People v. Byrd

27 Citing cases

  1. People v. Williams

    52 Ill. App. 3d 81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 18 times
    In Williams, the officer's testimony was limited to his physical activities and to the "bare occurrence of his conversations with [defendant]" (52 Ill. App.3d 81, 87, 367 N.E.2d 167, 172), and it is well established that an officer's testimony concerning his investigatory procedures is necessary and properly admitted to indicate that the police did not randomly select defendant for prosecution (see People v. Byrd (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 735, 357 N.E.2d 174).

    The officer's testimony concerning his investigatory procedures was necessary and properly admitted under the circumstances. See People v. Byrd (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 735, 357 N.E.2d 174; People v. Colletti (1968), 101 Ill. App.2d 51, 242 N.E.2d 63, aff'd (1971), 48 Ill.2d 135, 268 N.E.2d 397. • 6 Defendant Hall further contends that the two witnesses who identified him as a perpetrator of the armed robbery were inherently incredible and unworthy of belief.

  2. People v. Thompson

    2014 Ill. App. 5th 120079 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    In particular, the State must be allowed to explain why a previously unidentified defendant became a suspect. People v. Byrd, 43 Ill. App. 3d 735, 742, 357 N.E.2d 174, 179 (1976). Silence as to this point would leave open the question of why, of all the people in the world, the police arrested defendant.

  3. People v. Thompson

    2014 Ill. App. 5th 120079 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 5 times
    Stating "[t]he mere suggestion of prior police acquaintance is susceptible to prejudicial implication"

    In particular, the State must be allowed to explain why a previously unidentified defendant became a suspect. People v. Byrd, 43 Ill. App. 3d 735, 742, 357 N.E.2d 174, 179 (1976). Silence as to this point would leave open the question of why, of all the people in the world, the police arrested defendant.

  4. People v. Johnson

    114 Ill. 2d 170 (Ill. 1986)   Cited 212 times
    In Johnson, 237 Ill.2d 81, this court considered whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle belonging to another person.

    The consequential steps in the investigation of a crime are relevant when necessary and important to a full explanation of the State's case to the trier of fact. ( People v. Guyon (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 522, 534; People v. Byrd (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 735, 742.) In opening statement and again in closing argument, defense counsel suggested that police had unjustifiably targeted defendant eight months after the offenses by conducting the March 6 photographic lineup and the subsequent in-person lineup.

  5. People v. Gonzalez

    No. 1-06-0271 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008)

    Our supreme court has recognized that evidence of the course of the investigation into a crime and the events leading up to an arrest are relevant when necessary and important to a full explanation of the State's case. See People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 130 (1990) (police testimony regarding unsuccessful attempts to locate defendant admitted to explain the two-week delay between when defendant was identified by a witness and when he was arrested), overruled on other grounds, People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d 210, 219 (2002); see also People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 193-94 (1986) (witness testimony that she notified police of an unrelated incident with defendant, which ultimately led to defendant's identification and arrest, admitted to rebut suggestion that police unjustifiably targeted defendant eight months after the offenses occurred); People v. Byrd, 43 Ill. App. 3d 735, 742 (1976) ("Informing the trier of fact of consequential steps in the investigation of a crime is normal procedure and is important to the full presentation of the State's case"). In this case, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that testimony regarding the investigation into Blanca's death was relevant and necessary to explain to the jury the lengthy course of the investigation that began with Angelita's murder in Illinois in 1991 and culminated with defendant's arrest in Texas in 2002.

  6. People v. Gonzalez

    379 Ill. App. 3d 941 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 76 times
    Finding no error in the admission, for a limited purpose and with a limiting instruction, of an out-of-court statement by a person stating she knew the defendant killed the victim; a strong presumption exists that the jury follows a limiting instruction, and nothing in the record rebutted that presumption

    Our supreme court has recognized that evidence of the course of the investigation into a crime and the events leading up to an arrest are relevant when necessary and important to a full explanation of the State's case. See People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 130 (1990) (police testimony regarding unsuccessful attempts to locate defendant admitted to explain the two-week delay between when defendant was identified by a witness and when he was arrested), overruled on other grounds, People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d 210, 219 (2002); see also People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 193-94 (1986) (witness testimony that she notified police of an unrelated incident with defendant, which ultimately led to defendant's identification and arrest, admitted to rebut suggestion that police unjustifiably targeted defendant eight months after the offenses occurred); People v. Byrd, 43 Ill. App. 3d 735, 742 (1976) ("Informing the trier of fact of consequential steps in the investigation of a crime is normal procedure and is important to the full presentation of the State's case"). In this case, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that testimony regarding the investigation into Blanca's death was relevant and necessary to explain to the jury the lengthy course of the investigation that began with Angelita's murder in Illinois in 1991 and culminated with defendant's arrest in Texas in 2002.

  7. People v. Bass

    220 Ill. App. 3d 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 21 times
    In Bass, the defendant specifically alleged that the court erred by denying the motion to suppress her arrest, yet we held that was insufficient to preserve the issues with the search warrant.

    The State cites no part of the record to support this contention and the record reveals no support for the State's contention. The State relies heavily on the cases of People v. Byrd (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 735, 357 N.E.2d 174, and People v. Johnson (1986), 114 Ill.2d 170, 499 N.E.2d 1355. In Byrd, the court observed: "Informing the triers of fact of consequential steps in the investigation of a crime is a normal procedure and is important to the full presentation of the State's case."

  8. People v. Dixon

    133 Ill. App. 3d 1073 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 12 times
    Reviewing court modified sentence imposed to sentence imposed upon accomplice convicted of rape, etc.; reviewing court noted that defendant, unlike accomplice, did not brutalize victim

    ( People v. Williams (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 81, 367 N.E.2d 167.) In Williams, the officer's testimony was limited to his physical activities and to the "bare occurrence of his conversations with [defendant]" ( 52 Ill. App.3d 81, 87, 367 N.E.2d 167, 172), and it is well established that an officer's testimony concerning his investigatory procedures is necessary and properly admitted to indicate that the police did not randomly select defendant for prosecution (see People v. Byrd (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 735, 357 N.E.2d 174). In the present case, the following testimony was elicited regarding the connection between Wilson's arrest and the identification of Dixon as his codefendant.

  9. People v. Guyon

    117 Ill. App. 3d 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 31 times
    Informing the jury of the consequential steps in the investigation of a crime is necessary and important to the full explanation of the State's case

    He bases this argument (1) on the prosecutor's remark during trial that a warrant had been issued for Melvin for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution; (2) upon the fact that the police photograph from which he was identified had been allowed to go to the jury, and that two of the jurors were post office employees and the photograph had been displayed in the post office in connection with an F.B.I. manhunt; and (3) on the prosecutor's remark, "you don't find him (Melvin) in Marion, Illinois in a hairnet, if they allow that * * *." Regarding the mention of the warrant and the reference to Melvin's presence in Marion, it is well established that informing the jury of the consequential steps in the investigation of a crime is necessary and important to the full explanation of the State's case. ( People v. Byrd (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 735, 357 N.E.2d 174.) Such facts are properly received into evidence.

  10. People v. Guzzardo

    387 N.E.2d 896 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 6 times
    In People v. Guzzardo (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 252, 257, 387 N.E.2d 896, 899, it was determined that "[w]hen the words of the [pandering] statute are given their plain and ordinary meaning it becomes abundantly clear that the defendant's conduct, offering in exchange for money to provide a hotel room where Ms. Wooten could practice prostitution, is clearly the type of conduct the statute seeks to prohibit."

    • 6 The entire area of the testimony complained of by the defendant was entered into by the People for the legitimate purpose of showing the investigatory procedures which led the police to suspect the defendant of illegal conduct and his eventual arrest. ( People v. Byrd (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 735, 357 N.E.2d 174; People v. Thomas (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 88, 322 N.E.2d 597.) The complained-of testimony was a nonresponsive answer to a question in this legitimate area of inquiry. Furthermore, after the statement was made, the defendant requested and received an instruction from the trial judge telling the jury to disregard the statement.