Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 05WF2946, Thomas M. Goethals, Judge.
Doris M. Frizzell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Teresa Torreblanca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOORE, J.
Defendant was convicted of one count of aggravated mayhem following an incident in which he severely injured one of his roommates. He argues the trial court erred by failing to hold a full hearing on the issue of his competency to stand trial, and further claims there was insufficient evidence of his specific intent to support the aggravated mayhem charge. We find both arguments to be without merit and affirm the judgment.
I
FACTS
Defendant shared a home with Peter Lapkowski, Robert Schroth and a third man not involved in this case. In the early morning of October 10, 2005, defendant called 911 and reported a dispute between roommates, telling the operator that “Pete” (Lapkowski) and “Bob” (Schroth) were in bad shape.
Garden Grove Police Officer Patrick Gildea responded to the call, and the front door opened as he arrived. When defendant asked if he was a paramedic, Gildea replied that he was a police officer. Defendant then said: “The two guys I beat up are inside. Go get them.” When Gildea asked defendant what he was talking about, defendant told Gildea to come inside.
In the family room, Gildea saw blood on the floor, the couches and the walls. A man, later identified as Lapkowski, was seated on a couch, and defendant said: “That’s one of the guys I hit right there.” Lapkowski was bleeding heavily from a laceration on the side of his head, and blood covered his clothing and the couch on which he was seated. Gildea saw a bloody wooden baseball bat leaning against the side of the same couch.
Defendant then indicated Schroth, who was coming down the hallway, stating: “There’s the other guy that I hit right there.” Like Lapkowski, Schroth had a laceration on his head and was covered in blood. He appeared disoriented.
Gildea directed defendant to stand outside with Officer Troy Haller, who had also arrived at the residence. Haller asked defendant what happened, and defendant replied: “I hit them with a bat.” Defendant appeared to Haller to be calm. Defendant told Haller that Schroth and Lapkowski were devil worshippers, and one of them had broken into his room at some point in the past and damaged a guitar. He said that he was tired of liars. He denied consuming alcohol or drugs, and Haller did not observe that he was under the influence. Defendant also said that he had not been threatened or attacked.
In the house, Gildea asked Schroth what had happened. Schroth said that he had heard a noise outside his room, and after he went out to investigate he was hit on the head. Lapkowski was unresponsive. Both victims were taken to the hospital.
At trial, testimony was heard regarding the condition of the victims. Schroth had a 12-centimeter laceration on the top of his head and was released from the hospital the day after the attack. Lapkowski, however, had a 25-centimeter laceration on his head, and bruising on his chest, abdomen, and one of his arms. The following day he had an operation to remove part of his skull and some bruised brain tissue. He thereafter had additional surgeries and a tracheostomy. Lapkowski was unconscious for two weeks. At the time of trial, he continued to have problems with short-term memory, blurriness in one eye, dizziness, and balance, and he resided in an assisted living facility. Lapkowski also testified that he had never had prior altercations with defendant, and was not aware of any between defendant and the other roommates.
Gildea eventually went outside and spoke to defendant again, who continued to be calm and cooperative. Defendant told Gildea that Schroth and Lapkowski had “taken him to his final straw and that he decided to take care of the problem.” He again stated that he believed one of the men had broken into his room and damaged one of his guitars, and he decided to “take care of business.” When asked what he had used to hit the victims, defendant stated that he used the bat to hit them in the head. Gildea asked him why he would do that, and defendant said it was to teach them a lesson because they were devil worshippers. Defendant was placed under arrest.
Defendant was charged with multiple counts, including attemped murder as to both victims (Penal Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a), counts one and two) and aggravated mayhem as to Lapkowski (§ 205, count three). The information also alleged great bodily injury on Lapkowski as to counts one and three. (§ 12022.7, subd. (b).) Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
During jury selection, counsel and the court engaged in an unreported conference during which, apparently, defense counsel first raised the issue of defendant’s competence to stand trial. The court noted that it did not have a doubt as to defendant’s competence based on anything he had personally witnessed, noting that defendant seemed well-behaved and engaged. The court had seen defendant conferring regularly with counsel, and involved in the jury selection process. The court was well aware of its obligations under the law with respect to this issue, but also noted that the opinion of counsel, without more, did not trigger a competency hearing. Nonetheless, the court decided to conduct a limited inquiry with defendant to determine the threshold issues regarding competency.
The court inquired of the defendant outside of the presence of the district attorney. Defendant stated that he understood the charges against him, and that they were there to conduct a jury trial. He understood that the charges against him were serious. Defendant stated that he had never been diagnosed with or treated for a mental disorder, or taken medication for such a disorder. He was aware he had been in jail for two years. Defendant did not have any trouble understanding the proceedings, and knew they were in the process of selecting a jury.
The court trial ordered the transcript of this discussion sealed. We subsequently unsealed the transcript (along with two doctors’ reports), transmitted the documents to counsel, and resealed them. While the decision to seal the transcript was valid while the trial was ongoing, the reasons for keeping it sealed no longer apply. (Further, both parties substantively reveal the contents of the transcript in their unsealed briefs, particularly defendant, who quotes several pages of it in full.) We therefore order pages 299-309 of the reporter’s transcript unsealed.
With regard to jury selection, defendant and his counsel had been in some disagreement about who to select as jurors, because defendant believed that some people were devil worshippers. Defendant felt that some of the prospective jurors had “characteristics” of devil worshippers, and he was able to identify them through means he did not wish to disclose. He said that since 1988, a number of bad things had happened to him that he attributed to devil worshippers. Defendant did agree that there were 12 potential jurors who were not devil worshippers. He acknowledged that his attorney was good and experienced, but wished that he would talk to him more. Counsel had told him his opinion about what the best defense would be, but defendant did not always agree with it.
Following the hearing, the court discussed, on the record, the relevant legal standard. The court stated that while the evidence adduced during the in camera hearing gave the court pause about whether there was a doubt as to defendant’s competency, the court found that defendant both understood the nature of the proceedings, noting that his ability to assist counsel in a rational manner was a more difficult question. Defense counsel noted that the two doctors who had been appointed under section 1026 to evaluate defendant’s sanity at the time of the crimes had diagnosed him as suffering from a delusional disorder. A defense expert had reached the same conclusion. The court had not read those reports, because it did not believe it was appropriate to do so absent defense counsel’s request. The court noted that it was unlikely competency concerns would not have come to light through the reports, if such a concern was found by the examining physicians.
Defense counsel did not expressly ask the court to review the reports. After further discussion, the court declined to declare a doubt as to defendant’s competency. The court stated it would not foreclose the possibility of revisiting the issue if warranted.
The jury convicted defendant on count three and found the great bodily injury allegation to be true. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to counts one and two. The prosecutor’s motion to dismiss those counts was granted by the court.
During the sanity phase, neuropsychologist Charles Hinkin testified. His goal was to identify what neurologic or psychiatric disorder, if any, that defendant suffered from. In Hinkin’s opinion, defendant suffered from a delusional disorder, persecutory type. Such individuals are often resentful and angry and may resort to violence against people who they believe are hurting them. Hinkin noted that delusional people are generally capable of knowing the difference between right and wrong and understanding the nature of their actions. (Hinkin was not asked to determine defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense.)
At the conclusion of the sanity phase, the jury found it more likely than not that defendant was sane at the time of the crime. At sentencing, the court struck the section 12022.7, subdivision (b) enhancement for purposes of sentencing and sentenced defendant to life in prison. Defendant now appeals.
II
DISCUSSION
Mental Competency
Both the federal due process clause and California law prohibit the state from trying a defendant who is mentally incompetent. (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 524 (Lewis).) A defendant is mentally incompetent “if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).)
A defendant is presumed to be mentally competent to stand trial. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1216.) If “a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant,” the court is required to inquire of defense counsel, and if counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant may be mentally incompetent, a full hearing on the issue is required. (§ 1368, subds. (a), (b).)
The issue here is whether there was substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that it did not harbor a doubt as to defendant’s competence. (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 885 (Dunkle), disapproved on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) “Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 885.)
Defendant argues that the in camera discussion with the judge, during which he discussed his beliefs about devil worshippers, were sufficient to create a doubt in the judge’s mind and therefore trigger a full competency hearing. There is no doubt that defendant’s statements were somewhat bizarre, but to be entitled to a competency hearing, “‘a defendant must exhibit more than bizarre... behavior, strange words, or a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question of whether the defendant can assist his defense counsel. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 524.)
In Lewis, the court reviewed the issue of whether defendant was entitled to a full competency hearing. The court found that while defense counsel’s opinion as to the defendant’s competence was entitled to some weight, it was not, standing alone, substantial evidence. The opinion of a qualified medical expert as to competence did constitute substantial evidence, but such an opinion was lacking in this case, although the expert did opine on possible brain damage that might have impacted the defendant’s behavior. The court also noted: “Third, defendant’s outbursts at trial did not demonstrate incompetence. To the contrary, his statements indicated the depth of his understanding of the proceedings and his ability to assist counsel.” (Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 525.) Similarly, recalcitrance or unwillingness to assist counsel did not equate with an inability to do so. (Id. at p. 526.)
In this case, there was more than substantial evidence that defendant understood the proceedings against him. Defendant knew the charges against him. He knew that, at the time of the discussion with the court, they were engaged in jury selection. While his beliefs about devil worshippers may have created something of a challenge for defense counsel during jury selection, the problem did not rise to the level of being unable to assist counsel, either during jury selection or during the remainder of the trial. Thus, we find no substantial evidence of incompetence.
Defendant also points to the fact that the court did not read the reports of two experts who had been appointed to examine him on the issue of sanity. While we agree with defendant that it is not fatal to his claim that counsel did not specifically ask the court to read these reports, we also do not find it error per se that the court did not do so. Defendant’s sanity, or lack thereof, at the time the crime was committed is not the same inquiry as his mental competence at the time of trial. The court aptly pointed out that if the examining doctors had concerns about defendant’s competence, they surely would have noted such concerns in their reports. It follows logically that if they had, counsel would have highlighted these for the court. Thus, while counsel’s failure to ask the court to review these reports did not waive this argument, it is relevant to the issue of whether the reports were pertinent to the issue of present mental competence, as opposed to the question of whether defendant was sane at the time of the crime.
While defendant cites People v. Tomas (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 75 on this point, that case is readily distinguishable. The examiner in that case had been specifically asked to evaluate the defendant’s present competence. (Id. at pp. 80-82.) Thus, while the reports in that case were obviously pertinent as to competence, the reports at issue here were not, instead addressing defendant’s mental status at the time of the crime. Indeed, our review of the reports shows that neither opined on the issue of competence. The reports’ conclusions added nothing truly significant to the information the court already had before it, based on its own examination of defendant. The court was already aware that defendant suffered from a mental illness, which was the primary conclusion of the reports.
The other case defendant relies on, People v. Sundberg (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 944, also involved prior competence, not merely sanity, proceedings, and is equally distinguishable.
We therefore find the mere “availability” of the reports here insufficient to provide substantial evidence of a doubt as to defendant’s competence. Without any indication that such reports are directly relevant to the issue of competence, we decline to require that trial courts review every available report on a defendant’s mental status, particularly when defense counsel does not request the court to undertake such a review.
In sum, therefore, we find no substantial evidence of defendant’s incompetence was before the trial court. The court, therefore, did not err in not conducting a competency hearing.
Sufficient Evidence of Aggravated Mayhem
Defendant next argues that his conviction for aggravated mayhem must be overturned because insufficient evidence supports the conclusion that he had the specific intent to permanently disfigure or disable Lapkowski. He argues the attack was an “indiscriminate act” or “explosion of violence” that lacked the requisite intent.
“Our role in considering an insufficiency of the evidence claim is quite limited. We do not reassess the credibility of witnesses [citation], and we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment [citation], drawing all inferences from the evidence which supports the jury’s verdict. [Citation.]” (People v. Olguin (1999) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1382.) Substantial evidence is “evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) Before a verdict may be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence, a party must demonstrate “‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
The specific intent to cause permanent disability or disfigurement is an essential element of the crime of aggravated mayhem. (§ 205; People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 64 (Park).) “Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction. [Citations.]” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208.)
“A jury may not find specific intent ‘solely from evidence that the injury inflicted actually constitutes mayhem; instead, there must be other facts and circumstances which support an inference of intent to maim rather than to attack indiscriminately.’ [Citation.] ‘A jury may infer a defendant’s specific intent from the circumstances attending the act, the manner in which it is done, and the means used, among other factors.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Szadziewicz (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 823, 831 .)
Based on all of the facts present here, the jury could reasonably infer from the circumstances and nature of the attack that defendant’s actions reflected not merely indiscriminate violence, but an intent to maim. Evidence that an attack was aimed at a particularly vulnerable area, such as the head, supports the inference that defendant intended to cause a maiming injury. (Park, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 69.) While defendant also hit Lapkowski in other parts of his body, the seriousness of his head injuries supports an inference that the attack was directed at Lapkowski’s head. Such an inference is also supported by defendant’s attack on Schroth, which was also directed at the victim’s head.
Deliberation and planning also support an inference of specific intent. (Park, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 70.) Defendant’s statements to the police readily support the notion that the attack was deliberated and planned. Defendant explained to the police that he was upset with the victims because they were devil worshippers, who had, several weeks earlier, broken into his room and damaged his guitar. Defendant’s statement that the attack was intended to teach the victims a lesson because they were devil worshippers further supports planning and deliberation.
The cases cited by defendant are distinguishable. Unlike the attacks in People v. Lee (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 320, and People v. Sears (1965) 62 Cal.2d 737, overruled on other grounds by People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, the attacks here were neither unfocused and indiscriminate, or without any conceivable reason. Defendant, as expressed by his own statements, had a specific reason for his animosity toward the victims. Taken together, the permissible inferences could readily lead a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant’s intent was to permanently maim Lapkowski.
We therefore find substantial evidence to support the judgment.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR, RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., O’LEARY, J.