The purpose of the enactment of said section was undoubtedly to obviate the necessity of a new trial in a criminal case in which no miscarriage of justice resulted from a procedural error. As further illustrating the proposition that a conviction should not be set aside because of trivial and nonprejudicial errors, see People v. Hahn, 214 Mich. 419; People v. Budd, 279 Mich. 110. In 23 CJS, p 305, the following statement is made:

Cf. People v. Collins, 43 Mich. App. 259 (1972), citing MCLA 769.26; MSA 28.1096; GCR 1963, 529.1; People v. Budd, 279 Mich. 110 (1937); People v. Wolke, 10 Mich. App. 582 (1968). In distinguishing Giglio v. United States and in finding that the error in this case was harmless, this Court must be convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

In our view, improperly admitted testimony that is merely corroborative of properly admitted evidence is not the basis for holding the error reversible, MCLA 769.26; MSA 28.1096; GCR 1963, 529.1; People v. Budd, 279 Mich. 110 (1937); People v. Wolke, 10 Mich. App. 582 (1968). Finally, defendant claims reversible error because the trial court failed to define premeditation in the jury instructions.

Defendant was present in the courtroom and we assume that he stood up during the course of the trial either coming or going. The case of People v. Budd, 279 Mich. 110 (1937), resolves the issue before us. In that case an offering was made of the defendant's head size by allowing him to try on a hat that was found at the scene of a robbery.