Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIF127594. Eric G. Helgesen, Judge. (Retired judge of the former Tulare Mun. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
RICHLI, J.
A jury found defendant and appellant Edwin Cornelius Brown guilty of felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and felon in possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found true that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) The trial court subsequently struck the prior strike for the purpose of sentencing. (§ 1385.) Defendant was placed on three years’ formal probation on various terms and conditions, including serving 365 days in county jail. Defendant appeals from the judgment.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2005, around 1:15 p.m., officers and detectives from the Riverside Police Department, along with a special agent from the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearm Agency (ATF) conducted a traffic stop of a sports utility vehicle near Fairmont Park in Riverside. The front driver’s side window of the vehicle was tinted in violation of the Vehicle Code.
The officers were conducting a surveillance investigation of defendant and his male passenger based on information the officers received from a confidential reliable informant (CRI). An ATF special agent had set up a narcotics transaction between the CRI and two Black males involving the exchange of cocaine base for guns. Defendant and his companion matched the description of the men the CRI was communicating with, the description of the vehicle the men were driving, and the location of the purported transaction between the CRI and the men.
The officers made contact with the driver, defendant, and asked him to step out of the vehicle. The officers thereafter searched the vehicle and found in the rear of the vehicle a loaded “.25 caliber pistol” with a “magazine inserted [and] ammunition inside the magazine.” The gun was “hanging on a piece of metal that was in the back trunk area.” A briefcase containing mail addressed to defendant was also found.
Prior to trial, defendant’s two separate suppression motions were denied. The court found the officers had probable cause to stop and search the vehicle.
After defendant waived his constitutional rights, he initially denied any knowledge that the gun was in the vehicle. He, however, later informed the officers that the gun belonged to his wife (later identified as his girlfriend) and that he had recently “handled the gun.” Defendant also admitted to the officers that he had been convicted of a felony and that he knew he was prohibited from possessing firearms and ammunition.
No useable fingerprints were recovered from the gun. In court, defendant again admitted that he had previously been convicted of a felony.
Defendant’s girlfriend testified on behalf of the defense. She claimed that she owned the vehicle driven by defendant and that she had legally tinted the windows on the car at a tinting company. She further stated that she and defendant were in the process of moving, and that a gun (owned by her deceased husband) was in the vehicle. She explained that the gun was in a box in her vehicle because she was moving things in and out of storage. She did not see a gun hanging in the vehicle, and she did not tell defendant there was a gun in her vehicle.
II
DISCUSSION
Defendant appealed and, upon his request, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493], setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues, and requesting this court undertake a review of the entire record.
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, but he has not done so. Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have independently reviewed the record for potential error.
The record shows that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence on May 25, 2007, and July 25, 2008. (See, e.g., United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 809 [102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572].)
Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence to show that defendant knew the gun and ammunition were in the vehicle. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318 [99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560] [standard of review for sufficiency of evidence claims]; People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138 [same]; People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206 [same]; People v. Pena (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083-1084 [possession may be physical or constructive, and more than one person may possess the object in question]; People v. Neese (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 235, 245-247 [actual possession is when the weapon is in immediate possession or control; constructive possession is when the weapon is under dominion and control, either directly or through others; exclusive possession of the weapon is not required]; People v. White (1969) 71 Cal.2d 80, 83 [elements of possession may be established by circumstantial evidence as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence].)
Defendant admitted knowledge of the gun and handling it. Defendant’s evidence to the contrary was a credibility issue for the jury to resolve. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [in deciding whether substantial evidence supports the decision of the trial court, we do not resolve issues of credibility or evidentiary conflicts]; People v. Martinez (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1331 [resolution of conflicting evidence and credibility issues are for a jury to decide].)
We have completed our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J.MILLER J.