People v. Buckmire

7 Citing cases

  1. People v. Wallace

    2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 3305 (N.Y. 2018)   Cited 18 times

    Further, the use of a possessive pronoun, combined with the adoption of the place of business exemption in conjunction with an exemption for possession in one's "home"—an exception that is, itself, intended to allow for the defense of one's life and property in a place in which an individual has a significant proprietary or possessory interest—signals that the place of business exemption is intended to apply only where a person has a clear and substantial interest in the business beyond that of an employee. Consistent with the statutory language, the Appellate Division Departments have generally interpreted the exemption "narrowly ... in an effort to balance ‘the State's strong policy to severely restrict possession of any firearm,’ with its policy to treat with leniency persons attempting to protect certain areas in which they have a possessory interest and to which members of the public have limited access" ( People v. Buckmire, 237 A.D.2d 151, 151, 655 N.Y.S.2d 9 [1st Dept. 1997] [citations omitted], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 902, 663 N.Y.S.2d 514, 686 N.E.2d 226 [1997], quoting People v. Maniscalco, 198 A.D.2d 378, 378–379, 603 N.Y.S.2d 890 [2d Dept. 1993], lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 927, 610 N.Y.S.2d 179, 632 N.E.2d 489 [1994] ; see alsoPeople v. Khudadzade, 156 A.D.2d 384, 384–385, 548 N.Y.S.2d 336 [2d Dept. 1989], lv denied 75 N.Y.2d 814, 552 N.Y.S.2d 564, 551 N.E.2d 1242 [1990] ; People v. Fearon, 58 A.D.2d 1041, 1041, 397 N.Y.S.2d 294 [4th Dept. 1977], cert denied 434 U.S. 1036, 98 S.Ct. 772, 54 L.Ed.2d 784 [1978] ). Courts have explained that "the statute is designed to limit the use of guns, ever mindful of the fact that ‘concealed weapons present an immediate and real danger to the public’ " ( People v. Francis, 45 A.D.2d 431, 435, 358 N.Y.S.2d 148 [2d Dept. 1974], affd on other grds 38 N.Y.2d 150, 379 N.Y.S.2d 21, 341 N.E.2d 540 [1975], quoting People v. Moore, 32 N.Y.2d 67, 72, 343 N.Y.S.2d 107, 295 N.E.2d 780 [1973] ).

  2. People v. Wallace

    147 A.D.3d 1494 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 2 times

    Nevertheless, the contention is without merit (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Although the "place of business" exception is not statutorily defined, it has been "construed narrowly by the courts in an effort to balance 'the State's strong policy to severely restrict possession of any firearm' ... with its policy to treat with leniency persons attempting to protect certain areas in which they have a possessory interest and to which members of the public have limited access" (People v. Buckmire, 237 A.D.2d 151, 151, 655 N.Y.S.2d 9, lv. denied 90 N.Y.2d 902, 663 N.Y.S.2d 514, 686 N.E.2d 226 ; see People v. Francis, 45 A.D.2d 431, 434, 358 N.Y.S.2d 148, affd. on other grounds 38 N.Y.2d 150, 379 N.Y.S.2d 21, 341 N.E.2d 540 ; People v. Fearon, 58 A.D.2d 1041, 1041, 397 N.Y.S.2d 294, cert. denied 434 U.S. 1036, 98 S.Ct. 772, 54 L.Ed.2d 784 ). Inasmuch as the evidence at trial established that defendant was prohibited from bringing a gun to work, we conclude that to permit defendant to be subjected only to a misdemeanor "would certainly controvert the meaning and intent of the statute" (Fearon, 58 A.D.2d at 1041, 397 N.Y.S.2d 294 ).

  3. People v. Melville

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 50461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)

    The People are indeed correct that the exception has been "construed narrowly" for public policy reasons. People v. Buckmire, 237 AD2d 151 (1st Dept 1997), appeal denied 90 NY2d 902 . This "narrow" construction has been applied, however, only in specific areas consistent with the legislative intent.

  4. People v. White

    75 A.D.3d 109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 37 times

    In so doing, the courts have balanced competing "public policy concerns which reflect the constitutional right of citizens to bear arms to defend their persons and homes" against the State's "strong policy to severely restrict possession of any firearm" ( People v Maniscalco, 198 AD2d 378, 379). The balance struck between these policy considerations has resulted in a narrow construction of the term "home" which encompasses only "a very limited area around the house" ( id. at 379; see People v Buckmire, 237 AD2d 151; People v Tolbert, 253 AD2d 832, 833). As we explained in Maniscalco, "[i]f the purpose of having the firearm is to protect family and home, then the firearm should be readily accessible, in the immediate vicinity of the home" ( People v Maniscalco, 198 AD2d at 379).

  5. People v. Solomon

    253 A.D.2d 692 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 1 times
    Concluding that "defendant was not in his 'place of business' when he stood on the street corner near his cab" without addressing issue of whether taxicab is place of business

    The court's instruction on the "place of business" exception of Penal Law § 265.02 (4) was correct. Defendant was not in his "place of business" when he stood on the street corner near his cab, ostensibly waiting to escort a customer to the cab ( People v. Figueroa, 207 A.D.2d 670; see also, People v. Powell, 54 N.Y.2d 524, 531; People v. Buckmire, 237 A.D.2d 151, 152, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 902). We perceive no abuse of sentencing discretion and find that the sentence was not based on any inappropriate criteria.

  6. People v. Tolbert

    253 A.D.2d 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 9 times

    The defendant's effort to distinguish People v. Maniscalco (supra) on the basis that his driveway was fenced-in, rather than unfenced, is unpersuasive. The scope of the home exception provided for in Penal Law § 265.02 (4) has "been construed narrowly by the courts" ( People v. Buckmire, 237 A.D.2d 151; see also, People v. Powell, 54 N.Y.2d 524 [common hallway outside group residence not within the home exception]; People v. Crews, 236 A.D.2d 419 [home exception inapplicable where defendant secreted weapon in his house after having possessed it in girlfriend's car]). Here, the defendant's possession of a loaded firearm occurred out-of-doors, and not in any sense inside his home.

  7. People v. Minervini

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 50092 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009)

    Moreover, as this Court pointed out in its initial decision, the "place of business" exception has not been defined by statute, and has been narrowly construed by the courts. People v. Buckmire, 237 AD2d 151 (1st Dept. 1997); see also People v. Yaghi, 199 AD2d 829 (3rd Dept. 1993). The People allege that where the place of business exception has been found to exist, "most cases speak to a need to protect property.