Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. CM024408, SCR52933
BUTZ, J.
Defendant Roy Donny Brown pleaded no contest to felony resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69) in case No. CM024408, and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)) in case No. SCR52933. The trial court suspended sentence and imposed three years of formal probation in both cases.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant was subsequently charged with violating his probation, but the trial court judged defendant incompetent to stand trial. Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court’s finding of incompetence and the order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication are not supported by substantial evidence. We shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In case No. SCR52933, one of defendant’s neighbors saw him throw a rock through the front passenger window of a car. According to the witness, defendant had been behaving “irrationally” that day.
In case No. CM024408, an officer attempted to contact defendant in response to a complaint that he had cut the telephone and cable television lines of one of his neighbors. After initially refusing to talk to the officer, defendant denied cutting the lines, claiming his neighbors blamed him for everything that “goes wrong.”
Later that day, another police officer went to defendant’s apartment complex after receiving a report that defendant was trying to attack a woman with his pit bull. Defendant had thrown alcohol on the woman’s car, verbally abused her, and told his dog to attack her, but neighbors distracted defendant and pulled the dog away.
When the officer arrived, defendant was on the sidewalk with his unleashed dog. Upon seeing the officer, defendant ran to his apartment, “frantically” unlocking his door. The officer reached the door simultaneously with defendant and struggled to keep it open. During the struggle, defendant yelled profanities and repeatedly said, “Go away, pig.” He then yelled, “I have a gun and I’m going to put a bullet in your head, pig.”
A second officer was able to coax defendant out of his apartment, but defendant was arrested after he tried to go back into the apartment. Defendant was subsequently interviewed at the Butte County Probation Department, where he admitted not taking his medication for his mental health issues for several days and that he was “51/50” (sic) when arrested.
Presumably, this was a reference to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, which allows for a 72-hour involuntary commitment for those determined to be dangerous to themselves or others.
Defendant was charged with violating his probation after not reporting an arrest for public intoxication to his probation officer.
The trial court held a hearing to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial on the probation violation after defense counsel expressed doubts about his client’s competency. The court referred the matter to a psychologist, Paul R. Wuehler, Ph.D., who evaluated defendant and prepared a report for the court.
Dr. Wuehler relied on an interview with defendant, the charge sheet and the police reports. The report diagnosed defendant as having “Schizoaffective Disorder, Depressive Type” and “Tourette’s Disorder.” According to Dr. Wuehler, at “one point during the interview [defendant] suddenly put his hand over his mouth and began a grunting noise. This lasted for about 40 seconds, where after [sic] [defendant] stated: ‘That was my Tourette’s.” Dr. Wuehler found this behavior consistent with Tourette’s Syndrome.
Dr. Wuehler’s report identified problems with defendant’s thought and cognitive process. Defendant showed “significant mental disorder.” He “had a difficult time remaining on track with examination questions. He exhibited flight of ideas and loose associations. He did not exhibit the ability to remain on track with the legal process.”
The report also found problems with defendant’s affective processes. He showed “a very unstable affective response pattern during this interview.” Defendant “[a]ppeared to be anxious, then depressive, then comfortable. The patterns repeated [themselves] several times during the interview.”
Dr. Wuehler noted that defendant “admitted to previous hallucinations” but “denied current hallucinatory process.” However, defendant’s “manner of denial caused [Dr. Wuehler] to wonder if [defendant] was being truthful.” Defendant displayed “[p]oor control over his thought processes” and had a “[v]ery poor present ability to make reasoned decisions regarding his case.”
With respect to defendant’s ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him, “defendant appeared to have some basic understanding of the reason he is in jail.” While knowing he was in jail for violating probation, defendant “appeared to either not be aware of or choosing to ignore other charges and problems that he has or has had with the law.” Defendant thus “did not appear to be clear about, nor able to be clear about, his present legal situation.”
As to his ability to assist his defense, defendant knew his attorney’s last name, but told Dr. Wuehler “‘I got mental health issues . . . there’s a lot of things . . . I got . . . I didn’t do anything wrong this time.’” He did not believe he had done anything wrong and thought it was wrong for his counsel to have him see the psychological examiner. Defendant thought he was competent and tried to convince Dr. Wuehler of his competency.
Dr. Wuehler’s report opined that, “defendant, as the result of a present mental disorder, is presently unable to understand the nature and purposes of the proceedings taken against him,” and was “presently unable to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.”
Counsel submitted the issue on Dr. Wuehler’s report and the court found defendant was not competent to stand trial and committed him to a state hospital. Defendant appeals from the August 29, 2006 order of commitment (§ 1370). (People v. Fields (1965) 62 Cal.2d 538, 540-541 [commitment order appealable].)
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant contends the trial court’s finding of incompetence to stand trial is not supported by substantial evidence. He argues the only evidence supporting the court’s decision was Dr. Wuehler’s report, which “drew the required conclusions, but failed to provide evidence to support them.” We disagree.
Defendant was subsequently adjudged competent to stand trial during the pendency of this appeal. The Attorney General moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. We denied the motion on March 27, 2007, on the ground that dismissing the appeal would thwart defendant’s chance to clear his name from the stigma of being wrongly found to be incompetent. (See People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 345.)
Section 1367, subdivision (a) provides that “[a] person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while that person is mentally incompetent.” A defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial “if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (Ibid.)
“It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent.” (§ 1369, subd. (f).) On appeal, we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the trial court’s finding on the issue of competence. (See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 811.)
An unsupported conclusion by an expert cannot support the trial court’s finding. “‘Expert evidence is really an argument of an expert to the court, and is valuable only in regard to the proof of the facts and the validity of the reasons advanced for the conclusions.’” (People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 141.)
Dr. Wuehler’s conclusions are supported by a sufficient foundation in fact. He based his report on an interview with defendant and an examination of the police reports and charging documents. As we have already noted, Dr. Wuehler’s report is full of observations drawn from his interview with defendant. These observations provide ample support for his finding that defendant was incompetent to stand trial.
The report paints a picture of defendant with diagnosed mental illnesses which significantly impair his understanding of the legal proceedings against him, his ability to organize his thoughts, and to communicate coherently. This is consistent with Dr. Wuehler’s conclusions that defendant neither understood the nature and consequences of the proceedings nor could he assist counsel with his defense in a rational manner.
Rather than making unsupported conclusions about defendant’s competency, Dr. Wuehler supported his diagnosis with sufficiently detailed observations. His report and the conclusions contained therein provide substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling that defendant was incompetent to stand trial.
II
Defendant also contends the trial court ordered his forced medication with antipsychotic drugs without the appropriate factual basis. While the trial court initially ordered defendant’s involuntary medication, the court reversed the ruling at defendant’s placement hearing, rendering defendant’s contention moot.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (commitment order of August 29, 2006) is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS, Acting P. J., HULL, J.