Opinion
February 3, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Monroe County, Doyle, J.
Present — Dillon, P.J., Doerr, Green, Pine and Davis, JJ.
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree and related crimes, defendant raises several claims, none requiring reversal. The court properly refused to charge third degree criminal possession of stolen property as a lesser included offense because there was no reasonable view of the evidence that could have supported such a charge (see, People v Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61; People v Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427, rearg denied 57 N.Y.2d 775). The police had reasonable suspicion to attempt to stop defendant's vehicle initially because it matched the description of a car involved in prior related incidents and because the police heard a radio bulletin regarding suspicious activity of defendant's car (see, People v Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 418; cf., People v Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559; People v Spicer, 105 A.D.2d 1100). The People were not obligated to present the testimony of the sending officer at the suppression hearing to establish reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle (see, People v Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 376-377; People v Mack, 26 N.Y.2d 311, 315-317, cert denied 400 U.S. 960) and could justifiably rely on the information relayed by the radio communication from another police officer (see, People v Petralia, 62 N.Y.2d 47, 51-52, cert denied 469 U.S. 852). The radar detectors thrown from the car windows during police pursuit were abandoned and not seized as the product of any illegal police activity because the police had a right to stop and check defendant's car (see, People v Boodle, 47 N.Y.2d 398, 404, cert denied 444 U.S. 969). During pursuit of the car the police officer's reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause and when the car was ultimately stopped defendant was properly arrested, the car was properly searched without a warrant and the evidence seized pursuant to the search was properly admitted at trial. Addressing defendant's remaining claims, we conclude that the evidence of value was legally sufficient, the evidence of uncharged crimes did not deprive defendant of a fair trial and the first count of the indictment was not duplicitous (see, People v Loret, 136 A.D.2d 316, 317).