Opinion
22CA1925
05-23-2024
The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sara Burns, Defendant-Appellant.
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Sara Burns, Pro Se
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
City and County of Denver District Court No. 17CR10448 Honorable Edward D. Bronfin, Judge
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Sara Burns, Pro Se
OPINION
LUM JUDGE.
¶ 1 Defendant, Sara Burns, pleaded guilty to, among other things, a class 2 felony violation of the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA). She filed a Crim. P. 35(a) motion alleging that the five-year period of parole attendant to her COCCA conviction was illegal. She argued that, because it was a nonviolent felony conviction, it should carry a mandatory parole period of only three years pursuant to section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.l), C.R.S. 2023.
¶ 2 The district court denied the motion in a written order on the basis that the cited statutory provision applies only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2018. Because Burns's COCCA offense was committed before that date, subsection (1)(a)(V)(A.1) didn't apply; instead, the five-year mandatory parole provision of section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A) applied.
¶ 3 Burns appeals the order. Reviewing the challenged component of her sentence de novo, see People v. Bassford, 2014 COA 15, ¶ 20, we affirm.
¶ 4 As relevant here, section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1) provides that "any person sentenced for a [class 2] felony committed on or after July 1, 2018, and prior to July 1, 2020" shall be required to serve a mandatory period of parole of three years if the offense is not a crime of violence. The pertinent language of section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), in contrast, requires a mandatory five-year parole period for all class 2 felonies "committed on or after July 1, 1993, and before July 1, 2018."
¶ 5 Although Burns correctly points out that her class 2 felony COCCA violation was not a crime of violence, it was committed between and including February 11, 2016, and August 10, 2017. Thus, as the district court determined, the five-year mandatory parole provision of section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A) applies, and the parole component of Burns's COCCA sentence isn't illegal.
¶ 6 We aren't persuaded otherwise by Burns's request, to the extent she makes it, that we apply the three-year parole provision in subsection (1)(A)(V)(A.1) because she was sentenced on June 29, 2018, which is close in time to July 1, 2018. The plain language of the statutes is clear: the applicable parole period is determined by the date the offense was "committed," not the date of sentencing. See People v. Summers, 208 P.3d 251, 254 (Colo. 2009) (If statutory "language is unambiguous, we look no further and apply the words as written.").
¶ 7 The district court's order denying Crim. P. 35(a) relief is affirmed.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE BROWN concur.