Opinion
E043308
6-6-2008
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LEE DERRICK BROWN, Defendant and Respondent.
Rod Pacheco, District Attorney, and Alan D. Tate, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Diane Nichols, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Defendant was charged with three counts of making criminal threats. (Pen. Code, § 422.) Additionally, the People alleged defendant suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), which also qualified as a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). The People gave notice that defendants alleged criminal threats (§ 422) violated the terms of his probation in case No. INF045523. Defendant pled not guilty. The trial court appointed a doctor to evaluate defendants competency to stand trial. Over approximately three years, many hearings were held regarding defendants competency to stand trial and defendants placement while the proceedings were suspended. Eventually, after a motion by defendant, the trial court dismissed the charges. The People seek reversal of the order of dismissal because (1) the trial court did not state its reasons for dismissing the case; and (2) to the extent it can be determined the trial court dismissed the charges due to concluding defendant had completed a three-year commitment, the trial court abused its discretion, because time in confinement cannot be credited as commitment time. We reverse the order dismissing the charges, due to the trial court not providing reasons for its ruling.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 7, 2004, the district attorney filed the original complaint in the case, charging defendant with crimes occurring on or about January 31, 2004. On September 17, 2004, defendant waived time for trial and the court appointed a doctor to examine defendants competency to stand trial. On October 15, 2004, the court found defendant mentally incompetent to stand trial and suspended the pending criminal proceedings. (§ 1368.) Defendant was found to be incompetent due to a developmental disability. From October 2004 until October 2006, the trial court held multiple hearings concerning (1) defendants competency to stand trial; and (2) defendants placement while the criminal proceedings were suspended. During the course of the hearings, defendant was housed at Robert Presley Detention Center, Patton State Hospital, and Indio Jail. On October 20, 2006, the court ordered defendant be committed to the "State Dept. of Health, Transition Homes State Hospital," in Cathedral City, for a period not exceeding three years.
We do not provide the details of these hearings as they are not necessary for purposes of our discussion.
On February 23, 2007, defendants trial counsel made an oral motion to dismiss the charges. On March 16, 2007, the court held a hearing on defendants motion. Throughout the proceedings, starting in 2004, the trial court attempted to follow the procedures outlined in section 1370.1, which instructs courts on how to proceed with defendants who are developmentally disabled.
Two subsections of section 1370.1 are pertinent to the issue raised at the hearing on defendants motion to dismiss. First, section 1370.1, subdivision (c)(1)(A), provides that if a defendant has not become competent after three years from the date of commitment or "a period of commitment equal to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense charged in the information," then the defendant shall be returned to the committing court.
Second, section 1370.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i), provides that when a court is considering a recommendation for placement, the court shall order a mentally incompetent defendant be placed in a "state hospital or developmental center for the care and treatment of the developmentally disabled or any other available residential facility approved by the director of a regional center for the developmentally disabled."
At the hearing on the motion, defendants trial counsel argued that the charges should be dismissed because defendant had served his three-year maximum commitment time, as provided for in section 1370.1, subdivision (c)(1)(A). The district attorney disagreed, essentially arguing that defendant had not served his maximum commitment time because he had been in county jail for a majority of those three years, which did not qualify as a state hospital or developmental center for the care and treatment of the developmentally disabled, pursuant to section 1370.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i). The court was essentially faced with two questions: (1) whether or not defendant was "committed" when he was at jail, and if not, then (2) whether or not defendant could receive commitment credits for the time he served in jail. The court held that the charges would not be dismissed and ordered defendant be evaluated for conservatorship proceedings.
On March 29, 2007, the court noted that it received a report stating that it was "wrong" and that the county conservator would not be initiating proceedings. Defendants trial counsel argued the charges should be dismissed because (1) defendant had served his maximum commitment time; (2) defendants state and federal rights to equal protection were being violated; (3) defendants right to a speedy trial was being violated; and (4) defendants state and federal due process rights were being violated.
The district attorney argued that defendant was appropriately placed and that defendant should receive competency training, so that he will be able to stand trial. The district attorney argued that defendant could file a writ to "see if the court of appeals agrees . . . that [defendants] three years has run."
The court stated that if defendant were given competency training, then defendant would likely "decompensate" by the time the case reaches trial again and the parties would be "right back where [they] were." The court then granted defendants motion to dismiss, simply stating, "All right, motion to dismiss is granted." The court then commented, "Im just really worried that someones going to get hurt but—so maybe you can take it up and make some law."
The minute order from the March 29, 2007, hearing reflects the following: "Count(s) 1 2 3 dismissed in the interest of justice. (1385 PC) [¶] Court Orders Prior(s) 1 Stricken."
DISCUSSION
The People contend the trial court erred by not stating its reasons for dismissing the charges and not including its reasons in the courts minute order. Defendant concedes the minute order does not provide an adequate statement of reasons for the courts dismissal of the charges, but argues the matter should not be reversed on this point because it does not serve the interests of judicial economy to reverse on such a minor issue. We agree with the Peoples argument.
Our Supreme Court has held that when a court dismisses charges in the interests of justice (§ 1385) that "`[t]he reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes. [Citations.] `The statement of reasons is not merely directory, and neither trial nor appellate courts have authority to disregard the requirement. It is not enough that on review the reporters transcript may show the trial courts motivation; the minutes must reflect the reason "so that all may know why this great power was exercised." [Citation.]" (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 531.)
Neither the minute order nor the reporters transcript provides an indication as to the courts reasons for dismissing the charges. It is unclear if the court dismissed the charges because it found that it no longer had jurisdiction over the matter because defendant had served his maximum commitment time, or whether the court found defendant was correct that his state and federal constitutional rights were being violated, or whether the decision was due to other reasons. Accordingly, the order dismissing the charges must be reversed.
Defendant urges us to follow the reasoning of Bonnetta and review the trial courts ruling for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Bonnetta (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1334 (Bonnetta), review granted Mar. 12, 2008, S159133.) Defendant argues that in Bonnetta the appellate court questioned whether it was logical to follow the rule in Romero, which requires reversal if the trial court did not include its reasons for dismissal in the minute order because the rule demands such strict compliance. (Bonnetta, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334.) We note that although the Bonnetta court determined the rule in Romero is "ripe for reexamination," it nonetheless concluded that it must follow the binding precedent of Romero. (Bonnetta, at pp. 1334-1336.) Accordingly, we find defendants argument unpersuasive because the court in Bonnetta did not follow the reasoning defendant is urging us to follow. Moreover, if we were to follow the reasoning of Bonnetta and disregard the authority of Romero, we would not be able to review the trial courts decision for an abuse of discretion because the reporters transcript does not reveal any reasons for the courts decision. (See Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530 [A decision to dismiss charges in the interest of justice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion].)
DISPOSITION
The order dismissing the charges and allegations is reversed. The trial court is directed to determine if the charges and allegations should be dismissed. If the trial court dismisses the charges and allegations, then the trial court is directed to state the reasons for its decision and include those reasons in the courts minute order.
We concur:
Gaut, J.
King, J.