"In determining the value of stolen property, the jury need only have a reasonable, rather than speculative, basis for inferring that the value exceeded the statutory requirement. Because property valuation is not strictly a subject for expert testimony, opinion testimony by a lay witness is competent to establish the value of the property if the witness is acquainted with the value of similar property" ( People v. Butcher, 192 A.D.3d 1196, 1198–1199, 142 N.Y.S.3d 665 [2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1118, 146 N.Y.S.3d 190, 169 N.E.3d 548 [2021] ; seePeople v. Guarnieri, 122 A.D.3d 1078, 1079, 996 N.Y.S.2d 776 [2014] ). At trial, the deputy testified that he did not see the truck enter the business’ parking lot, the back of the lot was not visible from where he was parked across the street, and he had been parked there for more than half an hour when he saw the truck exit the lot.
"In determining the value of stolen property, the jury need only have a reasonable, rather than speculative, basis for inferring that the value exceeded the statutory requirement. Because property valuation is not strictly a subject for expert testimony, opinion testimony by a lay witness is competent to establish the value of the property if the witness is acquainted with the value of similar property" (People v Butcher, 192 A.D.3d 1196, 1198-1199 [2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1118 [2021]; see People v Guarnieri, 122 A.D.3d 1078, 1079 [2014]). At trial, the deputy testified that he did not see the truck enter the business' parking lot, the back of the lot was not visible from where he was parked across the street, and he had been parked there for more than half an hour when he saw the truck exit the lot.
"In determining the value of stolen property, the jury need only have a reasonable, rather than speculative, basis for inferring that the value exceeded the statutory requirement. Because property valuation is not strictly a subject for expert testimony, opinion testimony by a lay witness is competent to establish the value of the property if the witness is acquainted with the value of similar property" (People v Butcher, 192 A.D.3d 1196, 1198-1199 [2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1118 [2021]; see People v Guarnieri, 122 A.D.3d 1078, 1079 [2014]). At trial, the deputy testified that he did not see the truck enter the business' parking lot, the back of the lot was not visible from where he was parked across the street, and he had been parked there for more than half an hour when he saw the truck exit the lot.
Judge: Decision Reported Below: 3d Dept: 192 AD3d 1196 (Chemung)
Disposition: Applications for Criminal Leave to appeal denied Decision Reported Below: 3d Dept: 192 A.D.3d 1196 (Chemung)
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see Contes, 60 N.Y.2d at 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), established that defendant stole property that was valued in excess of $1,000 (Penal Law § 155.30 [1]) and removed vehicle parts that exceeded an aggregate value of $1,000 (§ 165.10 [2]). In this context, value "means the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime" (§ 155.20 [1]; see People v. Butcher, 192 A.D.3d 1196, 1198, 142 N.Y.S.3d 665 [3d Dept. 2021], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1118, 146 N.Y.S.3d 190, 169 N.E.3d 548 [2021]; People v. Grant, 189 A.D.3d 2112, 2114, 137 N.Y.S.3d 860 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 956, 147 N.Y.S.3d 525, 170 N.E.3d 399 [2021]). Here, the evidence established that the catalytic converters were valued at $1,200 each.
Contrary to defendant's further contention, the conviction of grand larceny in the fourth degree and auto stripping in the second degree is supported by legally sufficient evidence. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see Contes, 60 N.Y.2d at 621), established that defendant stole property that was valued in excess of $1,000 (Penal Law § 155.30 [1]) and removed vehicle parts that exceeded an aggregate value of $1,000 (§ 165.10 [2]). In this context, value "means the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime" (§ 155.20 [1]; see People v Butcher, 192 A.D.3d 1196, 1198 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1118 [2021]; People v Grant, 189 A.D.3d 2112, 2114 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 956 [2021]). Here, the evidence established that the catalytic converters were valued at $1,200 each.
In any event, defendant's contention lacks merit. While "[a] conclusory statement" or "a ‘rough estimate’ without evidence of its basis" is insufficient ( People v. Gonzalez , 221 A.D.2d 203, 204, 633 N.Y.S.2d 482 [1st Dept. 1995] ), "[i]n determining the value of stolen property, the jury need only have a reasonable, rather than speculative, basis for inferring that the value exceeded the statutory requirement" ( People v. Butcher , 192 A.D.3d 1196, 1198, 142 N.Y.S.3d 665 [3d Dept. 2021], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1118, 146 N.Y.S.3d 190, 169 N.E.3d 548 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; seePeople v. Geroyianis , 96 A.D.3d 1641, 1644-1645, 946 N.Y.S.2d 803 [4th Dept. 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 996, 951 N.Y.S.2d 472, 975 N.E.2d 918 [2012], reconsideration denied 19 N.Y.3d 1102, 955 N.Y.S.2d 557, 979 N.E.2d 818 [2012] ). In that regard, "a victim must provide a basis of knowledge for his [or her] statement of value before it can be accepted as legally sufficient evidence of such value" ( People v. Lopez , 79 N.Y.2d 402, 404, 583 N.Y.S.2d 356, 592 N.E.2d 1360 [1992] ; seeSlack , 137 A.D.3d at 1569, 27 N.Y.S.3d 301 ).
Here, both the victim and defendant testified that defendant was not given permission to enter the victim's apartment, and it was undisputed that the victim invited defendant to enter only once before, specifically to do repair work. A different verdict would not have been unreasonable had the jury believed defendant's testimony that he thought he had license to enter; however, deferring to the jury's credibility determinations, the weight of the evidence established that defendant unlawfully entered the victim's dwelling (seePeople v. Butcher, 192 A.D.3d 1196, 1198, 142 N.Y.S.3d 665 [2021], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1118, 146 N.Y.S.3d 190, 169 N.E.3d 548 [2021] ). "[I]n order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a court must consider whether defense counsel's actions at trial constituted egregious and prejudicial error such that defendant did not receive a fair trial.
Here, both the victim and defendant testified that defendant was not given permission to enter the victim's apartment, and it was undisputed that the victim invited defendant to enter only once before, specifically to do repair work. A different verdict would not have been unreasonable had the jury believed defendant's testimony that he thought he had license to enter; however, deferring to the jury's credibility determinations, the weight of the evidence established that defendant unlawfully entered the victim's dwelling (see People v Butcher, 192 A.D.3d 1196, 1198 [2021], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1118 [2021]). "[I]n order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a court must consider whether defense counsel's actions at trial constituted egregious and prejudicial error such that defendant did not receive a fair trial.