A defendant seeking suppression of evidence must establish standing by demonstrating a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or item searched (seePeople v. Ramirez–Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 108, 643 N.Y.S.2d 502, 666 N.E.2d 207 ; People v. McCullum, 159 A.D.3d 8, 12, 70 N.Y.S.3d 222, affd 34 N.Y.3d 1022, 114 N.Y.S.3d 773, 138 N.E.3d 502 ). "This burden is satisfied if the [defendant] subjectively manifested an expectation of privacy with respect to the ... item searched that society recognizes to be objectively reasonable under the circumstances" ( People v. Burton, 6 N.Y.3d 584, 588, 815 N.Y.S.2d 7, 848 N.E.2d 454 ; seePeople v. Ramirez–Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d at 108, 643 N.Y.S.2d 502, 666 N.E.2d 207 ; People v. McCullum, 159 A.D.3d at 12, 70 N.Y.S.3d 222 ). "Where a defendant abandons property, there is no search or seizure" ( People v. Hogya, 80 A.D.2d 621, 621, 436 N.Y.S.2d 62 ; seePeople v. Burkett, 98 A.D.3d 746, 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d 194 ). However, "if the abandonment is coerced or precipitated by unlawful police activity, then the seized property may be suppressed because it constitutes ‘fruit’ of the poisonous tree" ( People v. Ramirez–Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d at 110, 643 N.Y.S.2d 502, 666 N.E.2d 207 ).

However, contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court did not err in denying his motion to substitute counsel. Counsel may be substituted, at the trial court's discretion, where good cause is shown ( see People v. Porto, 16 N.Y.3d 93, 99–100, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283;People v. Burkett, 98 A.D.3d 746, 950 N.Y.S.2d 194). In support of such a motion, the defendant must “make a specific factual allegation of a serious complaint about his current counsel” ( People v. Burkett, 98 A.D.3d at 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d 194;see People v. Porto, 16 N.Y.3d at 100, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283).

We also agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the defendant's act of throwing the gym shorts and the gun over the fence was not precipitated by the police officer's presence on his property, and the gym shorts and gun were abandoned by the defendant. " ‘Where ... a defendant abandons property, there is no search or seizure’ " ( People v. Burkett, 98 A.D.3d 746, 747, 950 N.Y.S.2d 194, quoting People v. Hogya, 80 A.D.2d 621, 621, 436 N.Y.S.2d 62 ). "A defendant abandons property when he voluntarily relinquishes possession in a ‘calculated decision’ in response to police conduct" ( People v. Oliver, 39 A.D.3d 880, 880, 835 N.Y.S.2d 308, quoting People v. Ramirez–Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 110, 643 N.Y.S.2d 502, 666 N.E.2d 207 ). Here, the defendant's actions in briefly exiting his home with a gun concealed in shorts and throwing the items over a fence onto adjoining property demonstrate that he undertook an "independent act involving a calculated risk," as opposed to a "spontaneous reaction to a sudden and unexpected confrontation with police" ( People v. Boodle, 47 N.Y.2d 398, 403–404, 418 N.Y.S.2d 352, 391 N.E.2d 1329 ).

The defendant made admissions during a conversation with a confidential informant, with whom he was friendly, and his admissions were made in a noncoercive, noncustodial setting (seePeople v. Carter , 31 A.D.3d 1056, 1057, 818 N.Y.S.2d 854 ; People v. Roopchand , 107 A.D.2d 35, 37, 485 N.Y.S.2d 332, affd 65 N.Y.2d 837, 493 N.Y.S.2d 129, 482 N.E.2d 924 ). The defendant's claim that he was motivated to lie to the confidential informant so that the informant would allow the defendant to participate in a robbery did not render the defendant's statements involuntary, since he was not induced to lie by anything the informant said or did (seeColorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 165–166, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 ; People v. Burkett , 98 A.D.3d 746, 747, 950 N.Y.S.2d 194 ). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny the defendant's motion to preclude admission of his statements to the confidential informant.

The County Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's application to introduce an affidavit of his private investigator at a suppression hearing, since defense counsel's representation as to the statements the affidavit contained indicated that it would be noncumulative and material to the issue of the suggestiveness of the police identification procedure in question (cf. People v Taylor, 80 NY2d 1, 15; People v Burkett, 98 AD3d 746, 747; People v White, 79 AD3d 1460, 1461; People v Fowler, 61 AD3d 698). However, the court did afford defense counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the police witness who conducted the identification procedure concerning the relevant allegations in the affidavit.

The County Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's application to introduce an affidavit of his private investigator at a suppression hearing, since defense counsel's representation as to the statements the affidavit contained indicated that it would be noncumulative and material to the issue of the suggestiveness of the police identification procedure in question (cf. People v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.2d 1, 15, 586 N.Y.S.2d 545, 598 N.E.2d 693 ; People v. Burkett, 98 A.D.3d 746, 747, 950 N.Y.S.2d 194 ; People v. White, 79 A.D.3d 1460, 1461, 913 N.Y.S.2d 818 ; People v. Fowler, 61 A.D.3d 698, 876 N.Y.S.2d 498 ). However, the court did afford defense counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the police witness who conducted the identification procedure concerning the relevant allegations in the affidavit.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's application, made on the eve of trial, to substitute counsel. “The right of an indigent criminal defendant to the services of a court-appointed lawyer does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers at defendant's option” ( People v. Sides, 75 N.Y.2d 822, 824, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233). Counsel may be substituted at the trial court's discretion where good cause is shown ( see People v. Porto, 16 N.Y.3d 93, 99–100, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283;People v. Burkett, 98 A.D.3d 746, 747, 950 N.Y.S.2d 194). Here, the defendant failed to establish good cause for the substitution of his counsel, as the defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel was due to disagreements over trial strategy ( see People v. Johnson, 103 A.D.3d 1251, 959 N.Y.S.2d 365;People v. Martin, 41 A.D.3d 616, 617, 838 N.Y.S.2d 166;People v. Walton, 14 A.D.3d 419, 420, 788 N.Y.S.2d 107;People v. Welch, 2 A.D.3d 1354, 1355, 770 N.Y.S.2d 230;People v. Jones, 302 A.D.2d 476, 477, 754 N.Y.S.2d 889affd.2 N.Y.3d 235, 778 N.Y.S.2d 133, 810 N.E.2d 415). Further inquiry was not required, as the defendant's assertions did not suggest the serious possibility of irreconcilable differences or other impediment to the defendant's representation by assigned counsel ( see People v. Ayuso, 80 A.D.3d 708, 709, 915 N.Y.S.2d 149).

"A defendant abandons property when he voluntarily relinquishes possession in a calculated decision in response to police conduct" (People v Whitfield, 186 A.D.3d 1414, 1415 [2d Dept 2020], Iv denied 36 N.Y.3d 977 [2020]), quoting People v Oliver, 39 A.D.3d 880, 880 [2d Dept 2007], Iv. dismissed 9 N.Y.3d 868 [2007]; see People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 110 [1996], and "[w]here a defendant abandons property, there is no search or seizure" (People v Whitfield, 186 A.D.3d at 1415, quoting People v Burkett, 98 A.D.3d 746, 747 [2d Dept 2012], Iv. denied 20 N.Y.3d 985 [2012]; see People v Kluge, 180 A.D.3d 705, 707 [2d Dept 2020]; People v Hogya, 80 A.D.2d 621, 621 [2d Dept 1981], appeal dismissed 56 N.Y.2d 602 [1982]). However, "if the abandonment is coerced or precipitated by unlawful police activity, then the seized property may be suppressed because it constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree" (People v Rice, 204 A.D.3d 834, 837 [2d Dept 2022], quoting People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d at 110; see Matter of Francis O., 208 A.D.3d 51, 57 [1st Dept 2022]; People v Kluge, 180 A.D.3d at 707).

"A defendant abandons property when he voluntarily relinquishes possession in a calculated decision in response to police conduct" (People v Whitfield, 186 A.D.3d 1414, 1415 [2d Dept 2020], Iv denied 36 N.Y.3d 977 [2020]), quoting People v Oliver, 39 A.D.3d 880, 880 [2d Dept 2007], Iv. dismissed 9 N.Y.3d 868 [2007]; see People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 110 [1996], and "[w]here a defendant abandons property, there is no search or seizure" (People v Whitfield, 186 A.D.3d at 1415, quoting People v Burkett, 98 A.D.3d 746, 747 [2d Dept 2012], Iv. denied 20 N.Y.3d 985 [2012]; see People v Kluge, 180 A.D.3d 705, 707 [2d Dept 2020]; People v Hogya, 80 A.D.2d 621, 621 [2d Dept 1981], appeal dismissed 56 N.Y.2d 602 [1982]). However, "if the abandonment is coerced or precipitated by unlawful police activity, then the seized property may be suppressed because it constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree" (People v Rice, 204 A.D.3d 834, 837 [2d Dept 2022], quoting People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d at 110; see Matter of Francis O., 208 A.D.3d 51, 57 [1st Dept 2022]; People v Kluge, 180 A.D.3d at 707).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the defendant acknowledged a lack of standing to contest the admissibility of the knife, car, phones and keys recovered by the police and the Court credits the People's position that these items constitute abandoned property. [See People v. Burkett, 98 A.D.3d 746].