for murder and voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder; and (5) the rule of lenity requires the statutes to be construed in his favor. The first four arguments are not persuasive for the reasons set forth at length in Turner, Flores, and Cervantes. The fifth argument fails because the rule of lenity is inapplicable here.
A. Statutory text
Byrd's first argument relies on section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2), which allows resentencing if a defendant was "convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder." (Italics added.) Byrd contrasts the first clause dealing with convictions, which mentions that a defendant was convicted of first or second degree murder, with the second clause, which says only that a defendant accepted a plea after being charged with murder. According to Byrd, giving both clauses independent effect means the statute makes defendants eligible if they were convicted of murder or pled guilty to an offense other than murder.
As our colleagues in other districts have already noted, Byrd's textual interpretation is untenable when considered in the context of the rest of the statute. Before specifying the other conditions a defendant must meet, section 1170.95, subdivision (a) states that "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition . . . to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated." (Italics added.) Subdivision (d)(1) states that if the court finds a defendant's petition sets out a prima facie case for relief, it must hold a hearing "to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner." (Italics added.) Subdivision (d)(2) allows the parties to stipulate that a defendant is eligible "to have his or her murder conviction vacated and for resentencing." (Italics added.) As Turner held, this plain language of "the petitioning prerequisites and available relief indicate that the Legislature intended to limit relief to those convicted of murder under a theory of felony murder or natural and probable consequences murder." (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 435; accord, Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 887; Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 992-993.)
Byrd contends the specific language in section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2) controls over the general references to murder elsewhere in the statute. But subdivision (a)'s definition of the class of individuals who may take advantage of the resentencing procedure as defendants with murder convictions is at least as specific as the pleas clause in subdivision (a)(2), if not more specific. This argument therefore fails.
Byrd also urges us to adopt his interpretation of section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2) because it is the only one that avoids making surplusage of the reference to pleas. (See Park Medical Pharmacy v. San Diego Orthopedic Associates Medical Group, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 247, 254, fn. 5 ["a construction that renders part of a statute to be surplusage should be avoided"].) According to Byrd, if the Legislature intended subdivision (a) to restrict eligibility to those convicted of murder by trial or plea, it would have used more concise language like that found in other statutes. (See, e.g., § 1170.18, subd. (a) [allowing a person who "was serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea, of" felonies re-classified as misdemeanors to petition for resentencing].) But even if the reference to pleas is wordy or surplusage under our reading of the statute, that would not automatically invalidate it. "[T]he rule against surplusage will be applied only if it results in a reasonable reading of the legislation." (Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 234-235.) It is not reasonable to construe the second clause of subdivision (a)(2) as extending eligibility to those convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the face of the language in subdivision (a) restricting eligibility to those convicted of murder and the language in subdivision (d) specifying that the relief the statute provides involves vacating a murder conviction.
Turner's discussion of the legislative history behind section 1170.95 reveals one potential reason why the plea clause in subdivision (a)(2) might be written as it is. As originally drafted, subdivision (a) stated simply that "a defendant" could petition for resentencing when all of the criteria in subdivision (a)(1)-(3) were met. (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 438.) Subdivision (a) was later amended to its present form, allowing only those persons " 'convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory' " to file petitions. (Ibid.) It is unclear whether the bill as originally drafted would have allowed a defendant who pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter to obtain resentencing. But as Turner noted, this history suggests the Legislature intended to make clear that only those convicted of murder can pursue resentencing. (Ibid.)
B. Statutory purpose
Byrd's second argument is that denying him eligibility under section 1170.95 violates the statute's purpose, which Senate Bill No. 1437's uncodified preamble declares to be to "to limit convictions and subsequent sentencing so that the law of California fairly addresses the culpability of the individual and assists in the reduction of prison overcrowding, which partially results from lengthy sentences that are not commensurate with the culpability of the individual." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (e).) Byrd argues that denying him eligibility results in him serving a lengthy prison sentence for voluntary manslaughter, even though there is no factual basis for that sentence and he pleaded guilty to it solely to avoid a conviction for first degree murder. He contends it is absurd to force him to serve a longer prison sentence than someone convicted of murder merely because he accepted a plea to a lesser crime to reduce his sentence, even though the prosecution's agreement to the plea implicitly indicated that he had lesser culpability and he could not be convicted of murder under current law.
Turner considered and rejected these arguments. After reviewing the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1437, the court concluded that the Legislature "understood the distinction between murder and manslaughter and focused its efforts on revising accomplice liability under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory." (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 438.) This indicates that the Legislature did not intend to allow those who pled guilty to crimes other than murder to take advantage of section 1170.95. There is nothing absurd in this. The legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1437 demonstrates that in drafting section 1170.95, the Legislature was motivated in part by the desire to reduce prison sentences in order to reduce prison populations and save costs on incarceration. (See Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 438-439.) The Legislature could reasonably decide to achieve these goals by limiting eligibility to those convicted of murder, as such individuals would be most likely to have lengthy prison terms remaining and therefore benefit the most and provide the state the greatest cost savings from resentencing.
Byrd's reference in passing to the lack of a factual basis for his plea to voluntary manslaughter suggests he is requesting resentencing because he pled guilty to that crime merely to avoid the lengthier prison sentence from a felony murder sentence, even though his conduct did not satisfy the elements of voluntary manslaughter. The record before us is insufficient to permit us to evaluate this suggestion, though the People's briefing in the trial court suggests that Byrd may be correct. Assuming he is, we agree with Turner that any injustice in Byrd's current situation arises from the inadequacy of the factual basis for his plea, not the Legislature's failure to allow him to obtain resentencing under section 1170.95. (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 439-440.) At this point, the proper method to challenge the adequacy of the factual basis for his plea would be to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, though we express no opinion on whether such a petition would be successful. (See id. at pp. 440-441 & fns. 9-10 [advising that remedy, if any, lies via habeas corpus petition, but noting split of authority about whether pleading guilty forfeits an appellate challenge to the factual basis for the plea].)
"A voluntary manslaughter is an intentional and unlawful killing without malice usually based on a sudden quarrel, heat of passion or imperfect self-defense." (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 439.) By contrast, " 'neither felony-murder nor the natural and probable consequences doctrine are theories on which one can commit voluntary manslaughter,' " because culpability for the latter crimes does not require the defendant to act with an intent that the victim be killed. (Id. at pp. 439-440.) Thus, "[b]y admitting voluntary manslaughter, [Byrd] seems worse off for pleading guilty to a crime he likely could not have committed." (Id. at p. 440.) --------
C. Constitutional avoidance
Byrd next contends section 1170.95 should be construed to permit him to pursue resentencing to avoid equal protection and due process concerns from limiting resentencing relief to those convicted of murder. We need not discuss this argument in detail, as Cervantes considered it at length and persuasively rejected it. (Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 888-889.) Briefly stated, those who commit voluntary manslaughter, to which Byrd pled guilty, are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes to those who commit other crimes. (Id. at p. 888.) Additionally, "[w]hen the Legislature reforms one area of the law, it is not required to reform other areas of the law." (Ibid.) It could rationally choose to implement reform incrementally and postpone consideration of the need for resentencing of those who pled guilty to manslaughter rather than face trial for felony murder. (Ibid.) Neither equal protection nor due process principles prohibit such decisions. (Id. at pp. 888-889.)
D. Lesser-included offense
In his fourth argument, Byrd argues he is eligible for resentencing because voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder and remedial legislation applies to lesser-included offenses. We agree with Flores, which considered and rejected this argument. (Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.) Manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder, but it is still a separate offense, and the legislative history demonstrates the Legislature understood the difference between the two. (Ibid.) Given that the Legislature omitted any mention of manslaughter in section 1170.95, and especially in light of the legislative history suggesting that the Legislature intended to limit resentencing to those convicted specifically of murder, we must infer that the Legislature wanted to distinguish between defendants convicted of the two crimes. (See ibid.) Even if remedial legislation in other contexts may be construed to apply to lesser-included offenses, section 1170.95 may not be construed in this fashion.
E. Rule of lenity
Byrd's final argument concerns the rule of lenity, which Cervantes, Flores, and Turner did not discuss. We find this argument no more persuasive than the others. The rule of lenity states that "ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity, giving the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation." (People v. Soria (2010) 48 Cal.4th 58, 65.) However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the " 'rule applies "only if two reasonable interpretations of the statute stand in relative equipoise." ' " (Ibid.) As we have discussed above, we do not find Byrd's interpretation of section 1170.95 plausible in its own right, so it is not in equipoise with the interpretation of the statute that Cervantes, Flores, and Turner have endorsed. We therefore have no occasion to invoke the rule of lenity.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
BROWN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
STREETER, ACTING P. J. /s/_________
TUCHER, J.