Opinion
A130323
12-28-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SILAS BYERS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 211430)
Silas Byers appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of murder. (Pen. Code, § 187.) He contends his conviction must be reversed because the trial court instructed the jury incorrectly. We disagree and will affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was convicted of murdering Douglas Johnson by stabbing him in the chest. The facts of appellant's crime are as follows.
On the evening of June 21, 2009, Clifford Mayes and Sharon Duckworth were sitting in Mayes's car which was parked near the corner of Third and LaSalle Streets in San Francisco. Mayes and Duckworth were smoking crack and marijuana and drinking alcohol.
As the evening progressed, appellant, who knew Mayes and Duckworth, stopped by the car several times. When appellant stopped by the last time, Mayes and Duckworth had been joined by the victim Doug Johnson. Johnson was sitting in the front passenger seat. Mayes and Duckworth were in the backseat.
Appellant knocked on the car window and Johnson opened the door. Appellant gave Johnson a paper bag filled with marijuana. Mayes interpreted the marijuana as a "peace offering" because appellant and Johnson had had some sort of "situation" a few days before. It appeared that appellant and Johnson had patched things up because they were talking and laughing and having a friendly conversation.
Suddenly Duckworth heard a punch. She alerted Mayes and they both saw appellant running away from the car. Johnson was trying to talk but could not because blood was coming from his chest.
Mayes knew police officers frequented that area and he called for help. He also yelled at appellant asking, "why he did that coward ass shit in my car."
Police and paramedics arrived, but they could not save Johnson. He died from a knife wound that punctured his heart.
Appellant was arrested five days later on June 26, 2009 in Oakland. Appellant denied the crime saying he was at his girlfriend Debra Judkin's house when it was committed. Appellant also said he had known Johnson for about 20 years and that he had no problems with him.
Based on these facts, an information was filed charging appellant with murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) As is relevant here, the information also alleged appellant personally used a knife when committing the crime (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and that appellant had one prior strike within the meaning of the three strikes law. (§ 667, subds. (d), (e).)
The case proceeded to trial where jurors convicted appellant of first degree murder and found the knife use allegation to be true. In a court trial that followed, the court found the prior strike allegation to be true. Subsequently, the court reduced the crime to second degree murder.
After the court sentenced appellant to 31 years to life in prison, he filed this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Voluntary Manslaughter
The trial court instructed the jurors on the principles of murder but declined to instruct on either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter stating no evidence had been presented to support either of those crimes. Appellant now contends the trial court erred because it failed to instruct on voluntary manslaughter.
A trial court must instruct on all general principles of law that are relevant to the issues of a case including lesser offenses that are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 866-867.) Substantial evidence in this context means evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable persons could conclude the particular facts underlying the instruction existed. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162.) On appeal we consider de novo whether the court should have instructed on a lesser offense. (People v. Oropeza (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 73, 78.)
Here, appellant contends the court should have instructed on voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of imperfect self-defense.
Imperfect self-defense is the killing of another in the actual but unreasonable belief that one is in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773.) A person who intentionally kills in imperfect self-defense lacks malice and is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, not murder. (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 88.)
Here, there was no evidence to support an instruction on imperfect self-defense. Appellant's defense was alibi. He told officers who were investigating the crime that he was at Judkin's house when it was committed. The testimony of Mayes and Duckworth did not support imperfect self-defense. Mayes said appellant and Johnson were laughing and having a friendly conversation prior to appellant's attack. Duckworth testified similarly stating that appellant and Johnson were having a "friendly conversation" that they were talking like "good buddies" and that there was absolutely no argument between them. Because there was no evidence to support the conclusion that appellant killed Johnson in an actual but unreasonable belief in the need to defend himself against threats of death or great bodily injury, we conclude the court did not err when it failed to instruct on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense.
Appellant contends an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense was required based on evidence that he gave Johnson a bag of marijuana as a "peace offering" to make up for the situation that had occurred between them a few days earlier. But the mere fact that appellant and Johnson had some sort of unspecified prior dispute does not support the conclusion that appellant had any reason to fear Johnson. As the People argue convincingly, "Simply having an argument with another individual does not reasonably imply any reason to be fearful of death or great bodily injury."
Appellant also suggests the instruction was required based on evidence that an open multi-tool knife was found in Mayes's car on the floorboard of the backseat. But Mayes specifically testified that the knife was his, that he kept it in his car, and that he never saw Johnson threaten anyone with it. Again as the People argue persuasively, "To suggest that the mere presence of the knife in the car demonstrates that appellant was in fear for his life is pure speculation."
Because no reasonable jury could infer from the evidence that appellant acted in an actual but unreasonable belief in the need to defend himself against threats of death or great bodily injury, the court was not required to instruct on voluntary manslaughter under an imperfect self-defense theory. (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162.) There was no error.
B. Elements of Murder
Appellant contends the trial court erred because it failed to instruct the jurors that the absence of imperfect self-defense is an element of a murder offense. Appellant bases his argument on a passage contained in a dissenting opinion in People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at page 189, where Justice Kennard stated, "Given the manner in which California has structured the relationship between murder and voluntary manslaughter, the complete definition of malice is the intent to kill or the intent to do a dangerous act with conscious disregard of its danger plus the absence of both heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense."
Justice Kennard reiterated her views on this point in another dissenting opinion in People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 563-565.
A majority of our Supreme Court has never adopted Justice Kennard's view on this issue and even Justice Kennard indicated her interpretation applied only "[w]here, as here, there is sufficient evidence of heat of passion to support a voluntary manslaughter verdict . . . ." (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 189-190.) Here, as we have explained, there was no evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter verdict under a theory of imperfect self-defense. As our Supreme Court stated subsequently when rejecting a closely related argument, "nothing in either the majority or dissenting Breverman opinion suggests that the federal Constitution, any more than the California Constitution, is infringed when a theory of voluntary manslaughter unsupported by any substantial evidence is omitted from the law presented to the jury." (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 141.)
We conclude the court did not err when it failed to instruct on a principle that was unsupported by the evidence.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Jones, P.J. We concur: Needham, J. Bruiniers, J.