Such testimony was of little or no probative value, and the danger of such bolstering testimony was "especially acute," since it was provided by a law enforcement officer (People v Cuiman, 229 AD2d 280, 284). A violation of the rule against improper bolstering may only be overlooked in situations where "evidence of identity is so strong that there is no serious issue upon that point" (People v Fields, 309 AD2d 945, 946; see People v Bacenet, 297 AD2d 817; People v Bryan, 179 AD2d 667). That standard has not been met here.

The complainant observed the appellant during the incident under good lighting conditions, and subsequently identified the appellant at a showup that took place one hour after the incident and in the same building where the incident occurred. Contrary to the appellant's contention, it cannot be said that the identification testimony of the complainant was insufficient to establish the appellant's identity as one of the assailants ( see e.g. People v Rodgers, 6 AD3d 464, 465; People v Terrill, 265 AD2d 587; People v Baptiste, 201 AD2d 659, 660-661; People v Bryan, 179 AD2d 667). Moreover, "[w]hen a witness positively identifies a person as the perpetrator of a crime, the weight of the evidence of identification is a question primarily for the fact finder, unless it is incredible as a matter of law" ( Matter of Ryan W., 143 AD2d 435, 436; see Matter of Bryan C., 23 AD3d 052 [2005]).

" Finally, Detective Washington was allowed to testify that he placed the defendant in a lineup, brought the complainant into the 67th precinct and had her view it, and that following the lineup, he arrested the defendant. Taken together, under the unique circumstances of this one-witness identification case, this testimony impermissibly bolstered the complainant's prior testimony by providing official confirmation of her prior in-court identification of the defendant ( see People v. Samuels, 22 AD3d 507, 508; People v. Lee, 22 AD3d 602; People v. Milligan, 309 AD2d 950; see also People v. Bryan, 179 AD2d 667; cf. People v. Malloy, 11 AD3d 484). Contrary to the People's contention, any error was not harmless in this instance ( see People v. Fields, 309 AD2d 945). The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

The complainant testified that she identified the defendant at a lineup. The detective's testimony implicitly bolstered the complainant's testimony by providing official confirmation of the complainant's identification of the defendant ( see People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471; People v. Bacenet, 297 A.D.2d 817, 818; People v. Veal, 158 A.D.2d 633, 634; cf. People v. Holt, 67 N.Y.2d 819, 821; People v. Stanley, 185 A.D.2d 827, 828-829; People v. Bryan, 179 A.D.2d 667, 668). A violation of the rule against bolstering may not be overlooked except where the evidence of identity is so strong that there is no serious issue upon that point ( see People v. Bacenet, supra; People v. Veal, supra; cf. People v. Johnson, 57 N.Y.2d 969). Here, the evidence that the defendant committed the crime was not so overwhelming as to render the error harmless.

Thereafter the court permitted the arresting officer to testify that he sought out the defendant as a suspect in this crime when, "during the course of his investigation", he interviewed the complainant and "the name Richard Brown came up". These remarks served to inferentially bolster the People's case ( see, e.g., People v. Holt, 67 N.Y.2d 819; People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471; People v. Gordillo, 191 A.D.2d 455; People v. Bryan, 179 A.D.2d 667; People v. Vasquez, 120 A.D.2d 757). The prosecutor was further permitted to impermissibly strengthen his case by eliciting testimony from his two principal police witnesses that they had received awards for acts of "heroism" in the line of duty, such as for rescuing a dying baby, for saving the life of a disabled man suffering an epileptic seizure, and for sustaining broken ribs while arresting a murder suspect.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the complainant's admission, on cross-examination, that she had previously stated that she got a brief glimpse of the defendant does not diminish the explicit and consistent testimony at trial as to the circumstances of her encounter with him or her identification of him. The accuracy of an eyewitness's identification and the resolution of issues of credibility are primarily questions for the jury to assess and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record ( see, People v. Joyiens, 39 N.Y.2d 197, 203; People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94; People v. Bryan, 179 A.D.2d 667; People v. Parris, 167 A.D.2d 432). Moreover, the complainant's identification testimony was not undermined by a defense witness's purportedly conflicting description of the assailant, since that witness also testified she had seen the person she described walking away from the church at least one half hour before the complainant encountered the defendant in the church. Any possible error in permitting the prosecution to elicit testimony from witnesses which inferentially bolstered the complainant's identification testimony must be considered harmless in view of the complainant's strong and positive identification testimony ( see, People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471; People v. Johnson, 57 N.Y.2d 969; People v. White, 210 A.D.2d 271).

Moreover, issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence are primarily for the jury which saw and heard the witnesses ( see, People v Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). The jury's determination to credit the testimony of the complaining witness and to discredit the defendant's alibi defense is entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record ( see, People v. Bryan, 179 A.D.2d 667; People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15). Since Police Officer Samuel Horn did not testify about the complaining witness's identification of the defendant and, instead, only testified that he arrested the defendant after conducting an investigation, the defendant's claim of bolstering is without merit ( see, People v. Polidore, 181 A.D.2d 835, 837; People v. Poindexter, 138 A.D.2d 418, 419).

The evidence established that the defendant knowingly exercised dominion or control over the stolen vehicle as he was participating in the taking of the automobile when he was observed by the police officers (compare, People v Rivera, 82 N.Y.2d 695, 697; People v Katende, 198 A.D.2d 522, 523). Therefore, the evidence was legally sufficient to prove his guilt of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, although he was not driving the vehicle (see, People v Bryan, 179 A.D.2d 667, 668; People v Jenkins, 143 A.D.2d 846). The evidence was also legally sufficient to prove that the defendant, acting in concert with the driver, damaged and attempted to steal the automobile (see, Penal Law § 20.00). The People concede that the defendant was improperly sentenced to an indeterminate term of 1 1/2 to 3 years imprisonment for the conviction of attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree.

Showups that are conducted in close temporal and spatial proximity to the commission of the crime being investigated are generally permissible (see, People v Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541; People v Holley, 205 A.D.2d 638; People v Mitchell, 185 A.D.2d 249). Given the circumstances present in this case, we do not find that the identification procedure which was conducted while the defendant was handcuffed was constitutionally impermissible (see, People v Bitz, 209 A.D.2d 709; People v Grassia, 195 A.D.2d 607; People v Rowlett, 193 A.D.2d 768; People v Jenkins, 175 A.D.2d 648). Any error in permitting the prosecution to elicit testimony from one of the police officers which inferentially bolstered the testimony of a witness who saw the defendant on the subway tracks (see, People v Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471; see also, People v Holt, 67 N.Y.2d 819; People v Gordillo, 191 A.D.2d 455; People v Bryan, 179 A.D.2d 667; People v Vasquez, 120 A.D.2d 757) must be considered harmless in view of the strong and positive identification that was made within minutes after the crime (see, People v Colon, 188 A.D.2d 409; People v Burgess, 66 A.D.2d 667) and the other overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt (see, e.g., People v Gordillo, supra; People v Jones, 186 A.D.2d 585). The court's charge, when taken as a whole, properly conveyed the requirement that the defendant's identity must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Canty, 60 N.Y.2d 830; People v Vasquez, 176 A.D.2d 444). O'Brien, J.P., Santucci, Joy and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt is not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15). The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v Love, 57 N.Y.2d 1023, 1025) and, in any event, do not require reversal (see, People v Holt, 67 N.Y.2d 819; People v Gordillo, 191 A.D.2d 455; People v Bryan, 179 A.D.2d 667). Miller, J.P., Pizzuto, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.