Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. CH41523
Marchiano, P.J.
A jury convicted defendant Chester Brown of two counts of first degree residential burglary and three counts of receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 496, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to seven years four months in state prison. Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support one of the burglary convictions, count 6, because he did not take any property from the garage and did not intend to take anything when he entered. We disagree because a lack of desirable ill-gotten gains does not equate with a lack of intent to steal. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. FACTS
Under applicable standards of appellate review, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment of conviction, and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact which the jury could reasonably find from the evidence. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303; People v. Neufer (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 244, 247.)
The charged offenses arose from a series of home intrusions and vehicle entries committed by defendant in the same Pleasanton neighborhood early in the morning of March 18, 2006. We take judicial notice that March 18, 2006 was a Saturday.
Count 6 – Burglary of the Martell Home
The Martells lived on a cul-de-sac at 9188 Longview Drive. Their house is at the end of a steep, 100-yard driveway. Mrs. Martell testified that the family kept a chainsaw, gardening equipment, bicycles, skateboards, a generator, a trunk, and Mr. Martell’s search-and-rescue equipment in their garage. The garage door was probably left open.
Julie Bishop was the Martells’ next door neighbor, and lived at 9146 Longview Drive. At approximately 6:45 a.m. on March 18, just after daylight, Bishop heard a car drive up the Martell’s driveway and heard dogs barking. Looking out her bedroom window, which was about 40 feet from the Martells’ garage, Bishop saw a person get out of an older model silver or grey Buick parked in the Martell’s driveway. The person was wearing a long black jacket with a hood.
The person entered the Martells’ garage. After about five minutes in the garage, the person emerged, walked over to a pickup truck parked in the driveway, and looked in the window. Bishop could now see that the person was a black male. Bishop did not see the man take anything from the garage. The man got back into his car, backed down the driveway, and drove onto Longview Drive.
Bishop could not identify defendant in court as the burglar, but did testify that defendant was a stranger to her. Mrs. Martell testified she had not noticed that anything was missing from the garage. Mrs. Martell testified that defendant was a stranger to her also.
Count 1 — Burglary of the Cameron Home
Bishop continued to watch the Buick as it drove onto Longview drive and briefly stopped in front of her house. She saw the Buick enter the driveway of her next door neighbor, Clay Cameron, who lived at 9104 Longview Drive. The Buick backed into the Cameron driveway so that its front was pointed downhill.
Bishop called Clay Cameron at 6:55 a.m. Cameron was awakened by the call, but did not get to the phone in time to pick it up. He went into his third floor bathroom and heard someone in the second floor hallway. Cameron lived on the third floor. The first and second floors of the Cameron home were a bed and breakfast. There were no guests at the time, but the main entrance was not locked.
Cameron called out, “Who’s there?” A male replied, “I’m looking for somebody in the old folks’ home.” Cameron told him to “get out.” The man said he’d made a mistake and Cameron heard footsteps in the second floor hallway.
Cameron went to the window, looked down, and saw defendant standing in front of the garage door. Defendant was wearing a dark, full-length leather jacket. It was daylight and Cameron had a clear view of defendant. Cameron positively identified defendant in court. Defendant was a stranger to Cameron.
Defendant drove off. The Bishops called the police and reported the burglary. They gave the police a description of defendant, his clothing, and his car, as well as the car’s license number.
Pleasanton Police Officer Mike Murazzo responded to the Bishops’ call, and stopped defendant’s Buick at 7:05 a.m. on Longview Drive near the intersection with Foothill Drive. Murazzo positively identified defendant in court. When he was stopped, defendant was wearing a long black leather jacket with a pair of scissors protruding from a pocket. Defendant’s pockets also contained vice-grip pliers and two screwdrivers. On the front seat of defendant’s car were “ninja rocks,” broken pieces of spark plug porcelain used by auto burglars to break car windows with a minimum amount of noise.
Officer Murazzo found two wallets under the front seat. One contained identification for Richard Heidebrecht. Elsewhere in the passenger compartment, Murazzo found three cell phones, a watch, a bag of coins, a money clip, and jewelry. Murazzo found a briefcase containing a laptop computer in the trunk.
Cameron was brought to the scene and made an in-field identification of defendant as the man he saw standing in front of his garage. Cameron eventually recognized the watch found in defendant’s car as an old Bulova Accutron his father gave him, which he had kept in a desk drawer in his second floor office.
Count 4 — Receiving Stolen Property of Emmons
John Emmons lived at 9044 Longview Drive. He left his Jeep Cherokee unlocked in his driveway on the night of March 17, 2006. Around 6:30 a.m. on March 18, one of his dogs started barking. Emmons looked out a window, but saw no one because it was still dark. He left at approximately 7:00 or 7:30 a.m. to play in a golf tournament. He drove past the site where the police had stopped defendant’s car. When he arrived at the golf course, he discovered that his cell phone was missing. He drove back to the site of defendant’s stopped Buick and identified one of the cell phones found in the car as his. He also identified the money clip as similar to one he kept in his car that had gone missing. Defendant was a stranger to Emmons.
Count 5 — Receiving Stolen Property of Gragg
Charles Gragg lived at 5029 Forest Hill Drive, which was accessible from Foothill Drive and close to the Longview neighborhood. He left his locked GMC Yukon in his driveway on the night of March 17, 2006. Early the next morning, around 5:00 a.m., he heard his dog barking. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Gragg’s daughter discovered that a window of the Yukon had been shattered. Gragg’s briefcase and laptop were missing, but were later returned to him by the Pleasanton police. Defendant admits that Gragg’s briefcase and laptop were recovered from the trunk of his car. Defendant was a stranger to Gragg.
Count 3 — Receiving Stolen Property of Heidebrecht
Richard Heidebrecht lived at 640 Happy Valley Road, also accessible from Foothill Drive. He parked his unlocked GMC Denali in front of his garage on the night of March 17, 2006. He left his wallet on the central console. At approximately 7:30 a.m. on March 18, the police called him and asked if his wallet was missing. The wallet was indeed missing from the Denali but, as we noted above, had been found in defendant’s Buick. Defendant was a stranger to Heidebrecht.
Defendant was charged with the first degree burglary of the Cameron home (count 1); the second degree burglary of Gragg’s Yukon (count 2); receiving stolen property belonging to Heidebrecht (count 3), Emmons (count 4), and Gragg (count 5); and the first degree burglary of the Martell home (count 6). Defendant did not present a defense. The jury acquitted defendant on count 2, but convicted him on the remaining five counts.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction on count 6. He admits that he entered the Martell garage, but claims he lacked intent to steal anything because he did not take any property from the garage. As we noted at the outset, the failure to find suitable loot after entering a structure does not necessarily negate an intent to steal formed on entry.
The standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is well known. (See People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432.) The sole function of the appellate court is to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, presume in support of the judgment every fact that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence, and “determine . . . whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.; see People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) The evidence must be “reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
Defendant’s intent to steal when he entered the Martell garage was readily inferred by the jury from the facts and the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence. (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 47; see People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1130.) During a brief period of time, early on a Saturday morning, when most people would still be asleep, defendant entered two homes and three vehicles, stealing property from all but the Martell home. His intent to steal from the Martell home can be inferred from the pattern of events, i.e., his near contemporaneous entries into nearby homes and vehicles for the purpose of taking property. The recent commission of a similar crime is circumstantial evidence of intent to steal. (See People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 128.)
Defendant was a stranger to the neighborhood and had no apparent lawful business there. He went from house to house stealing jewelry, wallets, cell phones, and a laptop computer—all items easily carried and converted to cash. He presumably took nothing from the Martells because he found no items that fit his requirements. We do not know why he did not take anything from the Martell garage, but he was a thief on a mission that morning. His loot included small items, including a briefcase, and perhaps defendant felt the Martell target did not include any items that he was after.
It strains credulity to suppose that defendant failed to form an intent to steal from the Martell home when he was engaged in a pattern of entries into the homes and cars of the Martells’ neighbors to take property before and after the Martell entry. We doubt that after taking property from the Emmons, Gragg, and Heidebrecht vehicles, defendant was stricken by a brief period of honesty when he walked into the Martells’ open garage, shook it off, and then reverted to burglarious intent only minutes later as he entered the Cameron home and stole a watch. A jury with strong circumstantial evidence found to the contrary.
There is sufficient evidence to support the conviction on count 6.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Stein, J., Margulies, J.