Opinion
Rehearing Denied May 18, 1964.
C. Ray Robinson and Jonathon H. Rowell, Merced, for appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edsel W. Haws, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.
STONE, Justice.
Appellant, an officer in the United States Air Force, has been permanently stationed at Castle Air Force Base, Merced County, California, since June 1957. He was assigned to temporary duty at Squadron Officer's School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, on September 3, 1959, and returned to Castle Field on December 19, 1959. On October 30, 1959, appellant purchased a used car in Montgomery, which he registered in his name, and upon paying a license fee obtained Alabama license plates which were valid in Alabama until September 30, 1960. He drove the car to Merced, California, and used it as his sole means of transportation, including commuting from his home to Castle Field.
Appellant is a resident of the State of Washington and has maintained his domicile in that state at all times. However, he neither registered the vehicle there nor in the State of California. On February
'No person shall drive, move, or leave standing any motor vehicle, trailer, semi-trailer, pole or pipe dolly, or auxiliary dolly upon a highway unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code.'
Appellant sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Justice Court of the Atwater Judicial District, Merced County, California, from proceeding with the trial of his case. This court denied the writ. Subsequently appellant was tried and found guilty of violation of Vehicle Code, § 4000, and this appeal followed.
It is necessary to keep in mind from the outset that the license fee here involved is not a personal property tax. In Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal.2d 154, at page 159, 53 P.2d 939, at page 942, 103 A.L.R. 1, the Supreme Court specifically held, '* * * we have no hesitancy in declaring that the charge involved is one imposed on the owners of motor vehicles for the privilege of using the highways of the state and is not, in nature, a property tax.'
Appellant first contends that he is exempt from the provisions of section 4000, Vehicle Code, by reason of section 574 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 574).
Section 574 is in two parts. Part (1) provides generally that personal property shall not be deemed to be located or present in or to have a situs for taxation in the state, political subdivision or district in which military personnel are serving, provided they have not established domicile therein. However, part (2) treats of motor vehicle licenses, fees, or excises specifically, by providing that:
'When used in this section, (a) the term 'personal property' shall include tangible and intangible property (including motor vehicles), and (b) the term 'taxation' shall include but not be limited to licenses, fees, or excises imposed in respect to motor vehicles or the use thereof: Provided, That the license, fee, or excise required by the State, Territory, possession, or District of Columbia of which the person is a resident or in which he is domiciled has been paid.' (Emphasis added.)
Appellant leans heavily upon the case of Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 73 S.Ct. 721, 97 L.Ed. 1041, in fact it is the only case cited in his opening brief, but it is not applicable since it is concerned with a tax on furniture and comes within part (1) of section 574.
If the owner-serviceman has registered his motor vehicle in his state of domicile or paid the license fee in that state, it is clear that he cannot be made to register it also in the state in which he is permanently stationed. In Woodroffe v. Village of Park Forest, D.C., 107 F.Supp. 906, domiciliary taxes or license fees had been paid by the serviceman, and the court there held that the state in which he was on active duty could not also charge the serviceman a vehicle license tax. Om the other hand, in Whiting v. City of Portsmouth, 202 Va. 609, 118 S.E.2d 505, the facts were comparable to those before us, in that the serviceman had not registered his vehicle or paid any license tax or other fee in his state of domicile, and the court held that he must therefore pay the vehicle license fee required by the state in which he was permanently stationed.
Appellant tacitly admits the inapplicability of Dameron and part (1) of section 574 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act by arguing that he has complied with part (2) of section 574. The gist of his argument is that his domicile is in the State of Washington; that the State of Washington requires no vehicle registration or payment of fee unless the vehicle is driven upon the highways of that State; that he has not driven on the highways in Washington; therefore no license can be required by the State of California.
Appellant overlooks the wording of part (2) of section 574, which exempts a serviceman Since appellant has not paid the license fee in the State of Washington, he has not complied with part (2), so that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act does not exempt him from the California registration requirements. We hasten to acknowledge that the foregoing construction is both narrow and literal. Other things being equal, in deference to the spirit of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, we would be inclined to use a more liberal approach in our interpretation of part (2) of section 574. However, public safety dictates a strict construction, since if we were to adopt appellant's argument it would mean that a serviceman from the State of Washington stationed in California for a number of years (appellant has been here over six years) could purchase a new car each year and never register a single vehicle in California so long as he did not drive in his home state. A car unlicensed or to the car thief, but it becomes a public to the car theif, but it becomes a public hazard in the event of an accident. We emphasize the 'hit-and-run accident' wherein witnesses almost instinctively look for the license plate on the hit-run car.
The Supreme Court noted, in Stoddart v. Peirce, 53 Cal.2d 105, at page 117, 346 P.2d 774, at page 781, that the vehicle registration statutes were adopted 'for the purpose of protecting innocent purchasers, and to afford identification of vehicles and of persons responsible in cases of accident and injury.' That registration is important in criminal cases involving stolen cars was noted by the court in People v. Galceran, 178 Cal.App.2d 312, 316, 2 Cal.Rptr. 901.
These diverse reasons for requiring the registration of vehicles driven upon the highways of California serve to point up that the licensing requirement is an exercise of the police power of the state, as well as a use tax for the privilege of using the highways.
Appellant also asserts that he is being denied equal protection of the law since Vehicle Code § 6701 exempts certain military personnel, but not him, from the provisions of section 4000. The exemption specified in section 6701, insofar as here pertinent, provides:
'Any member of the Armed Forces, whether a resident or nonresident, shall also be entitled to exemption from registration in respect to a vehicle owned by him upon which there is displayed a valid license plate or plates issued for such vehicle in a state where such owner was regularly assigned and stationed for duty by competent military orders at the time such license plate or plates were issued. Such competent military orders shall not include military orders for leave, for temporary duty, nor for any other assignment of any nature requiring his presence outside the state where such owner was regularly assigned and stationed for duty.'
We find nothing discriminatory in the section; to the contrary, the reason for the distinction to which appellant points is quite evident. Title to a vehicle registered to a serviceman in the state of his domicile or in the state in which he is on permanent duty, can be traced readily. This is not true where the serviceman purchases a car while temporarily in another state, and brings it into California. Since he is neither permanently stationed nor domiciled in the state of purchase, it is difficult to trace the car or its ownership in the event of an accident, a theft, or a sale.
Next, appellant contends he is being discriminated against because section 6705 provides that any discharged service person who enters California for the purpose of establishing or re-establishing residence or accepting gainful employment following his discharge from the Armed Services, may operate his vehicle until the current license expires. Appellant argues that the discrimination The differences between classifications mentioned in both sections 6701 and 6705 of the Vehicle Code clearly are based upon valid distinctions. The Supreme Court discussed the question of statutory classification in the light of constitutional requirements in Bilyeu v. State Employees' Retirement System, 58 Cal.2d 618, at page 623, 25 Cal.Rptr. 562, at page 565, 375 P.2d 442, at page 445, and said:
'There is no constitutional requirement of uniform treatment, but only that there be a reasonable basis for each classification. In Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist. v. Pacific G. & E. Co., 20 Cal.2d 684, we said at page 693, 128 P.2d 529, at page 535: 'Wide discretion is vested in the Legislature in making the classification and every presumption is in favor of the validity of the statute; the decision of the Legislature as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant the classification will not be overthrown by the courts unless it is palpably arbitrary and beyond rational doubt erroneous. [Citations.] A distinction in legislation is not arbitrary if any set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it.' (See also State of California, Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Ind. Acc. Com., 48 Cal.2d 365, 371, 310 P.2d 7.)'
(Accord: City of Walnut Creek v. Silveira, 47 Cal.2d 804, 811, 306 P.2d 453.)
Appellant's final contention is that the phrase 'temporary duty' is vague and ambiguous, and therefore unenforceable. Appellant points to Webster's Dictionary, which defines 'temporary' as 'lasting for a time only; ephemeral; transitory.' We find that Bouvier's Law Dictionary, third revised edition, defines 'temporary' as 'that which is to last for a limited time.' These definitions, when applied to military duty, seem sufficiently clear to enable a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what temporary duty means. If there could be a doubt, it would be dispelled by looking up the entire term, not the isolated words, in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, where the term is defined thus: 'temporary duty n: military service away from one's assigned organization usu. for a limited period of time.' Certainly the term is clear enough to come within the rationale of Kershaw v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control, 155 Cal.App.2d 544, at page 549, 316 P.2d 494, at page 497, wherein the court said:
"'* * * [ ]The Constitution does not require impossible standards'; all that is required is that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices * * *.' United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 1542, 91 L.Ed. 1877 [1883]. * * *
'* * * That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense * * *."'
That courts will, if possible, construe statutes so as to avoid absurd applications and to uphold their validity, is well settled. (In re Cregler, 56 Cal.2d 308, 312, 14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Com., 30 Cal.2d 719, 728, 185 P.2d 805.)
The judgment is affirmed.
CONLEY, P.J., and RALPH M. BROWN, J., concur.