People v. Browne

Full title: People of the State of New York v. Tiana Browne

Court: Supreme Court, Kings County

Date published: Oct 7, 2011

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 52077 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)

Opinion

9883/08

10-07-2011

People of the State of New York v. Tiana Browne

Charles Hynes, Esq. (Mark Hale, Esq., of counsel), for the People of the State of New York Douglas Rankin, Esq., for the Defendant

Wayne M. Ozzi

Charles Hynes, Esq. (Mark Hale, Esq., of counsel), for the People of the State of New York

Douglas Rankin, Esq., for the Defendant

Wayne M. Ozzi, J.

The defendant, Tiana Browne, was convicted upon a jury verdict of Murder in the Second Degree. Defendant has now moved this court for an order pursuant to C.P.L. §330.30(1) setting aside the jury's verdict and granting a new trial. The People oppose Defendant's motion in its entirety.

C.P.L. §330.30(1) authorizes a trial court to set aside a verdict only if a ground appears on the record which, if raised upon an appeal from a prospective judgment of conviction, "would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court." C.P.L. §330.30(1); see also People v. Ventura, 66 NY2d 693 (1985); People v. Carter, 63 NY2d 530 (1984). The Court of Appeals has stated that the power granted to a trial court pursuant to this section of the Criminal Procedure Law is "far more limited than that of an intermediate appellate court," which is authorized to determine questions of law and fact, to reverse or modify a judgment when the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, and to reverse as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice. People v. Carter, 63 NY2d at 536. A trial court may set aside a verdict pursuant to a C.P.L. §330.30 motion only if there exists on the record a clear error requiring reversal.

In the matter presently before the court, the defendant claims that the court erred at trial in declining to charge the jury with the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and Manslaughter in the First Degree based on an extreme emotional disturbance defense. Penal Law §125.20(2). In asserting an affirmative defense such as extreme emotional disturbance, the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the elements of the defense have been established. Penal Law §25.00(2); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 198 (1977); People v. White, 79 NY2d 900, 902-903 (1992). Pursuant to Penal Law §125.25(1)(a):

A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person;
except that...it is an affirmative defense that the defendant acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse.

To establish the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, the defendant must submit proof that she, at the time of the incident in question, suffered from a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity, which is typically manifested by a loss of self-control. People v. Roche, 98 NY2d 70, 75 (2002); People v. White, 79 NY2d 900 (1992); People v. Walker, 64 NY2d 741 (1984). However, not all mental infirmities warrant a charge of extreme emotional disturbance. Id., citing People v. Casassa, 49 NY2d 668 (1980).

The affirmative defense has two components: an objective element requiring sufficient proof that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance, and a subjective element which requires a defendant to proffer sufficient proof that her conduct was influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance at the time the crime was committed. People v. White, 79 NY2d at 902, citing People v. Moye, 66 NY2d 887, 889-890 (1985); Penal Law §125.25(1)(a). A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance only where the court determines that sufficient credible evidence has been presented for a jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that both elements of the defense have been established. People v. Casassa, 49 NY2d 668; see also People v. White, 79 NY2d at 902-903.

After considering the arguments in support of, and in opposition to, Defendant's application to set aside the verdict, the Court is of the opinion that there are no grounds appearing in the record which would require a reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction as a matter of law by an appellate court. The defendant did not present evidence at trial which would warrant a charge to the jury of Manslaughter in the First Degree based upon an affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and charging the affirmative defense would have invited the jury to impermissibly speculate as to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the stabbing. See People v. Walker, 64 NY2d 741 at 743; see also People v. White, 79 NY2d at 904. Neither Dr. Dudley, the defendant's expert, nor Dr. Bardey, testifying as an expert on behalf of the People, testified that the defendant exhibited a loss of self-control at the time of the incident in question.

At no point during Dr. Dudley's testimony did he testify that the defendant experienced a loss of control at the time of the commission of the crime. In fact, Dr. Dudley's opinion and testimony were limited to the notion that the defendant was unaware of her conduct or its wrongfulness, thus rendering her not responsible by mental disease or defect. Specifically, Dr. Dudley concluded, the defendant, at the time of the fatal stabbing, was in the midst of a dissociative episode, or flashback, which prevented the defendant from knowing what she was doing or that it was wrong. The defendant did not introduce any evidence, through Dr. Dudley's testimony or otherwise, that, at the time of the crime, the defendant was suffering from a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity.

The defendant argues that the People's expert testified that the defendant suffered from a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity and that the record contained proof of the subjective and objective elements of the extreme emotional disturbance affirmative defense. However, Dr. Bardey expressly stated in his testimony that while the defendant may have had Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in the past, "[i]n [his] opinion that was not at play on the day of the homicide." Although Dr. Bardey indicated in his testimony that he believed that the defendant was disturbed, he never conceded that she was suffering from a mental disease or infirmity at the time of the crime, nor did he testify that in his opinion the defendant experienced a loss of control at the time of the incident in question. Contrary to the defendant's argument, Dr. Bardey's testimony supports the People's contention that the defendant did not offer any evidence tending to prove the subjective element of the extreme emotional disturbance defense. Thus, the defendant has not offered sufficient proof from which the jury could reasonably conclude that she acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance. Consequently, a charge on this affirmative defense was not warranted.

Further, in People v. Roche, 98 NY2d at 76-77, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant's conduct immediately following the commission of the crime, which included contriving a false explanation for the victim's wounds and removing items from the apartment so they would not be discovered by the police, was inconsistent with the loss of self-control associated with an extreme emotional disturbance defense. Here, the evidence introduced at trial through lay-witness testimony revealed that the defendant, after stabbing Shannon Braithwaite, made a 911 call during which she claimed a man named Yussef, dressed in brown, forcibly entered the apartment and killed Ms. Braithwaite, a story which proved to be a complete fabrication. Further, after leaving the apartment, the defendant went to her boyfriend's house for several hours and told him a story similar to the one she told the 911 dispatcher regarding what occurred in the apartment.

Similar to the defendant's post-crime conduct in Roche, here, the defendant's conduct immediately following the commission of the crime is wholly inconsistent with the loss of self-control associated with the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The court therefore concludes that there was "no reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant's conduct actually was influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance." See People v. Murden, 593 N.Y.S.2d 83 (2nd Dep't 1993). Consequently, Defendant failed to establish her entitlement to a charge of Manslaughter in the First Degree under Penal Law §125.20(2) based on an extreme emotional disturbance defense.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, there are no grounds appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of law by an Appellate Court. C.P.L. §330.30(1). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's motion to set aside the verdict in this case is denied.

The above constitutes the decision and order of the court.

___________________________

HON. WAYNE M. OZZI, J.S.C.