Opinion
A160618
01-24-2022
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NAPOLEON BROWN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. SCN183729
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1, reciting only those facts necessary to resolve the issues raised.
TUCHER, P.J.
Napoleon Brown filed this appeal from an order denying his petition for resentencing. (Pen. Code § 1170.95; statutory references are to this code.) The trial court denied the petition on the ground that Brown does not qualify for relief under section 1170.95 because his homicide conviction was for manslaughter rather than murder. During the pendency of this appeal, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), which amends section 1170.95 to expressly authorize a person convicted of manslaughter to file a petition for resentencing. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) Brown contends the order denying his petition must be reversed so the trial court can consider his petition in light of the newly amended statute. (See 1 e.g. People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1006.) Agreeing, we reverse and remand.
Brown's homicide conviction arises out of a 2001 incident during which two robbery suspects fled from police and a woman died after she fell or was pushed out of the suspects' car. A jury convicted Brown of murder, robbery, and carjacking, but the trial court subsequently granted a new trial as to the murder charge on the ground that Brown was denied effective assistance of counsel. On the remaining counts, Brown was sentenced to an aggregate term of 44 years and 4 months in prison. In 2009, the judgment and order granting Brown a new trial were affirmed on appeal. (See People v. Brown (July 21, 2009, A113670, A113671, A123374) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2011, Brown then pleaded no contest to an amended charge of involuntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (b)), and the trial court sentenced Brown to a two-year prison term to run concurrently with the sentences imposed for Brown's related convictions.
The present appeal relates to Brown's 2019 petition to vacate his manslaughter conviction and for resentencing under section 1170.95. Opposing the petition, the People argued that section 1170.95 does not apply to a conviction for manslaughter or, alternatively, Brown is ineligible for resentencing because he was convicted as an actual killer. At an initial hearing, the trial court rejected the People's claim that section 1170.95 does not apply to manslaughter convictions. Subsequently, the court reversed its ruling and denied Brown's petition on the ground that Brown could not allege a prima facie case for relief because he had entered a plea to a charge of involuntary manslaughter, which is not a murder offense. Brown filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 10, 2020. This timely appeal followed. 2
The only issue before us on appeal is whether the trial court erred by finding Brown categorically ineligible for resentencing. The People's respondent's brief, filed in July 2021, seeks affirmance of the order denying Brown's petition on the sole ground that section 1170.95 does not apply to a person convicted of involuntary manslaughter.
In October 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill 775, which amended section 1170.95. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) Pertinent here, section 1170.95, subdivision (a) was amended explicitly to authorize a petition for resentencing of convictions for manslaughter when specified conditions are met. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
Shortly before amended section 1170.95 went into effect on January 1, 2022, the parties submitted supplemental briefing regarding the impact of Senate Bill 775 on Brown's appeal. Brown argued he was entitled to the immediate benefit of the amended statute, which establishes that the trial court erred by finding him categorically ineligible for resentencing. On December 13, 2021, the People filed a letter conceding that Brown would "certainly" have a remedy under the amended statute, but arguing there was no basis for reversing the trial court's ruling because the amendments had not gone into effect. The People cited no authority for taking this position.
"New legislation generally applies to all judgments which are not final as of the effective date of the new statute. [Citations.] Where it is unlikely that a judgment will be final by the effective date of new legislation, courts have remanded matters to the trial courts so that the new statute can be applied after its effective date." (People v. Montes, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006; see also People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 973.) This procedure promotes "judicial economy and efficiency" (Montes, at p. 1006), and it seems especially appropriate in a case such as this one, where an 3 amendment eliminates the only ground provided by the trial court for summarily denying Brown's resentencing petition.
In any event, statutory amendments to section 1170.95 have now gone into effect. The People do not dispute that these amendments apply to the non-final order we review here. (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305-306 ["a defendant generally is entitled to benefit from amendments that become effective while his case is on appeal"]; People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 789, fn. 5 [a judgment is not final until the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has passed].) Under the amended statute, a defendant convicted of manslaughter may be eligible for resentencing. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) Thus, the only ground provided by the trial court for denying Brown's petition is invalid.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Brown's petition for resentencing is reversed. The matter is remanded for the trial court to consider whether Brown has established a prima facie case for relief, and to conduct such further proceedings as may be required.
WE CONCUR: FUJISAKI, J., PETROU, J. 4