Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 5-071906-2
Reardon, J.
A jury convicted appellant Marc Anthony Bryant of first degree residential robbery and found that he committed this offense in concert. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 213, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The trial court found prior conviction allegations to be true and he was sentenced to 21 years in state prison. (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12.) On appeal, Bryant contends that the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by excluding proffered evidence that the robbery victim’s parent used a racial epithet when denouncing Bryant to police. We affirm the judgment.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
I. FACTS
A. The Crime
On the morning of April 13, 2007, Sandra Belcher was at her Concord home with her 16-year-old son Michael Z., her younger son Matthew Z. and her grandniece (hereafter A.). Michael was on juvenile probation after being involved in commercial burglary, assault on a police officer, and receiving stolen property. At the time of the April 2007 incident, he was under house arrest, wearing an electronic ankle monitor. The rules of his house arrest limited him to one visitor at a time. Michael was not to have any visitors at home when Belcher was gone. If his probation were to be revoked, he faced several years in custody.
Testimony from the victim of the receiving stolen property charge testified that Michael actually took the stolen property from him. Michael denied robbing this victim.
Two young African-American men came to Belcher’s home that morning—men known to her as Quaylo and Larry. To her son Michael, these two young men were known by two different names. Quaylo was Jacquay Jackson, a friend that Michael had known for about a year. Larry introduced himself to Michael as Wiggler. It was the first time they had met and Michael was told that Wiggler was Jackson’s cousin. Belcher knew Jackson, who was a friend of Michael’s. In the past two weeks, Jackson had told her that he needed a place to stay, and he had stayed at her home several times, although he had not spent the night. He had eaten dinner at her home a few weeks earlier. He seemed sad to Belcher and had always been nice to her.
Like Michael, Belcher did not know Larry/Wiggler, who was later identified as appellant Marc Anthony Bryant. His appearance and his conduct in her home made Belcher uneasy. Bryant hesitated before giving his name when he introduced himself, he was in the bathroom many times during the short time that he was at the house, and he kept standing in the hallway looking around. He looked to Belcher as if he was homeless.
That morning, Jackson said that he was waiting for his girlfriend to pick him up. He and Bryant went into Michael’s room. Belcher took Michael aside and told him that she was not leaving the house until the two young men left. She did so to comply with the rules of Michael’s house arrest and because she did not trust Bryant.
Jackson and Bryant left after about 45 minutes. Belcher waited until they were gone before she left the house with Matthew and A. As Belcher was leaving, Michael’s girlfriend—16-year-old Melanie F.—came to the house. Melanie said that she was just stopping briefly to drop off a sandwich for Michael and that she planned to leave soon. She did not have her parents’ permission to be at Michael’s house.
At this point, events become less clear, because Michael and Melanie have differing reports about what happened next. According to Melanie, two African-American men came by to see Michael, who appeared to know them. One man was bald and wore a boot on his leg as if the leg had been broken. The second man had dreadlocks. They sat in the backyard and talked with Michael. Michael had told her that two men wanted to buy his grill—a set of gold “teeth” with diamonds in it—so Melanie assumed that these men were there for that purpose. For his part, Michael later identified these two men as Quaylo and Wiggler—that is, Jackson and Bryant.
Michael reported to police that Bryant had told him on the day of the incident that he had been shot in the leg several months earlier and that he was collecting Social Security “[s]oldier money” for that injury.
Melanie explained that the bald man went inside to use the bathroom. Michael, Melanie and the man with dreadlocks—Jackson—went in to check on him after the bald man stayed in the house for a long time. They found the bald man standing in Michael’s room. Two other African-American men came into the room and jumped onto Michael.
Melanie did not mention this in her report to police. She said that Michael invited Jackson and Bryant into the house.
Melanie was on Michael’s cell phone and at first, she thought it was a joke. When she realized that Michael was being assaulted, she looked to the back door to gauge if she could run out of it. The man with dreadlocks told her to get off the cell phone. He put a gun to Melanie’s neck and took the cell phone from her. Melanie tried to leave, but the man with the dreadlocks grabbed her and ordered her onto Michael’s bed.
The men pistol-whipped Michael and kicked him. The bald man yelled at Michael and Melanie—he said that he would kill them if they “tr[ied] something.” Bryant held a gun, hitting Michael in the face with it and demanding that Michael give him “everything.” They seemed to be asking for drugs.
Melanie told police that it was Jackson who hit Michael with the gun.
There was some dispute over whether the weapon was real or a replica. Michael testified that he thought it was real at the time of the incident, although he admitted to police later that it might have been a replica.
Melanie saw that Michael was bleeding and was very upset. In Michael’s version of the events, he took some money out of his pocket and threw it on the bed. One of the men took it. The way Melanie told the story, Michael refused to say where his money was, so the bald man told Melanie to find it. Jackson put a gun against her neck to underscore this demand. Melanie found a roll of cash in Michael’s pants and gave it to the bald man. The men took the grill, too. Bryant told Michael to take off his jeans and shoes, which Bryant took along with a lot of his other clothing from his closet.
There were also some differences between the two eyewitness accounts of other aspects of the encounter. According to Michael, one of the men told Melanie to remove her clothing, but Michael protested that they should leave her out of it. Bryant agreed and the men left Melanie alone. Melanie reported that she was only instructed to remove her shoes, not her clothes.
At first, Jackson and Bryant remained in the room while the other two men ran around the house. Then, Bryant gave the gun to Jackson and went to help the other two men going through the house. The other two men were now in the living room; from time to time, the bald man walked in and out of the bedroom, checking on them. Michael heard Bryant say that he had taken care of the phones—the house telephone and the cell phone.
At some point, according to Michael, he announced that he had a neighbor who was a cop. Jackson grabbed a bag with Michael’s shoes and clothes in it, admonished his cohorts to leave, and told Michael and Melanie not to move. Before he left with the other three men, Bryant told Michael that he had a larger gun that he would return with if Michael said anything to police about the incident.
B. Investigation
Michael tried to call the police and to call his mother, but the men had taken his cell phone and the house’s cordless telephone had been at least partially disabled. Belcher received a call from Michael saying that he had been beaten up and robbed. She called Concord police and returned home quickly.
Michael seemed reluctant to report the incident to police, which made Melanie nervous. She knew that she was not supposed to be at his house, either. When questioned that day, Melanie did not tell police the whole truth—she told them that four Black men burst into the house, omitting that Michael had allowed Jackson and Bryant in. For his part, Michael said that he wanted to talk with Belcher before he spoke with police. Once he talked with police, he also failed to tell the whole truth during this initial questioning. Afraid that the intruders would hurt him and his family, Michael told police that four men that he did not know had pushed themselves into the house.
By the time Belcher arrived, the police were there. Michael and Melanie were both in the driveway of the house. Michael was bleeding and his face was cut open; Melanie was hysterical. Both of them were afraid. Inside the house, Belcher saw that parts of the house had been ransacked. Matthew’s Playstation, Game Cube and piggy bank were missing; A.’s duffel bag had been taken; and some of Michael’s clothes and shoes were gone. A cell phone, the grill and some cash were also missing. The batteries had been removed from two cordless telephones.
To the police, Michael’s report seemed vague, raising the suspicion that he was not being completely truthful. He was questioned again, and this time, Michael admitted that he had not been completely honest with police earlier. He admitted that he knew Jackson and Bryant, that they had been in the house earlier in the day when his mother was present, and that he had allowed them back into his house later that day to buy the grill. Michael reported that two younger juveniles came in. He said that during the robbery, all four of the men held the gun and punched him and that Bryant hit him in the face with a gun. Michael said that he had not been candid with police earlier because Jackson threatened to return with a gun if he notified police.
The police interviewed Melanie again shortly after talking with Michael. This time, she told them the more complete truth—that Michael was talking with Jackson and Bryant at the house before two other Black males entered the house and beat him up. She looked at photographic lineups and was able to identify Jackson as one of the intruders, but she was unable to identify Bryant.
A Concord police officer testified that Melanie “eliminated” Bryant as a suspect during the lineup.
On April 25, 2007, Jackson was arrested. At the time of his arrest, he was found with a cell phone and a telephone number for “Wiggla.” Jackson’s cell phone also had this telephone number in its memory.
The Attorney General asserts that the number was linked to Bryant. There was no direct evidence of this, as the prosecution was unable to produce any records showing this number belonged to Bryant. However, the number was linked to “Wiggla” on the paper in Jackson’s possession and Bryant identified himself to Michael as “Wiggler.”
Melanie was also interviewed again by police. She told police that she had lied in her initial report—saying that four men pushed their way into the house as she was leaving—because she had feared that Michael would be in trouble if the police knew that people were at the house. The police also reinterviewed Michael. He told police that he had not been truthful in the report he made on the day of the incident both because he feared having violated a condition of his probation and because threats were made against him and his family if he reported the incident to police. Michael told the police that his statement was accurate, except for how the first two men entered his house. By this time, Michael told police that Jackson and Bryant were the men who came to his home. Michael formally identified Jackson and Bryant from photographic lineups.
Concord police also interviewed Michael’s mother Belcher. Her interview was audiotaped. She also identified Bryant and Jackson from these photographic lineups as the men who had been in her home earlier on the day that the crime occurred.
After his September 2007 arrest, Bryant was interviewed by police. At that time, he had a cast on his leg and walked on crutches. Bryant told police that he had never been to Concord, that his leg was injured in an accident for which he received disability, and that he had never been known as Wiggler or Wiggla. He denied knowing Michael, striking him or ever having been to his house. When the telephone number attributed to Wiggla was read to him, Bryant denied that it was his number.
C. Criminal Proceedings
In December 2007, Bryant was charged by information with the first degree residential robbery of Michael and the attempted first degree residential robbery of Melanie. (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 664.) Both charges included special allegations that Bryant committed this crime in concert with two or more others. The information also alleged two prior convictions—a 2005 robbery conviction alleged as a strike and a prior serious felony conviction, and a 1996 conviction of possession of marijuana for sale that resulted in Bryant’s service of a prior prison term. (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b), 667.5, subd. (b).) Finally, the information alleged six convictions—including two prior felony convictions—charged to render him ineligible for probation. (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4).) Bryant pled not guilty to these charges and denied all allegations. The trial court granted Bryant’s request to bifurcate trial of the new offenses from that of his prior convictions.
At trial, Melanie was unable to identify Bryant as the bald man in court. She told the jury that the bald man had not had a gun. Michael told the jury that he did not remember how much money was taken, but that some of his money was missing when the incident ended. The jury saw photographs of Michael’s injuries. In impeachment testimony, it also heard a crime victim testify that Michael had not merely received stolen property, but had actually stolen his MP3 player, his hat and his cell phone.
At the close of evidence, Bryant made an unsuccessful motion for acquittal. (§ 1118.1.) He opted not to testify. The jury found Bryant guilty of first degree residential robbery, finding that he committed this offense in concert with others. It acquitted him of the attempted robbery of Melanie and of a lesser included offense. After a court trial, the prior conviction allegations were found to be true.
Bryant’s motion for new trial—focusing on the impeachment of Michael’s credibility based on his juvenile record—was denied. He was sentenced to 21 years in state prison—an aggravated term of eight years for first degree residential robbery, doubled because of his strike, and a five-year enhancement for another prior conviction. (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 667, subds. (a)(1), (b), 1170.12.) The court did not impose sentence for the prior prison terms enhancement. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
After sentencing, the trial court also terminated Bryant’s probation unsuccessfully in another felony probation matter.
II. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
A. Trial Court Exercise of Discretion
Bryant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to question Belcher about her use of a racial epithet during her police interview. He contends that by excluding this critical evidence of Belcher’s bias against African-Americans, the trial court both abused its discretion to exclude evidence and violated his right to confront witnesses against him, thereby depriving him of a fair trial. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend; Evid. Code, § 352.)
All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
In the trial court, Bryant sought to introduce evidence that Belcher—who identified herself as Hispanic—had used a racial epithet when she spoke with police. In a foundational hearing outside the presence of the jury, it was established that during her police interview, Belcher said “Fuck you, niggers.” (§ 402.) Apparently, she made this outburst after Michael reminded her that Bryant had referred to A. as a “mixed little sister.”
The transcript also showed that Michael and his mother reported that they were upset that Bryant had referred to A. as a “mixed little sister.” On appeal, Bryant asserts that this statement should also have been admitted into evidence. From the two-page transcript that was provided to us on appeal, it appears that Belcher was angry that Bryant could steal from someone with whom he seemed to identify. The trial court record of Belcher’s report of this reference conflicts with the transcript. In any case, the trial court only precluded her use of the one-word racial epithet, and not the “fuck you” response or the recollection of the “mixed little sister” comment prompting that response from Belcher. Bryant cannot complain of the exclusion of evidence that his counsel chose not to offer into evidence.
Belcher told the trial court that she had been upset and felt betrayed by people—especially Jackson—who had come into her home and had lied to her. She was particularly upset that the robbers had stolen items belonging to her grandniece and her younger son. Although she had earlier denied having used a racial epithet, once the audiotape of the interview was played, Belcher admitted that she “said something horrible.”
Twice, Bryant argued that the evidence was relevant to show bias—that her use of a racial epithet tainted her other testimony about Bryant having been in her house behaving in a suspicious manner. He argued that Belcher had a racial motive for her suspicions; that the evidence was admissible to impeach her initial denial of having used any epithet; and that any evidence of racial bias was relevant in a case of a cross-racial identification.
The trial court recalled that Jackson was a friend of her son’s and had been a guest in Belcher’s home. This was not the conduct of a racist, the trial court concluded. It also noted that Belcher’s grandniece was of mixed racial heritage, some of it African-American. The prosecution argued against admission of the evidence, urging the trial court to balance the minimal relevance of the statement against the heavy prejudice that would result from its admission. The trial court conducted a balancing test and found the racial bias evidence to be highly prejudicial and inflammatory without really being probative. Accordingly, while it permitted Bryant to bring out evidence that Belcher used profanity when referring to the intruders, it did not allow him to question her about her use of the one-word racial epithet “niggers.” (§ 352.)
Three of the jurors were African-American.
It also rejected Bryant’s legal theory that he was entitled to bring in Belcher’s use of the racial epithet as part of Belcher’s entire statement. (§ 356.)
Before the jury, Belcher testified that when she was interviewed by police, she was upset—particularly with Jackson—because she had considered him a friend. She explained that when Jackson and Bryant appeared at her home early on the day of the incident, she had been uneasy about Bryant because of his conduct, not because of his race. Reluctantly, Belcher testified that her grandniece A. was racially mixed—both Black and White. She told the jury that A.’s father’s family was Black and that she was close to them. During cross-examination, Bryant did not bring out evidence that Belcher had said “Fuck you” during the interview, although the trial court had ruled that only the word “niggers” could not be admitted into evidence.
Outside the presence of the jury, Bryant’s counsel reiterated his request to bring in evidence that Belcher used a racial epithet during her interview with police. He argued that this evidence was the only way to challenge her testimony that her view of Bryant was not based on his race. Again, the trial court exercised its discretion to exclude this evidence. It found the evidence to be of little if any probative value, and found that this probative value was substantially outweighed by the highly inflammatory prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence. (§ 352.)
B. Section 352
Bryant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding this proffered evidence. He reasons that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. A trial court may, in its discretion, exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. (§ 352.) The trial court enjoys broad discretion when assessing the probative value of proffered evidence and determining whether it is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124.) Its exercise of its discretion pursuant to section 352 to exclude evidence will not be reversed on appeal, absent a showing that the exercise of discretion was arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd, resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (Ibid.; see People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1118 [evidence admitted]; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 214-215 [same].)
In order to assess whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence, we weigh the probative value of the evidence against the potential for prejudice resulting from its admission. (See People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 372; People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018; see also § 352.) Of course, the proffered evidence had probative value because it raised an inference that Belcher was biased against African-Americans. Credibility issues are matters for the jury to determine. (Vorse v. Sarasy (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 998, 1009.) However, the Legislature has given trial courts the authority to balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, necessarily requiring that trial court conduct some weighing of the value of the proffered evidence. (See § 352.)
The identity of the robbers was an issue in the case. Melanie was not able to identify Bryant as a robber—of the two potential victims present at the time of the offense, only Michael made a positive identification of Bryant as Jackson’s cohort. Bryant reasons that some corroboration of Michael’s identification was necessary to bolster it, given the various attacks on Michael’s credibility at trial. As Belcher’s identification of Bryant tended to corroborate Michael’s identification of him, her credibility is also at issue, Bryant argues. For this reason, he urges us to find that evidence of her racial animus was relevant to show bias and to undermine her identification of Bryant.
This argument is flawed for several reasons. First, it assumes incorrectly that Belcher’s identification was the only evidence tending to corroborate Michael’s identification evidence. Bryant ignores other evidence that—taken together—tended to corroborate Michael’s identification of Bryant as the intruder who accompanied his friend Jackson during the robbery. There was evidence at trial that Melanie observed that the robber wore a special boot on his foot and that Bryant wore such a boot months after the date of the crime, having worn it for many months. This evidence alone would be sufficient to corroborate Michael’s identification of Bryant as the robber. But there is more evidence that would tend to corroborate Michael’s identification in the evidence linking Jackson and Bryant together at the scene of the crime. Bryant had called himself “Wiggler” when he was introduced to Michael; the name “Wiggla” appeared among the possessions of Jackson; a telephone number associated with “Wiggla” was contained in the memory of a cell phone found on Jackson at the time of his arrest; Jackson was known to Michael long before the incident; and both Michael and Melanie identified Jackson as the one of the perpetrators. This other corroborative evidence makes it less crucial to the prosecution to corroborate the accuracy of Belcher’s identification of Bryant.
Second, Bryant overstates the relevance and probative value of the proffered evidence. His argument treats Belcher as if her identification evidence was a key to the case against him, as if she was an eyewitness to the charged crimes. She was not. Belcher identified Bryant as one of two men who had been at her house on the same day as the crimes occurred. Both Bryant and Belcher had left the house and a lapse of time occurred before the robbery. Belcher’s identification was helpful to the prosecution about a collateral matter, but the identifications of the persons present at the time of the robbery—eyewitnesses Michael and Melanie—were much more probative than was hers.
Evidence of racial animus can be relevant to show bias. (See § 210 [witness credibility]; People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 628 [defendant’s use of racial epithets against murder victim as tending to show premeditation and deliberation].) In the case before us, we agree with the trial court’s ultimate assessment that the proffered evidence’s probative value was not substantial. Even if proffered evidence has some probative value, a trial court may still exclude it if that probative value is not substantial or is largely outweighed by the probability that its admission would have a prejudicial effect. (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 371; People v. Scheer, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018; see § 352.) This brings us to our third problem with Bryant’s argument—his assessment of the prejudicial effect of the evidence.
Bryant’s citation of People v. Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th 600, in support of this claim of error is less supportive than he reasons. In Quartermain, the defendant repeatedly used racial epithets to refer to a murder victim and other African-American persons during his interviews with police. When the trial court found these interviews to be admissible, the defendant sought to exclude evidence of these racial epithets, without success. (Id. at p. 627.) On appeal, the California Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to admit this evidence. (Id. at pp. 628-629.) It found a defendant’s expression of animus against a victim or someone of the victim’s race to be relevant in a murder case, particularly to the issue of whether the murder was deliberate and premeditated. (Id. at p. 628.) It also upheld the trial court’s necessary finding that the evidence was not so inflammatory that its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (Ibid.)
Prejudicial evidence within the section 352 context is evidence uniquely tending to evoke an emotional bias—evidence that has very little effect on the disputed issues at trial. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 320; People v. Poplar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1138.) Thus, the prejudice that section 352 seeks to avoid is not that naturally flowing from relevant, highly probative evidence. The statute attempts to avoid the prejudging of a case based on extraneous facts. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 958; People v. Poplar, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1138.) In addition to the reasons recited in section 352, that statute’s balancing process requires consideration of the relationship between the proffered evidence and the relevant inferences to be drawn from it, whether the evidence is relevant to the main or only a collateral issue, and the proponent’s need for the evidence to establish his or her case. (People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 585.)
We are satisfied that the trial court properly concluded that the probative value of the proffered evidence was far outweighed by the likelihood that it might inflame the jury against Belcher. A second prejudicial effect is the consumption of time that this collateral matter would have required. Bryant argues that presenting the statements would have been brief. However, having reviewed the statement transcript and the discussions of it that took place outside the presence of the jury, we found the evidence to be confusing and contradictory. (See fn. 11, ante.) It is apparent to us that a time-consuming mini-trial would have been required to clearly present all of the evidence of whether or not Belcher was racially biased. The broad discretion of section 352 authorizes the exclusion of evidence “to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues.” (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 296; see People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 301.) As the evidence was both inflammatory and potentially time-consuming, the trial court properly concluded that the evidence had a substantially prejudicial effect.
Finally, we observe that Bryant did not take up the trial court’s invitation to question Belcher about her use of the phrase “Fuck you” during the interview. It is significant that the trial court was willing to allow Bryant liberal cross-examination, but for the use of the single word that it found substantially more prejudicial than probative. (See, e.g., People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 828.)
The trial court’s ruling was not arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd such that it resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (See, e.g., People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1124.) Thus, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the proffered evidence.
C. Confrontation Clause
Bryant also argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him—specifically, unfairly limiting the scope of cross-examination—by its exclusion of this evidence. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a state criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her in order to have an opportunity to cross-examine them. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678.) However, the confrontation clause does not prevent a trial judge from imposing limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. Consistent with the confrontation clause, trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about, inter alia, interrogation that is only marginally relevant. (Id. at p. 679.)
In this matter, we have held that the trial court acted within its discretion when excluding one word of Belcher’s statement from the jury. The trial court excluded evidence that had little probative value, marginal relevance and a high potential for inflaming the jury about a collateral identification by someone who was not an eyewitness to the crime. (See pt. II.B., ante.) It allowed Bryant to question Belcher about racial bias, but for the use of one inflammatory word. We find that the exclusion of this single word was a reasonable limitation on cross-examination that did not impinge on Bryant’s right to confront witnesses against him. Thus, we find no violation of his right to a fair trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J., Rivera, J.
We find this case to be distinguishable from Bryant’s case, for three reasons. First, Belcher was neither the defendant nor the victim of the charged offense. Her state of mind was irrelevant to prove any element of the case-in-chief. Second, the evidence of bias against African-Americans went only to a collateral matter—the accuracy of the identification of one who was not an eyewitness to the crime. Third, the Quartermain court was asked to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence, while Bryant asks us to find an abuse of discretion in the exclusion of evidence. When the admission or exclusion of evidence is within the trial court’s discretion—as it is when a section 352 objection is posed—a case holding that a racial epithet is not so inflammatory that the evidence should have been excluded does not necessarily compel the conclusion that evidence of a racial epithet must be admitted. This is particularly so in a case such as the one before us, when the proffered evidence was countered by significant evidence tending to undermine the inference of bias that Bryant would have the jury draw, and when the inference would only go to a collateral matter.